Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1985

Book Reviews

Dale R. Herspring
George G. Weickhardt
Jill A. Friedman



North Korean Foreign Policy

Young C. Kim

South Asia After Afghanistan

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Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia

H. Gordon Skilling

Ceauşescu's Socialism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

Notes & Views

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

North Korean Foreign Policy
Young C. Kim

Despite an early dependence on the Soviet Union and China, North Korea has evolved a relatively independent foreign policy, siding with one or the other of its communist neighbors on specific issues but aligning with neither. Pyongyang has also shown a keen interest in gaining access to Western technology and capital, in particular in its dealings with Japan and other developed states. At present, however, the overriding concern of North Korea's foreign policy is the withdrawal of US troops from the South and the reunification of the Korean peninsula.

South Asia After Afghanistan
Stephen P. Cohen

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 has had an unsettling effect on the politics of South Asia. The move, taken without consultation with treaty partner India, only served to expand American economic and military assistance to Pakistan and raise the possibility of a US-Pakistani-Chinese condominium, thereby indirectly heightening the degree of insecurity in New Delhi. Although Indian dependence on the Soviet Union, primarily for arms, has grown since 1979, it appears unlikely that India and the Soviet Union would join in some venture to dismantle Pakistan.

Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia
H. Gordon Skilling

Although popular disaffection with regime policies in Czechoslovakia has not expressed itself in mass protests, it can be seen in an upsurge in religiosity, a revival of an independent youth culture, as well as the continued activities of Charter 77 and similar groups. These trends have helped foster independent scholarly and cultural expression frequently at variance with what is officially condoned. A recent and more political divergence between regime and society has occurred over the stationing of missiles in Czechoslovakia and the peace issue generally.

Ceauşescu's Socialism
Vladimir Tismaneanu

Ceauşescu's brand of socialism sets Romania apart from the other Soviet satellites both in its domestic and foreign policies. The country's public life is dominated by the President's personality cult, while its ideology and international behavior have expressed a large degree of independence from Moscow. The roots of Romania's uniqueness can be found in the evolution of the Romanian Communist Party as well as in Ceauşescu's personality and career.

* * *

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Notes & Views

Doublethink in the USSR

James P. Scanlan

In Soviet society, certain aspects of the concept of "doublethink" introduced by George Orwell in his novel *1984* are used in different ways. Those who would defy the totality of control that Moscow would impose use doublethink to frustrate the purposes of the authorities, while the state finds itself incapable of putting its own ideological straitjacket on a rich and diverse culture.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Technology and the Soviet System

Dale R. Herspring

High technology has had a pervasive impact on all segments of Soviet society, including the military. It also has major implications for East-West relations and especially the arms race. The problem for the West, in devising policies on technology transfer to the East, is how to balance security considerations with the possible impact of such transfers on both the domestic and foreign postures of the Soviet Union.

Ustinov versus Ogarkov

George G. Weickhardt

The September 1984 demotion of Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov may well mark the culmination of an important strategic debate in the Soviet military that had pitted the Chief of the General Staff against the Minister of Defense, Dmitriy Ustinov. Ogarkov seems to have been the lead man among advocates of a nuclear offensive capability for the Soviet Union. Ustinov, whose views would appear to have triumphed, reflects the Brezhnevite acceptance of the concept of mutual deterrence. Such a view does not preclude efforts by the USSR to draw political benefits from its growing military might.

Policy Succession in China

Jill A. Friedman

The passing of Mao Zedong has forced China watchers to study an entire array of less familiar successor personalities and policies. Since China's current reform effort entails a systemic transformation in such sectors as agriculture, the analysis of the new policies is of more immediate interest than that dealing with personalities. While most scholars focus on the prospects of China's reforms, some remain more interested in reconciling themselves with their disillusionment regarding Mao's revolution.

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North Korean Foreign Policy

Young C. Kim

Geopolitically, the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea occupies a unique position in Northeast Asia. To the north and west is the People's Republic of China (PRC); to the south and east, the Republic of (South) Korea and Japan. At the tip of its extreme northeastern border is the Soviet Union. Since its inception in August 1945, when the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a temporary division of the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel,[1] North Korea has been a focus of considerable attention in the region. In September 1948, it proclaimed its sovereignty and claimed authority over the entire peninsula (as did the South a month earlier). In June 1950, the North invaded the South, easily routing and outmaneuvering the poorly trained and ill-equipped South Korean forces.[2] The North's early victories precipitated an immediate American commitment of troops, which in turn precipitated the intervention of Chinese "volunteers" four months later. The subsequent stalemate lasted some three years and involved all the major actors in the region in some capacity.

Despite its early dependence on the Soviet Union and China, over the next several decades the North, under the leadership of Kim Il-song, evolved a relatively independent foreign policy. Key to this independence has been Kim's extraordinary ability to manipulate his country's posture of "equidistance," siding with one or the other of its communist neighbors on particular issues but aligning with neither.[3] Such fluctuations, moreover, are neither haphazard nor unfocused. On the contrary, under Kim's leadership, North Korea has consistently pursued a policy designed to secure its borders against attack from hostile nations; avoid a direct confrontation with either the Soviet Union or China; isolate South Korea from the international community; strive for economic self-sufficiency; force a withdrawal of American troops from the South; and reunify the Korean peninsula.[4] That some of these objectives seem contradictory or unattainable only attests to Kim's versatility and determination.

Recent events on the Korean peninsula underscore the unique nature of the relationship between North and South Korea and how this relationship affects other nations in the region. On August 20, 1984,

[1]For a concise discussion of the political maneuvering leading up to the division of the country, see Chong-Sik Lee, "Historical Setting," in *North Korea: A Country Study*, 3rd Ed., ed. by Frederica M. Bunge, Washington, DC, The American University, 1981, pp. 17–24.

[2]Ibid., pp. 18–23.

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[3]After initially relying heavily on Soviet assistance in the building of the communist party in the North, North Korea steadily drew closer to China as Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech and call for peaceful coexistence triggered a sharp decline in Soviet–North Korean relations, culminating in a complete cutoff of Soviet aid in 1963. Relations improved slightly after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, remaining cool but "correct." The North's relations with China chilled during the Cultural Revolution. For several years, Kim stayed aloof from both the USSR and China, only warming up to China once Zhou Enlai apologized in 1969 for China's earlier transgressions. The North also strongly condemned Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, which angered the Soviets, and initially refused to endorse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For a discussion of North Korea's differing policy stances during the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Robert A. Scalapino, "China and Northeast Asia," in Richard H. Solomon, Ed., *The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1981, pp. 183–94. See also Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984, pp. 204–10.

[4]See Scalapino, loc. cit.; and Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Government and Politics," in *North Korea: A Country Study*, pp. 193–206.

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South Korean officials offered to extend economic and technical assistance to the North; six weeks later, amid great fanfare and after a historic meeting in the truce village of Panmunjom, the North delivered 725 truckloads of relief goods to flood-ravaged areas in the South. During the next month and a half, the two sides agreed to set up a telephone hotline, discussed exchanges in trade and economic cooperation for the first time, and convened a meeting to discuss the question of separated families.[5] But this goodwill was short-lived. On Friday, November 23, a 22-year old Soviet Korean-language student sprinted across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into South Korean territory touching off an intense 10-minute fire fight between border guards on each side. By the time a cease-fire had been arranged a half-hour later, four soldiers had been killed and six wounded, including one American.[6] After an angry exchange between North and South officials the following day at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, created in 1953 to serve as a forum for airing grievances on truce violations, the North temporarily suspended economic talks with the South.

The November 23 border incident merely confirmed what regional leaders feared most—that "peace" on the Korean peninsula is highly volatile and precarious. Indeed, the "Korean problem" has figured prominently on the agenda of numerous high-level summit meetings that have taken place in the past several years among the major actors in the region. North Korea's Kim Il-song visited both Moscow and Beijing; China's Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang went to Pyongyang; Japan's Nakasone Yasuhiro traveled to Beijing, Seoul, and Washington; and US President Ronald Reagan exchanged visits with Zhao Ziyang and South Korea's Chun Doo Hwan. In late November 1984, immediately following Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa's visit to North Korea, Kim again traveled to Beijing to confer with Deng and Hu. Such heightened diplomatic activity attests to the significance that the Korean question holds for the peace and security of East Asia, as well as of the rest of the world.

This essay is primarily concerned with selected aspects of the foreign policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in particular that country's recent dealings with the Soviet Union, China, Japan, the United States, and South Korea. I shall attempt to analyze the major policy objectives and motivations underlying the North's current policy, taking into account the key factors that shape the DPRK's relations with each of these countries. While this is not intended to be a comprehensive survey, several important themes will receive considerable attention, most notably the North's efforts to safeguard its national security, maintain a high degree of independence from China and the Soviet Union, bring about the withdrawal of US troops from the South, and reunify the Korean peninsula.

Securing Soviet Support

From the North Korean perspective, objectively the Soviet Union is perhaps the DPRK's most crucial ally. It provides a protective shield that ensures the North's security, serving as both a countervailing force against any combination of hostile powers and an effective deterrent against any military actions by the United States and South Korea. The Soviet Union is also the only country that can satisfy North Korea's need for sophisticated advanced weaponry. Moreover, among socialist nations the Soviet Union is most capable of providing the North with substantial economic and technological assistance. The much-touted principle of *Juche* (self-reliance) notwithstanding, the North has consistently sought Soviet cooperation in these respects. However, both the quantity and quality of Soviet provisions to North Korea have fallen seriously short of North Korean expectations, especially in the military sphere. An often cited example of this is the Soviets' reluctance to supply the North with MiG-23's, at least until recently.[7]

In the field of diplomacy, too, Soviet power and international influence are extremely valuable for North Korean foreign policy undertakings, particularly those concerning South Korea. For one thing, the Soviet Union has played a crucial role in mobilizing the support of other socialist and nonaligned Third World countries to buttress the DPRK's irredentist claims. For another, although the North Koreans have at times shown considerable distrust of the Soviet Union, occasionally labeling Soviet actions as signs of "dominationism," they are also aware that cordial relations with the Soviets afford them significant leverage vis-à-vis China, Japan, and the United States. In particular, good relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union inevitably make China more sensitive to the needs and interests of the North.

[5]For a concise summary of recent developments in North and South Korean interaction, see "Key Events in Korean Relations," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Nov. 20, 1984.

[6]See "U.S. and North Korea Trade Charges on DMZ Clash," *The New York Times*, Nov. 25, 1984.

[7]See Paul Ensor, "Pyongyang's Military: A State of Perpetual Alert," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Feb. 2, 1984, pp. 26–27.

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

North Korean and South Korean Red Cross officials meet at Panmunjom on November 20, 1984, to discuss family reunification; on November 23, a North Korean border guard scrambles for cover with a wounded comrade during a skirmish that broke out in the Demilitarized Zone in the course of a Soviet citizen's escape to South Korea.

—UPI.

But the North has experienced setbacks in its diplomatic maneuvering with the Soviet Union, most notably in its efforts to block Soviet–South Korean interaction. Indeed, the North has been extraordinarily sensitive to any signs of improved relations between these two states. Northern leaders recognize that any Soviet deviation from the North Korean policy line would seriously undermine the level of support socialist and nonaligned countries give to the North, perhaps even resulting in a shift in their policy toward the Korean peninsula. The North's fears are not entirely unwarranted. Since the early 1970's, despite North Korean protests, the Soviets have allowed South Korean nationals to attend international conferences held in the USSR. Still, with few exceptions, the Soviets had not authorized their own nationals to visit South Korea until the fall of 1982, when Soviet TASS agency officials and an official from the Ministry of Culture attended an international conference in Seoul. (It is interesting to note that the Soviet decision to allow its officials to attend the meeting in Seoul followed both Kim's visit to China and the Soviets' declaration of dissatisfaction with the North's stance on the Vietnam-Kampuchean issue.)

But the Soviet destruction of Korean Air Line's Flight 007 redounded to North Korea's advantage, drawing the two nations closer together. Kim's government did not issue a pronouncement fully supportive of the USSR on the incident until after Soviet authorities had publicized their decision not to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference being held in Seoul (three weeks after the incident). If not for the KAL tragedy, it is highly probable that the Soviet Union (along with other East European countries) would have attended the IPU meetings. Subsequently, when 17 South Korean officials were assassinated in an explosion in Rangoon, Burma, on October 10, 1983, Soviet commentators rejected the generally held view (later confirmed by Burmese authorities) that the North Koreans were responsible for this terrorist act.[8]

Throughout the early months of 1984, Soviet–North Korean relations continued to improve, especially as Soviet leaders showed signs of adopting a more accommodating attitude toward the question of political succession in North Korea.[9] Kim Il-song's interview with a TASS correspondent in March of 1984 clearly indicated Kim's perception of an improvement in the relations between the two countries, and encouraged

[8]The Soviet press chided "Seoul authorities" for "taking advantage of the explosion" to whip up tensions and to fan a "military psychosis" in the South. The Moscow Domestic Service also stated that "observers" had attributed the "hullabaloo" over the bombing to President Chun's efforts to intensify suppression of opposition groups in the South. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Seoul 'Whipping Up Tensions,'" *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Oct. 12, 1984, p. C/1. Burmese officials later "firmly established" from the "statements of the two captured Koreans, the articles seized and other facts obtained from investigations . . . that the explosion was the work of saboteurs sent by North Korea." Cited in John McBeth, "The Verdict Is Guilty," *FEER*, Nov. 17, 1983, p. 18.

[9]In February 1984, a deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union attended, presumably for the first time, a reception given by the North Korean Embassy in Moscow in celebration of Kim Chong-il's birthday. See *Naewoe Tongsin* (Seoul), May 11, 1984. A quick perusal of recent coverage of North Korea in the Soviet media indicates a continuing warming trend. Thus, "Soviet-Korean political consultations," in which the two countries' foreign ministries agreed on a plan for cooperation in 1985–86, took place in an "atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding." Moreover, a DPRK party delegation visited Leningrad at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and a North Korean citizen received in Moscow a "Badge of Honor" from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's deputy chairman for rescuing Soviet Baykal-Amur railroad workers during a flood. See, e.g., *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 26, 1984, pp. C/1–2.

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speculation among Western analysts that Kim would soon visit the USSR.

As expected, President Kim visited the Soviet Union in May 1984, the first time in 18 years. From the Korean leader's perspective, the trip promised to promote at least several of North Korea's foreign policy objectives. It provided Kim a high-level summit meeting in which he could directly solicit Soviet political, economic, and military aid. It also gave the North Korean leader a chance to seek a firm pledge from the Soviets to support his country's policy toward the South and to oppose any movement toward a policy recognizing two Koreas on the peninsula. In terms of Korean domestic politics, the trip provided Kim the opportunity to seek Soviet tolerance—if not understanding and support—concerning the issue of North Korea's political succession. At a minimum, Kim hoped to persuade the Soviet Union to abstain from interfering in North Korea's domestic affairs. At best, the North Koreans hoped to receive Soviet acknowledgment of Kim Chong-il's unique position as successor-designate to his father as head of the party and government.

The meetings also enabled Kim to convey North Korea's perception of the threat posed by US and Japanese actions in and around Korea, and presented to the rest of the world a convincing demonstration of Soviet–North Korean solidarity, which would, the North Koreans hoped, constrain actions of the United States, Japan, and South Korea and induce China to adopt a more positive attitude toward North Korea's interests. Actually, the fact that Kim's visit even occurred is significant. Although Moscow had been considering such a visit for a number of years, it had never materialized. That the trip finally took place attests to the coincidence of the two nations' interests at the time.

Three additional factors expedited Kim's trip to the Soviet Union: the resumption of negotiations between the Soviet Union and China; the profound strengthening of North Korean relations with China; and the worsening of US–Soviet relations. Thus, North Korean

North Korean party and state leader Kim Il-song, right, meets with his Soviet counterpart, Konstantin Chernenko, on May 25, 1984, in Moscow.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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Chinese and North Korean dignitaries in Pyongyang, May 1984: from left to right, Kim Chong-il; Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CCP); Kim Il-song, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party; and Yang Shangkun, Permanent Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the CC CCP.

—***China Pictorial*** **(Beijing), No. 8, 1984, p. 11.**

leaders may have thought the timing of Kim's trip appropriate, as they judged the friction between China and the USSR to be low and Soviet sensitivity and amenability to North Korea's requests to be high.

For their part, when pondering the implications of US military activities in Asia and the evolving cooperative relationship among the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea, the Soviets undoubtedly recognized how closely Korean views and interests approximated their own.[10] The Soviets clearly saw the necessity of exerting anew their influence over North Korea, which would afford them an opportunity to prevent the North from drifting toward better relations with the United States and Japan under Chinese tutelage, and the chance to prevent a closer cooperation between China and North Korea. Thus, the Soviet Union sought to reassert itself as a dominant and interested force in Korean affairs, emphasizing that no political settlement, whatever the format of negotiations, was to take place without Soviet approval. Kim, on the other hand, tried to wrangle a bit more independence. Although it is still too early to assess the results of Kim's visit, it appears that he accomplished most of what he aimed to do.

North Korea's "Militant Friendship"

If the Soviet Union is at the heart of North Korea's quest for an independent foreign policy, then the People's Republic of China perhaps is at its soul. Indeed, public declarations of the intensity of admiration and support between North Korea and China generally have surpassed those extolling Soviet–North Korean relations. The signs of mutual support are ample. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Yaobang proclaimed (September 16, 1982) that Kim Il-song had led the Korean people to victory through creative application of the universal truth of Marxist-Leninist principles to the particular conditions of Korea.[11] Kim on his part acknowledged (September 21, 1982) the CCP's socialist modernization program to be an appropriate policy wholly compatible with the interests of the Chinese people.[12] Moreover, during the past few years, there have been extensive and numerous high-level visits between the leaders of the two countries. In addition to such dignitaries as Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary Hu, and Premier Zhao Ziyang, China's foreign and defense ministers have visited Pyongyang. North Korean visitors to Beijing have included President Kim, Kim Chong-il, the premier and deputy premiers, as well as the foreign and defense ministers.

This feeling of closeness is in part rooted in a sense of cultural and racial affinity for one another. It may also in part be a result of Kim's military and political experiences in China during the war with Japan. In general, however, the warmth of this feeling is attributable to other, more practical factors. The North Kore-

[10]Notice the striking similarities in the assessments given by the Soviet Union and North Korea of President Reagan's visit to South Korea in November 1983. For an analysis of Soviet policy toward Korea, see Young C. Kim, "Soviet Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," in Ichikawa Masaaki, Ed., *Kankoku-Kita Chōsen Sōran* (Compendium of Papers on South and North Korea), Tokyo, Hara Shobō, 1983.

[11]See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Sept. 20, 1982, pp. D/1–3.

[12]See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Sept. 22, 1982, pp. D/3–7.

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ans keenly appreciate that relations between the two countries can best be characterized as a "militant friendship cemented in blood."[13] That Chinese intervention during the Korean war was critical in ensuring the survival of the North Korean regime shows the vital importance of a friendly China to North Korean security. Certainly, a hostile China would fundamentally affect the North's strategic posture vis-à-vis the South. Also, like the Soviet Union, China is an important source of military equipment and supplies and of economic support. In 1983 alone, China provided North Korea with some 20 to 40 A-5's (an improved version of the MiG-21-type fighter).[14] In addition, China supplies North Korea with substantial amounts of oil, and in recent years, these oil supplies have actually exceeded those provided by the Soviet Union. In terms of volume of trade, China accounted for about 17 percent of North Korea's total foreign trade, which was slightly more than half that accounted for by the Soviet Union (33 percent).[15]

But it is in the realm of diplomacy that China has perhaps been most useful in Kim's foreign policy undertakings. The vitality of the relations between the North Koreans and the Chinese provides the North with considerable leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. By strengthening its ties with China, therefore, Pyongyang feels it can deal more effectively with "Soviet dominationism," as well as solicit a higher level of economic and military assistance from the Soviets. Good relations with China also potentially benefit North Korea's recent diplomatic démarche toward the United States and Japan. Chinese leaders could, for instance, intervene on behalf of the North Koreans, urging these nations to adopt a more flexible policy to-

[13]For Kim's views on North Korea's "militant friendship" with China, see ibid., p. D/6.

[14]Reports give different figures on the number of Chinese A-5's sent to North Korea. For the lower figure, see Young Whan Kihl, "North Korea in 1983," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), January 1984, p. 105; cf. Chung-whan Chun, "The Triangular Relationship Among China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea," *Korea Hyōron* (Tokyo), May 1983, p. 34.

[15]See Chun, loc. cit., p. 34. Professor Chun estimates the amount of Chinese oil supply in recent years to be about 0.8 to 1.5 million tons as compared with about 0.5 million tons from the Soviet Union over the same period. Also, some analysts put the combined figure for Chinese and Soviet volume of trade with North Korea at 60 percent of the North's total. See, e.g., Mike Tharp, "A Nimble Neutrality Keeps Moscow and Peking as Allies," *FEER*, Feb. 2, 1984, p. 29.

At a North Korean metallurgical plant in 1982; the slogan in the background reads: "Everybody on the Road to Achieving the Three Great Technological Revolutions."

—Hiroji Kubota/MAGNUM.

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ward the DPRK. This could facilitate the North's much-desired access to Western technology and capital. Chinese support has also proven instrumental in sustaining and increasing support for North Korea among Third World countries.

Most important, China's support is crucial in the execution of North Korea's strategy toward the South. China has consistently and vigorously voiced its support for North Korea's reunification policy. Most remarkable is the fact that since the fall of 1983, Chinese leaders have shown an active interest and willingness to discuss Korean affairs with American and Japanese officials. Recent Chinese efforts to promote talks involving the two Koreas and the US on behalf of North Korea have been particularly conspicuous.[16]

Domestically, China's public expressions of respect and support for President Kim and his achievements have been a source of enormous satisfaction to the North Korean leadership. Particularly meaningful to Northern officials (both in the domestic and international contexts) has been Chinese acceptance of and support for successor-designate Kim Chong-il in recent years. Although Chinese officials had earlier officially ridiculed Kim's practice of political primogeniture as feudalistic,[17] by the fall of 1981 they began to acknowledge Kim Chong-il's ascendancy at official state banquets. Deng and Hu also reportedly conveyed their support of the younger Kim's succession during their visits to Pyongyang in April 1982. When President Kim visited China in September 1982, the Chinese leadership took the opportunity to express again its support for the ascendancy of the younger Kim. Both President Kim's reception in China and the treatment accorded him during his stay were extraordinarily warm and enthusiastic. Kim, in return, expressed his support for the policy line of Deng and his associates. The Chinese stance on the question of political succession crystallized in June 1983 when General Secretary Hu invited Kim Chong-il to China. Hu further emphasized Chinese support by personally serving as host during a part of Kim's tour.[18]

There are, however, several factors that contribute to occasional tensions between North Korea and China. For one thing, North Koreans are sensitive to all manifestations of what they see as "big nationism," harboring a general distrust toward all major powers, including China. Thus, when North Koreans speak of "dominationism," their code word for hegemonic tendencies, they refer to both the Soviet Union and China. For another, the North has always feared a betrayal of DPRK interests by its socialist allies. China's relations with the United States and Japan might, for instance, evolve to a point where North Korea's interests would be jeopardized. Therefore, the apparently increasing cordiality between China and the United States, North Korea's archenemy, causes serious anxiety among North Korean leaders. The most authoritative statement of this fear came in General Secretary Kim's October 1980 report to the 6th Party Congress, when he declared that

The socialist countries, nonaligned countries, and all the newly emerging nations must make no unprincipled compromise with imperialism....The socialist and nonaligned countries must not give up their anti-imperialist stance in order to improve their diplomatic relations with the imperialist countries, nor must they sacrifice the interests of other countries in their own interests.[19]

Moreover, despite North Korea's public endorsement of Deng's Four Modernizations policies, Kim's government is clearly dubious about the ramifications of such policies for the politics and ideology of a socialist state. Particularly disturbing to the North Korean leadership is the process of de-Maoization that is currently under way in China, a process that clearly raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of Kim Il-song's leadership and of the regime itself.

The potential for improvement in Chinese–South Korean relations is another area of grave concern to the North Koreans. The North Korean government has watched the recent multiplication of contacts between China and South Korea with growing apprehension and disdain. Among the recent developments that have heightened North Korea's concern are: the participation of a Chinese scholar in an academic conference in Seoul in 1981; the growing indirect trade between South Korea and China through intermediaries in Hong Kong; the direct government-to-government negotiations following the hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner to Seoul in 1983; the commencement of sports exchanges (South Korea's tennis team in Kunming and China's basketball team in Seoul); and the permission granted to Chinese of Korean descent to visit their relatives in South Korea.

[16] See the numerous articles in the Chinese press translated in *FBIS-CHI*, mid-February through mid-March, 1984.

[17] *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Aug. 9, 1984.

[18] For an analysis of the younger Kim's visit to China, see Yoshida Masaya, "The Significance of Kim Chong-il's China Visit," *Korea Hyŏron*, September 1983, pp. 29–36.

[19] Quoted in Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980: The Son Also Rises," *Asian Survey*, January 1981.

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Combating Japanese Militarism

It is hardly surprising that North Korea's attitude toward Japan is heavily influenced by the legacy of Japanese colonial rule and Korea's anti-Japanese struggle for independence. The symbolism and rhetoric of North Korean political communications still evoke powerful emotions among the North Korean populace, and are perceptibly shaped by the Koreans' prewar struggle against Japanese colonialism and imperialism. But for North Korea, its assertion that Japan is still dreaming of establishing hegemony over Korea is not mere rhetoric. Having witnessed both the steady and significant growth in Japan's military capabilities and the progressive expansion of the role of the Japanese military,[20] North Koreans genuinely fear a revival of Japanese militarism and an evolving triangular security relationship among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The most recent authoritative statement on this was given by President Kim himself in a talk to a delegation of the Soviet news agency TASS on March 31, 1984:

The revival of Japanese militarism in Asia poses a grave threat to the Asian people. It is very justifiable that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, and people heighten vigilance against the revival of Japanese militarism and raise their voice of struggle against the scheme to fabricate a US–Japan–South Korean tripartite military alliance, and we fully support this stand.[21]

The persistence of these fears has greatly increased North Korea's sense of urgency concerning the reunification of Korea. While North Korean leaders are aware of the constitutional and political constraints that inhibit the expansion of Japan's military role, they still fear that a militarily powerful Japan would be likely to take actions—though not necessarily military—to impede the reunification process. Indeed, from the North's perspective, Japan already dominates the South, extending economic, political, and diplomatic support that directly undermines North Korean interests. The South Korean government and economy would collapse, North Korean leaders contend, if not for US military and Japanese economic aid. Interestingly, North Korea perceives Japan as a more formidable and tenacious enemy than is the United States: a protracted struggle might conceivably drive out US forces, but Japanese influence in the South would be much more difficult to eradicate.



A helicopter of Japan's Self-Defense Forces transports a jeep during autumn 1983 maneuvers.

—H. Yamaguchi/Gamma-Liaison.

The North has shown considerable interest in the campaigns waged by the leftwing forces in Japan against the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, recognizing that the United States's ability to render effective and timely military assistance to South Korea would require Japanese cooperation. Also, North Korean leaders recognize that this security treaty actually provides a rationale and an impetus for Japan's growing military power.[22] Whether North Korea would prefer a militarily powerful yet independent Japan to a Japan growing within the framework of the security treaty is unclear. What is clear, however, is the North's steadfast commitment to the undermining of Japanese support for the South, and to the weakening of the ties between these two countries, thus reducing Japanese influence on the Korean peninsula. An important ally in this endeavor can be found in Japan itself, where some 700,000 Koreans reside. At least one-third of them, a force of some political significance, is said to be loyal to the North Korean regime.[23] They are expected to give full support

[20] For a discussion of Japan's military role in Northeast Asia, see Tetsuya Kataoka, "Japan's Northern Threat," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1984, pp. 1–16.

[21] DPRK Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations, "Press Release," New York, Apr. 11, 1984.

[22] See Kataoka, loc. cit., pp. 2–3.

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to the effort to bring about the realization of North Korean foreign policy objectives.

But if Japan constitutes a major threat to North Korean foreign policy interests, it also represents a key resource in the North's quest to diversify its economic relations. Thus, North Korea continues its attempt to expand existing ties with Japan, acutely aware of the potentially vast technical and economic benefits that such expansion might provide. In terms of volume of trade, Japan accounted for about 14 percent of North Korea's total foreign trade in 1983.[24] And in connection with its next economic plan, North Korea looks to the expansion of trade with Japan and other Western countries with which it has no diplomatic relations—a tactic that is consistent with the policy adopted at the January 1984 meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly.[25] Accordingly, Pyongyang has encouraged Japan to establish a trade office in the North, to conclude an aviation agreement, and to expand its personnel exchanges to include high-level government officials and resident journalists.

"Liberating" the South

From its inception, the North Korean regime has doggedly pursued its objective of eliminating US influence from South Korea. To the North Korean leadership, South Korea is being forcibly occupied by the US military, and the liberation of Southern brethren from American imperialism and colonialism constitutes the supreme and urgent national task—for a true Korean revolution would not be complete without a revolution in the South. In North Korean eyes, US domination of South Korea is indisputable: the United States maintains operational control over the South Korean military, dictates South Korean politics, and controls the South Korean economy. The United States is also, according to the North, capable of replacing at whim the present leaders of the South Korean "puppet" government. In addition, North Koreans allege that the United States is raising tensions on the peninsula by turning South Korea into a nuclear forward base from which the US can launch its aggressions against North Korea and other socialist countries on the Asian continent. Indeed, Pyongyang claims to have sighted some 1,000 nuclear warheads in the South, and North Korean officials warn that the United States plans to introduce intermediate-range Pershing II and Tomahawk nuclear missiles.[26]

For these reasons, North Korean leaders consider the US military presence in Korea as the single most important obstacle to the reunification effort. Without the removal of US forces from South Korea, they contend, the establishment of either a South Korean people's democratic government (following a revolution) or a government led by "patriots and democrats" could not be expected to occur. The removal of the US military from South Korea thus has become the objective of highest priority in all of North Korea's foreign policy undertakings.

To help accomplish this task, in March 1974 the North Korean government issued its first explicit proposal for a peace agreement with the United States. Under the provisions of this proposal, each side would pledge "not to invade the other" and to "remove all the danger of direct armed conflict."[27] Other provisions called for the discontinuation of "arms reinforcement" and for the withdrawal of US forces from Korea. The proposal was notable not only for its provisions but also for its treatment of South Korea, which would be allowed to attend a North Korea–United States conference only as an observer and would be excluded from participating in the peace agreement. Only after a peace agreement had been reached with the United States would North Korea negotiate with South Korea regarding what the North called "practical measures."[28]

As expected, the United States responded to the proposal by announcing full South Korean participation as a precondition for US participation, an idea that it took the North Koreans *ten* years to accept. Finally, in the so-called tripartite conference proposal of January 1984, the North declared that it would accept equal status for the South in the proposed talks. Despite this promise of equal standing, the North apparently has not revised its earlier proposal in such a way as to include South Korea in US–North Korean peace negotiations. Whether the South would be al-

[23] Donald M. Seekins estimates Japan's Korean population at 675,000 in 1981. Although he gives no concrete figures on the percentage of this population that is sympathetic to the North, Seekins does note that the most prominent Korean interest group in Japan is the North Korea–sponsored General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. See his contribution to *Japan: A Country Study*, 4th Ed. Rev., ed. by Frederica M. Bunge, Washington, DC, The American University, 1983, p. 274.

[24] Tharp, loc. cit., gives an even higher figure (20 percent) for Japan's portion of total North Korean trade (p. 29).

[25] "Resolution of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, On Strengthening North-South Cooperation and External Economic Activities and Further Developing Foreign Trade, January 26, 1984," in *Documents of the Third Session of the Seventh Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK* (hereafter *Documents* ...), Pyongyang, January 1984, pp. 2–10 (in English).

[26] See "The Two Kims' Dream of Peace," *FEER*, Feb. 2, 1984, pp. 30–31.

[27] Shinn, loc. cit., p. 204.

[28] Young C. Kim, "Korea's Future: Pyongyang's Perspective," *Asian Survey*, November 1977.

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lowed to participate in discussions about this agreement (let alone in its signing) is not clear.

At any rate, the January 1984 proposal stated that the North and South should adopt a mutual declaration of nonaggression whereby each side pledges not only to refrain from using arms against the other, but also to cut drastically its own army and armaments.[29] Only after the adoption of the peace agreement and the signing of the nonaggression declaration at the tripartite talks does Pyongyang plan to hold a dialogue between the North and the South to address the question of reunification. Again, as in the 1974 proposal, the North Koreans insist that the proposed peace agreement must lead to the withdrawal of US forces from the South. However, it is not clear whether US troops would actually have to depart prior to the adoption of the nonaggression declaration with the South.

North Korea's priorities are clear (in order of importance): a peace agreement with the United States, a nonaggression declaration with the South, and a reunification dialogue. Although the proposal maintains that the peace agreement and nonaggression declaration would be discussed at the tripartite talks, it really envisages two separate sets of talks within the framework of the tripartite talks. After all, it still remains uncertain whether the North Korean–US talks and the North-South talks would occur simultaneously or serially. Would the peace agreement, for instance, necessarily precede the nonaggression declaration?

Although it remains unresolved how South Korea could be excluded from the peace agreement and still be deemed a full participant, and what the North Koreans' true intentions are regarding the tripartite talks, the fact that the North Koreans even declared a willingness to accept South Korea as an equal in these talks is significant. This is especially true in light of the North Koreans' rationale for earlier rejecting South Korean participation. Southern officials should be excluded, they argued in 1974, because the South had opposed the 1953 armistice agreement and had refused to become a signatory. Moreover, according to the North, since the United States maintained operational control of the South Korean armed forces, it was the only power that could guarantee that the South would honor the peace agreement. Interestingly, the January 1984 proposal uses similar arguments to try to induce the United States to sign a peace agreement with the North. But now, the proposal also *urges* South Korean authorities, "as another party directly involved in the creation of the present tensions," to take part in the negotiations "so as to fully solve in all aspects the question of removing military confrontation and to ease tensions."[30]

Of course, North Korea had in the past rejected South Korean proposals for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact, arguing throughout that such a proposal would be tantamount to supporting a two-Korea plot designed to perpetuate both US occupation of the South and the division of the Korean nation. Besides, the South's proposals made no provision for the withdrawal of US troops from Korea and was therefore unacceptable to the North Koreans, who persistently assert that the presence of the United States on the Korean peninsula is the main cause of tension and conflict there. Finally, Pyongyang argued that such a proposal would artificially separate the issues of peace and peaceful reunification, rendering the attainment of the latter more difficult.[31]

Peace or Propaganda?

Why has North Korea recently called for a nonaggression declaration, given its past objections to such a pact? Although the North Korean government has been silent thus far on this question, one likely explanation is that the North considers its proposal appropriate because conclusion of the declaration presupposes a peace agreement with the United States and the subsequent withdrawal of US troops from the South. However, the January proposal, in its present form, is unacceptable to the other two parties. The United States is unwilling to participate in negotiations whose principal objective is to terminate the US military presence in the South. Also, both the United States and South Korea find many aspects of the proposal itself untenable, including the proposed role and status of the South at the talks, the insulting and abusive descriptions of US and South Korean actions in and around Korea, and some of the actual premises for North Korea's call for such talks.

Indeed, such considerations lead many specialists to doubt North Korea's sincerity and to call the January proposal merely a deceptive propaganda attempt designed to divert public attention from the Rangoon incident.[32] These specialists point with incredulity to

[29] "Report by Deputy Ho Dam," in *Documents*..., pp. 13–22.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Young C. Kim, "Korea's Future," pp. 1082–83.

[32] According to the North Koreans, the Rangoon blast incident is a "slanderous self-produced drama by traitor Chon Tu-huan." See commentaries by the North Korea Foreign Ministry and the account in *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang) following the Burmese government announcement that the incident was the work of operatives of North Korea, in *FBIS-APA*, Nov. 7, 1983, p. D/1.

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the timing of the initial transmission of the proposal: North Korea asked China to transmit the DPRK's willingness to hold talks with the United States and South Korea shortly before the bombing in Rangoon. The message, however, reached the United States after the incident, and the public announcement of the proposal was not made until January 1984. It is possible, of course, that North Korea expected a positive response to its proposal despite the bombing. The United States and the South had, after all, called for such a tripartite meeting as far back as 1979. In a speech to the National Assembly in Seoul in November 1983, President Reagan stated that the United States would enter into talks with the North if South Korea's full participation were ensured. Moreover, the North Korean government later claimed—but the US denied—that it had received a communication with a similar proposal from the United States in September 1983.[33]

Both the substance and the tone of the January proposal reflect an inflexible and self-righteous attitude as well as numerous misperceptions. Perhaps the need to justify their past policy stances dictated the use of many expressions that are harsher and more strident than even North Korean leaders believe realistic. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the Northern leadership was conscious of the propaganda advantages to be gained even if the proposal were rejected.

[33] "Report by Deputy Ho Dam," in *Documents*..., pp. 13–22.

A Japanese television shot of one of the victims of a bomb exploded by North Korean agents at Rangoon's Martyrs' Mausoleum on October 10, 1983, that killed four ministers of the government of the Republic of Korea and other South Korean nationals.

—Wide World.

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There is little doubt that the Rangoon bombing deeply affected US and South Korean perceptions of North Korea's proposal for tripartite talks. As noted, the dominant view among Western analysts was that the proposal was a device designed to recover the prestige North Korea lost following the bombing. The question these analysts ask most often is how the North Koreans could have perpetrated such an act had they been seriously considering talks with the South. It is conceivable, however, that in the minds of the North Koreans, the terrorist elimination of the South Korean leadership and the pursuit of some modus vivendi with the South are compatible. Indeed, there are indications that the North Korean government has been groping for a more "pragmatic" way of dealing with the South, one of whose components could possibly be the assassination of Southern officials, including the President. The elimination of President Chun could presumably cause considerable instability in South Korea, seriously impeding the South's attainment of economic, political, and diplomatic goals. An unstable situation there could discourage heads of state from visiting Seoul and cause foreign investors to reassess their commitments to business ventures in the Republic of Korea. It would also no doubt frustrate South Korea's diplomatic offensive toward nonaligned countries. Such prospects may have appeared irresistible to the North Korean leadership, especially given the high chance of success and the minimal risk of exposure of North Korean complicity.



North Korean Premier Kang Song-san, right, with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, during a visit to China in the summer of 1984 to examine light industry in Shanghai and the Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen.

—Wide World.

Some analysts argue, however, that North Korea has in fact adopted a more moderate and realistic policy toward the South. Although most Western analysts consider this view somewhat ludicrous, a few thoughts may be advanced to support this minority view. First, Kim Chong-il, who is deeply involved in all North Korean decision-making, has demonstrated an active interest in economic development. He appears determined to enhance the legitimacy of the regime and of his own leadership through increasing economic benefits to the people. As evidence of the North's increasing interest in this regard, these analysts point to the stream of leading cadres from North Korea that have been visiting China in recent years to observe the PRC's economic modernization program at work. Moreover, Pyongyang has progressively shown an interest in gaining access to Western technology and capital, the most dramatic evidence of this being the enactment in September 1984 of a law sanctioning joint economic ventures. But the North realizes that the United States and Japan will both remain unresponsive unless North-South relations improve. While his efforts have reportedly met with resistance from some old revolutionary cadres, the younger Kim seems to enjoy support from technocrats and other cadres who are his contemporaries.

To rebut these arguments, many analysts point out that politics and economics in North Korea are highly compartmentalized, and that ideological considerations dwarf economic requirements. While President Kim might be able to deviate somewhat from ideological dictates in his policies (given his vast authority over the North's populace), it is not clear that his successor-designate would have such flexibility. Indeed, to counter those who assert that Kim Chong-il could simply make use of his father's authority to put forward his controversial policy line, the majority of analysts emphasize how ideologically rigid the North Korean populace is—especially the younger generation—and how much Northern leaders seem to need to demonstrate militant fidelity to the orthodox policy lines of Kim Il-song.

No one disputes that the North Korean leadership has placed enormous emphasis upon economic development and is increasingly inclined toward interaction with foreign—that is, Western—economies. What most analysts challenge is the "spillover" effect of economic imperatives into politics that some claim has taken place in the North's dealings with South Korea. Why, they ask, did North Korea until very re-

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cently remain opposed to the resumption of dialogue or other exchanges with the South if it is really interested in reaching a modus vivendi with the South? And earlier this year, they point out, North Korea rejected a proposal for trade and economic cooperation by insisting upon two preconditions: the withdrawal of US troops from Korea and the termination of anticommunist policies within the South Korean government.

The Drive for Reunification

The North Korean government approaches the question of reunification with utmost seriousness and a strong sense of urgency. The North's proclaimed supreme national task is reunification and the "emancipation" of its Southern brethren. Most, if not all, of the North's domestic and foreign policies are directed toward this goal. Northern leaders have insisted that the reunification effort be governed by three guidelines: it should be free of external interference, be accomplished by peaceful means, and produce a national unity that transcends ideals, ideologies, and social systems. These three guidelines constitute a portion of the North-South joint communiqué of July 4, 1972.

According to the North Korean perception, peaceful reunification will be possible only under one of two circumstances: (1) when a successful revolution in the South results in the expulsion of imperialistic forces, the overthrow of their puppets, and the subsequent establishment of a people's democratic government; or (2) when a "patriotic and nationalistic" government is established in South Korea. Thus, even in the absence of the establishment of a government of workers, a government composed of "democratic personages with nationalistic consciences" (the North's code words for those in the South who oppose the government there) would be able to reach an accord with the North concerning reunification.[34]

North Korean leaders have long advocated the establishment of a confederal system of government, the most elaborate proposal for which was presented by General Secretary Kim in a report to the 6th Party Congress in October 1980. Kim stated that Korea "should be reunified by founding a confederal republic through the establishment of a unified national government on the condition that the North and the South recognize and tolerate each other's ideas and social systems, a government in which the two sides are represented on an equal footing and under which they exercise regional autonomy respectively with equal rights and duties."[35] On numerous other occasions, North Korea has renewed its call for such a government, which it has labeled the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, apparently in commemoration of the dynasty that consolidated control on the peninsula in the 10th century.[36]

For the establishment of this state, Northern leaders call for the convening of a national political consultative conference to be attended by representatives of various parties and groups from both the North and South. In its January 1984 proposal, however, the North Korean government specified certain preconditions for such a dialogue. The proposal states, in part,

When a legal guarantee for the relaxation of the tension in Korea is provided and preconditions for the independent and peaceful reunification are created with the signing of a peace agreement and the adoption of a declaration of nonaggression at the tripartite talks, a reunification dialogue between the North and the South will be held to solve the question of reunification.[37]

By contrast, South Korean officials advocate direct talks between the North and the South on all matters. These talks could then be followed, if necessary, by a four- or six-party conference.

A Negotiated Settlement

While North Korea claims that it is prepared to allow the "South Korean authorities" to participate in the proposed tripartite talks, it is not willing to hold bilateral talks with the South—particularly with representatives of the Chun government. Indeed, as preconditions to such bilateral talks, the North has repeatedly specified some or all of the following: the cessation of "anticommunist rackets" and/or anticommunist policies; the renunciation of a two-Korea policy; the release of political prisoners and an end to the suppression of "patriotic and democratic personages"; acceptance of the North Korean formula for reunification; and withdrawal of US troops. Until quite recently, the North had even rejected South Korea's proposal concerning economic exchanges and the

[34] Young C. Kim, "Korea's Future," pp. 1077–78.

[35] Kim Il-song, *Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Press, 1980, pp. 69–70.

[36] Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980," pp. 115–17.

[37] "Appeal to Parliaments and Governments of All Countries," in *Documents...*, pp. 10–13.

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question of reuniting separated families, since from the North Korean perspective, humanitarian and economic issues are inseparable from political issues. Thus, talks on humanitarian issues would be meaningful only in the context of broad reunification efforts.

It should be kept in mind that North Korea is committed to a South Korean revolution as part of the reunification effort. The very conception of a revolution in the South is significant, since North Korean leaders define it as both a national liberation revolution against the United States and a people's democratic revolution against the "stooges" of American imperialism. Again, the US military presence is the most fundamental issue here, and all other problems must be evaluated in light of this issue. However, other considerations in the North's perception are also operative. First, North Korea's decision to hold talks with South Korean government representatives would be tantamount to recognition of the legitimacy of Chun's government and thus betray "patriotic and democratic personages" fighting in the South. Moreover, the North's participation in a direct dialogue would, by legitimizing Chun's rule, contribute to the growing stability of South Korea. This would clearly be contrary to North Korean interests, particularly as the Chun government is perceived as still recovering from the Kwangju incident of mid-1980 (when government troops deployed to quell a student uprising caused a large number of casualties) and from a series of scandals.

Both of these considerations derive from North Korea's overestimation of the revolutionary potential in the South. The North holds a perennial hope that a "democratic personage with a nationalistic conscience"—if not a people's government—will emerge in the South to replace Chun. But this will take time. It is possible, therefore, that North Korean leaders may be reluctant to hold talks with the South because they perceive the current situation in the South as making it relatively invulnerable to North Korean designs and objectives.

One of the most fundamental explanations for the dismal record to date of North-South dialogue is this reluctance on the part of the North to acknowledge that there is a separate government in the South (however illegitimate the North may perceive it to be) functioning and exercising its rule over the South Korean populace. From the North Korean perspective, it is only to be expected that the DPRK would refuse to deal with a ruling clique in the South that supports a policy of two Koreas and insists upon a continuous US military presence. This also helps to explain the North's repugnance to the concept of "cross recognition." After all, the South Korean government, they claim, is only a puppet and is unworthy of diplomatic recognition. Also, such recognition would effectively legalize the present division of Korea.

WELCOME
TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
로날드 레이건 미합중국 대통령각하 내외분 공식방한
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND MRS RONALD W REAGAN

Preparations for US President Ronald Reagan's visit to Seoul in November 1983.

—H. Yamaguchi/Gamma-Liaison.

Clearly, such an attitude on the part of the North is contradictory to its professed desire for a confederal state. After all, under such an arrangement, each side would be allowed to retain its own ideology, as well as its own social, economic, and political systems. Perhaps the North Koreans would justify their stand by saying that the establishment of a confederal Korean state could only be seriously contemplated after a withdrawal of US troops and a repudiation of a two-Korea policy.

It is important to bear in mind that North Korea's quest for reunification is not merely symbolic or rhetorical, but a genuine factor shaping North Korea's policies—both domestic and foreign. North Korea has pursued this goal relentlessly through a three-pronged strategy that calls for strengthening the revolutionary power base in the North, fostering revolutionary potential in the South, and increasing solidarity with in-

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ternational revolutionary forces. Southern revolution and reunification, they believe, depend ultimately on success in these three spheres.

Military Solution?

Although North Korean leaders have repeatedly affirmed the sincerity of their commitment to a peaceful reunification process, they have not ruled out reunification by military means as a possible alternative. Such means would be employed, they claim, only if war were first forced upon them by their enemies. In this case, they warn, imperialist forces would be defeated, and the war for liberation of the South would be fought and won. Recall the speech that President Kim made in Beijing in April 1975. If a revolution were to take place in the South, Kim declared, North Korea would strongly support the South Korean people. And if the enemy were to start a war, the North would, again, answer that challenge with war. In this war, Kim claimed, Korea would "lose the military demarcation line and gain the country's reunification."[38]

The dominant view among Western specialists currently seems to hold that a North Korean military operation against the South is unlikely, but not impossible. Some specialists, however, believe that such operations by the North remain very possible, and even probable, at least through this decade.

The former group, who doubt that a North Korean invasion of the South is likely, cite the following considerations in support of their view. First, the North Korean government would not risk incurring the massive destruction that such a war would certainly wreak upon the North. Moreover, both China and the Soviet Union are at present opposed to reunification by military means, and Northern leaders recognize that these powers are critical to a decisive victory for the North. Another effective deterrent is the North's awareness of an almost automatic and certain US intervention on behalf of South Korea, which would be formidable given the scale and manner of deployment of US forces in the South. Also, they argue, now that economic development is a top priority for the Northern leadership, successor-designate Kim Chong-il would probably see a war as damaging to both this new goal and the legitimacy of his own rule. In this regard, these analysts note, it is significant that the younger Kim is prominently portrayed in the North Korean media as promoting economic development. Finally, North Korea's current military capabilities do not necessarily betray an offensive strategy. They may, instead, reflect the North's insecurity in view of the quantity and quality of the South's arms and the joint US–South Korean military exercises that have been conducted there under the code name "Team Spirit."

Interestingly, the other specialists, those who believe that a Northern invasion of the South is probable,

[38] Young C. Kim, "The Democratic Republic of Korea in 1975," *Asian Survey*, January 1976.

US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Yoon Song Min at an April 1983 press conference in Washington; at right, American troops are welcomed to the Republic of Korea for the "Team Spirit 1983" maneuvers of US and South Korean forces.

—US Department of Defense.

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enced by such factors as the possible engagement of US troops elsewhere, the character of the conflict, and the question of North Korean responsibility for aggression.

Several other important considerations round out their rebuttal. They point out that the North Korean leadership has become increasingly anxious about the steady and significant growth of South Korea's military and economic power. Aware that their own weaponry is rapidly becoming obsolete, might not Northern leaders conclude that their reunification efforts would be most successful if undertaken in the near future? The possibility of a renewed US superiority in the US–Soviet balance of power in the future adds to the North's urgency concerning the reunification effort. There is also the critical issue of leadership change. Kim Chong-il might be more likely to resort to war than cite many of the same considerations to support their view; however, their interpretation is dramatically different. While it is true that such a war would be extremely destructive, they respond, the Northern leadership would accept a higher level of risk than Western leaders would consider tolerable, given the value that the North places upon the attainment of reunification. Moreover, North Korea has sufficient materials to wage a sustained war for three months even without Soviet and Chinese help. Besides, the Chinese and Soviets would probably be drawn into the war on the North's side despite their initial objections. Even the value of the US deterrent is questionable. Might not North Korean leaders choose to attack if they believed the United States unable or unwilling to provide effective and timely assistance to its Southern allies? US intervention would, in any case, be influ-

Kim Chong-il and General O Chin-u, Minister of the People's Armed Forces, at an April 14, 1982, joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and the Supreme People's Assembly marking the 70th birthday of Kim's father, Kim Il-song.

—Hiroji Kubota/MAGNUM.

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Kim Il-song, left, is seen off at Beijing's railroad station by (at right, from left to right) Xi Zhongxun, Ulanhu, Hu Yaobang, and Yang Shangkun at the end of his unofficial visit to the People's Republic of China in late November 1984 at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

—New China Picture Company.

would his father, who has experienced the destruction of war and the near collapse of his regime. The younger Kim's inexperience and personality characteristics,[39] compounded by the instability of the period of power transition and the ideological rigidity of the younger generation of cadres, suggest that he may pursue a more adventurist policy line than his father.

Finally, these specialists contend, North Korea's military capabilities are more important and meaningful than are its stated intentions, which may change quickly. The quantity and quality of North Korean weaponry, the pattern of its deployment, the discipline and morale of the North Korean forces, and the nature of party-military relations all suggest that a sudden invasion of South Korea might be successful. This sensitivity to North Korea's war-making capabilities is natural, they contend, in view of the lack of convincing evidence that North Korea is truly seeking political accommodation with the South.

Conclusion

Whatever one's judgment about these two alternative interpretations, it seems indisputable that the North's quest for a reunited Korea is sustained by a strong ideological compulsion and is intertwined with regime legitimacy and the dynamics of domestic politics. The call for reunification is not an empty slogan, but a powerful driving force, shaping North Korea's undertakings, both domestic and foreign. It is therefore safe to assume that North Korean foreign policy will continue to exhibit both revolutionary and conflictual tendencies toward South Korea.

On the other hand, along with the manifestations of militancy and inflexibility in the political sphere, there are some indications of growing pragmatism in the economic sphere. Also discernable are the undercurrents indicating a search for alternative means of goal-attainment and a modest reordering of priorities.

Just how such a reordering of priorities would affect North Korean relations with the major actors in the region is unclear. It is highly unlikely, of course, that the North would alter its stance on either the presence of US troops in the South or the legitimacy of the current government of South Korea. Nor is it likely that Northern leaders would adopt a policy that clearly favored one of its huge communist neighbors over the other. Recent diplomatic activity suggests a steady course for North Korean "equidistance"—note the coincidence of the initialing of a border treaty with the Soviet Union (in Pyongyang on November 26 of this year)[40] and of Kim's recent unexpected visit to Beijing to meet with Deng and Hu. Thus, it is in the area where the political and economic spheres overlap that the potential for change is greatest. Indeed, any clear signs of pragmatism "spilling over" into the political sector and producing a demonstrable North Korean interest in securing a modus vivendi with the South would call for a reassessment of some of the prevailing assumptions about North Korean foreign policy behavior.

[39] On the personality traits of the younger Kim, see *Naewoe Tongsin*, Nov. 18, 1983.

[40] See TASS, "Treaty Initialed," in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1984, p. C/1.

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South Asia After Afghanistan

Stephen P. Cohen

The assassination of Indira Gandhi heightened interest in the tense international relationships existing in South Asia. Of course, one of the chief sources of regional tension is the fundamental, long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan, which just prior to Mrs. Gandhi's death had flared up to the point where some observers, including her own son, predicted a new war between the two states. However, another significant factor has been the Soviet Union: directly, through its massive arms shipments to India; and indirectly, through its invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. How have the invasion and the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the face of a fierce national resistance movement affected relationships on the subcontinent? Has the heightened Soviet presence spurred on an arms race in which India's reliance on Moscow grows, or may it ultimately encourage states of the region to find new grounds for cooperation?

Five years have passed since Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan. Unless the Soviets decide to increase dramatically their forces, expand their actions beyond Afghanistan, or—improbably—unilaterally concede defeat and withdraw, it appears that five years from now they will be still enmeshed in a savage war of attrition. Although considerable attention has been given to the impact of the invasion on Afghanistan and on relations between the USSR and the United States, relatively little has been given to its impact upon Afghanistan's neighbors to the south and east—a region containing about one-quarter of the world's population.[1]

In looking at South Asia, it is reasonable to ask whether the invasion of Afghanistan was designed to advance some important Soviet goal or goals in the region. What effect has the invasion had and is it likely to have on the most important regional conflicts that predate it, especially that between India and Pakistan? What are the prospects for a major Soviet-backed escalation of the war into Pakistan, or even of a joint Indo-Soviet move against Pakistan? Not only have these questions been submerged in the larger debate over the strategic consequences of the Soviet invasion, but much of the early analysis has proved wrong. In turning to a more careful examination of these questions, it is useful first to review Soviet regional policies and interests, including those pertaining to Afghanistan.

Soviet Regional Influence

Twenty-five years ago there was virtually no important support for the Soviet Union in South Asia except from the pro-Soviet wing of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and a few ideological supporters in the Indian Congress Party. The Communist Party of Pakistan was outlawed, and in any case had only a

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[1]There is some confusion whether Afghanistan is or is not in "South" Asia. For political purposes, various governments have tended to treat it as a part of "Southwest" Asia along with Pakistan and Iran. However, it is also culturally part of Central Asia *and* South Asia, and the Indian and Pakistani governments have always regarded it as part of their region. For a cultural, political, and geographical analysis, see Joseph B. Schwartzberg, Ed., *An Historical Atlas of South Asia*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978, which includes Afghanistan in "South" Asia.

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small following. Russian influence in Afghanistan was competitive but marginal (even then the local communist party was sharply divided),[2] and there was no Soviet presence in either Nepal or Ceylon. The Soviets were about to enter into a major arms deal with India (in 1962) selling MiG-21 interceptors, helicopters, and transport aircraft, although India's MiG's did not actually fly until 1964. Indeed, it was the United States that seemed to be the most influential power in the region. It was primarily to the United States that Indian defense planners turned after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. At the time, American and Commonwealth air units participated in joint exercises with their Indian counterparts. Also, India adopted some of US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's innovations in defense planning, and several hundred US military personnel were stationed in India until 1965.[3] There was also a large US civilian and military presence in Pakistan until 1965, and that country liked to term itself the "most allied of allies," as it was linked to the US through a bilateral treaty and membership in CENTO and SEATO.

A quarter century later, the Soviet position is unquestionably improved.[4] The USSR finds itself maintaining a substantial military presence in a devastated Afghanistan, with a view to converting that mountainous land into a Soviet satellite. Despite routine charges that Islamabad is aiding the Afghan "insurgents," Moscow has normal diplomatic relations with Pakistan, and Soviet-Pakistani economic projects, including construction of a steel mill in Karachi, are on schedule. Although the Soviet presence in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh remains minimal, India has become closely linked to the Soviet economy and defense establishment through massive purchases of weapons, paid for by shipments of Indian-made consumer goods.[5] The Indian Air Force flies many recent Soviet models, the Navy is more than half Soviet or Polish in origin, and the Indian Army is newly dependent upon the Soviet Union for armor. On the day of Indira Gandhi's assassination, October 31, 1984, Indian Defense Minister S. B. Chavan was in Moscow reportedly negotiating details for India's acquisition of 40 advanced MiG-29 fighter planes—reputedly the first Soviet sale of these aircraft to any country.[6]

But Soviet influence in the region did not expand uninterruptedly during this period. Moscow's influ-

[2]For a survey of the communist parties of Afghanistan see Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

[3]The air exercises, a response to Nehru's frantic appeals for help, were held between November 9 and 19, 1963. A squadron of USAF F-100 Supersabres, a squadron of RAF Javelins, and two Australian Canberra bombers participated along with the Indian Air Force. Later, the US designed and built much of India's air defense network. For details of these exercises see *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), November 1963, pp. 264–65.

[4]For a recent overall assessment of the net gains and losses in Soviet influence in Asia—South Asia in particular—see Thomas P. Thornton, prepared statement and testimony, in US Congress, House of Representatives, *The Soviet Role in Asia*, Hearings before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, July–October 1983, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, pp. 3–27.

[5]Ironically, some of these goods are manufactured in plants established by Western multinationals. There is some debate in India over the desirability of tying down so much production capacity to Soviet markets. For one, it tends to lessen the competitiveness of Indian goods on the world market. Moreover, the Soviets have dumped some of these goods on the international market, undercutting Indian-marketed items.

[6]William Branigin, "India Is Expected To Keep Its Reliance on Soviet Weapons," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 1984.



Soviet MiG-21 aircraft in the complement of the Indian Air Force.

—*Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Oct. 6, 1980, p. 182.

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Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin, standing at center, hosts talks between President Muhammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan and India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on January 4, 1966, at the Uzbek SSR's Government House in Tashkent.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

ence was probably greatest in 1966–71, when the US had virtually withdrawn. The Soviets presided over the 1966 Tashkent meeting that formally ended the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war (and even received American blessings for the effort). Moscow found itself supplying weapons to both India and Pakistan in 1968, and, with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1971, the USSR greatly increased the flow of Soviet weapons to India. Some have even argued that the Soviet Union used its Far Eastern military buildup to deter China from entering the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict on the side of Pakistan.[7] It was also during this period that the Soviets floated the idea of a regional collective security treaty—a proposal that New Delhi gave serious consideration before rejecting.[8] However, the USSR failed (as had the British and the Americans before it) to bring Pakistan and India into a de facto alliance. And communist ideology remains unattractive to the South Asian states, most of all Afghanistan, where it is sustained only by a massive Soviet military presence.[9] In a word, the Soviet Union unquestionably exercises considerable influence in South Asia today, but it is more a consequence of the brutal intervention in Afghanistan than of an expanding mutuality of interests, and the influence has come at considerable material and political cost.

[7]See Harry Gelman, "Soviet Policy Toward China: The Contending Perspectives in Moscow," in *Soviet Role in Asia*, p. 353. Gelman is probably wrong in this assessment. New Delhi shrewdly waited until the snows had blocked any possible Chinese movement in the northeastern Himalayan passes before invading East Pakistan. Moreover, the Indians had had tactical superiority over the Chinese along their border for some time.

The Soviet connection was important because of the promise of weapons supplies and the nuclear "umbrella" Moscow extended over India. This umbrella—assurances of support in case of a Chinese nuclear threat—had earlier been offered by the United States in 1964–65, but had been withdrawn by the US on the eve of President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. For a civilian and a military analysis by Indians of their strategic nuclear problem, see respectively Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Nuclear Weapons: Policy Options for India*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1983; and Maj.-Gen. D. K. Palit, *Nuclear Shadow Over the Subcontinent*, New Delhi, United Services Institution of India, 1981.

[8]For a history of the Brezhnev proposal, see Robert N. Donaldson, *Soviet Policy Toward India*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 219.

[9]Recent reports indicate an increase of 70,000 in the level of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which had been estimated at between 105,000 and 110,000. *The New York Times*, Oct. 10, 1984. This may be a temporary increase reflecting replacement of old units by new. See also ibid., Nov. 1, 1984.

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Soviet Regional Interests

What motivates Moscow in its quest for influence in South Asia? Soviet interest in the region seems largely indirect, reflecting concern with important strategic correlations elsewhere. The exception is Moscow's involvement in Afghanistan, although even there the 1979 Soviet invasion may have been undertaken in part with an eye toward developments in Poland.[10] As for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, it is primarily indirect strategic calculations rather than ideological, cultural, or economic considerations that occasion Soviet interest.

In India, where the Soviets move most freely and appear the most welcome, relations exhibit little personal warmth or ideological fervor. To the Soviets, India remains a bourgeois society at the top and a prerevolutionary quagmire at the bottom.[11] For their part, Indian officials, even those with the strongest attachment to the Soviet tie (such as the late Indira Gandhi), have not hesitated to crack down on India's communists when it suited domestic needs.[12]

Soviet interests in South Asia are certainly not economic. Although the barter arrangement with India is convenient, the Soviets are under no compulsion to export their weapons to India nor are they dependent upon any raw materials or finished products acquired from South Asia. They do get an unknown quantity of cheap natural gas from Afghanistan, but this hardly was the chief reason for the Soviet invasion.

Militarily, the Soviets see no threat emanating from South Asia. No South Asian country belongs to an alliance harboring aggressive designs on the USSR. Indeed, Moscow was able to normalize relations with Pakistan in April 1965 after Muhammad Ayub Khan made it clear that his country's membership in CENTO and SEATO and reliance on the US for arms did not reflect anti-Soviet motives.[13] The Soviets were, after all, able to live in harmony with a Shah of Iran heavily dependent upon American weapons. And, since 1965, there has been no serious American military presence in South Asia that might explain the great expansion of Soviet military and economic aid to the area.

Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on March 6, 1983, at the start of the 7th summit of the Nonaligned Movement, in New Delhi; bilateral talks between the two countries were scheduled to be held after the conference.

—Wide World.

Finally, some might attribute Soviet interest in ties with India to the latter's role in the Nonaligned Movement. However, although it was doubtless viewed by Moscow as useful to have such a prestigious and friendly state assume importance in that movement again in 1983, India has not been a pliable partner (it is too early to determine how Rajiv Gandhi will relate to the Nonaligned Movement). Cubans and others have been available for several years to express the authentic Soviet position in this and related forums.

Rather, Soviet interest in South Asia is primarily strategic in nature, deriving almost entirely from the long-standing Sino-Soviet conflict. Soviet-Indian relations thus fluctuate in tandem with the state of Sino-Soviet relations and the relations between China and individual South Asian states. Nothing brings Soviet generals to New Delhi bearing gifts of military hardware faster than the prospect of Sino-Indian negotia-

[10]The massive use of force in Afghanistan may have been intended to demonstrate to troubled allies that the Soviets had not lost the will to control dissident communist allies since 1968. For a comparison of the 1968 and 1979 invasions, see Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1980, pp. 114–41.

[11]While Soviet scholars are reasonably well informed about India, this—on the basis of my own limited contacts—seems less true of Soviet officials and bureaucrats. Of course, the officials and bureaucrats of other important states also have an imperfect understanding of this complex and diverse state. See Donaldson, op. cit., pp. 183–84.

[12]In 1959, while serving as President of the Indian Congress Party, Mrs. Gandhi toppled a communist-led government in the South Indian state of Kerala. If given a chance, she probably would have toppled the current communist governments in West Bengal and Tripura. Her approach to such matters was nonideological.

[13]Pakistan had made it known when it entered the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) that it was not entering into a military "alliance" against the USSR, and that its real concern lay with the Indian threat. For a survey, see William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, New York, Praeger, 1975.

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Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, reviews an Indian honor guard at New Delhi's airport in May 1984 on one of his periodic visits to India.

—SYGMA.

tions over their border dispute.[14] Similarly, the Soviets have always been troubled by Pakistan's continuing military and strategic tie with China, perhaps even more than by the revitalized American connection with Pakistan. One recalls that in the 1960's, American intelligence flights from Pakistan and Turkey embarrassed the Soviet Union but were not necessarily perceived as a direct threat. Indeed, such "national means of verification" have since been legitimized by the various SALT treaties. What Moscow finds more troubling is to see another major communist power exercising an independent diplomacy along or near the Soviet periphery, even if objectively such diplomacy is primarily defensive, aimed at easing pressure on China by bolstering other states, like Pakistan, that share a common strategic interest.[15]

If Moscow perceives China as a threat, it is not China in isolation or even a China in combination with Pakistan.[16] Rather, it is China and Pakistan in combination with a large industrial power. A China-US-Pakistan relationship not only could strengthen an unfriendly (albeit not hostile) government in Islamabad, which can embarrass the Soviets in Afghanistan; it also could potentially serve as a link in a broader security system that would be an effective counter to Soviet power.

The link between China and Pakistan is galling, for it allows direct passage between Xinjiang and Gilgit, along a route that traverses the Karakorams only a few miles from Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor. This desolate area was the point of contact of four historic empires (the British, the Persian, the Russian, and the Chinese), and Moscow must assign it great symbolic and strategic value, judging from the fact that Soviet

[14]For a concise survey of the Indo-Soviet military relationship, see S. Nihal Singh, "Why India Goes to Moscow for Arms," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), July 1984, pp. 707–20.

[15]See Jonathan Pollack, *The Lessons of Coalition Politics: Sino-American Security Relations*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1984.

[16]John J. Stephan, "Asia in the Soviet Conception," in Donald S. Zagoria, Ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982, p. 40.

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troops occupied the Wakhan simultaneously with their capture of Kabul and other major Afghan cities.

Compared with concern about China, the lure of the Indian Ocean is of only secondary importance in Soviet calculations.[17] While access to the seas is doubtless included among Soviet long-term objectives, the Soviet Union remains a land-based state, more immediately aware and excessively fearful of the diverse problems along its borders, especially those bounding the three-quarters of the USSR that lies in Asia. China represents one kind of challenge to Soviet regional domination; the possible fall of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan represented another. Both have implications for our understanding of whether the Soviet Union seeks influence, equality, hegemony, or dominance in its regional relations.

Because of the importance of China, the Soviet Union has reason to cultivate India, which has also experienced strife with the People's Republic. India is one of only a few countries other than the USSR that have a common border with China, and this could conceivably be of vital importance to the Soviets in case of a major Sino-Soviet conflict.[18] There is, to be sure, no evidence that the Indians have agreed to help the USSR against China (and the Soviets must be uncertain as to how useful the Indians would actually be in such a crisis), but only India and Vietnam have the capacity and motivation to assist the Soviets in containing China. Moreover, for Moscow to strengthen these two does not threaten any established Soviet interest in South or Southeast Asia.

Beyond the indirect strategic calculations that underlie the Soviet link with India, the relationship has a certain inertia—related to the stake that various Soviet civilian and military bureaucracies have acquired in its maintenance. This does not mean that the Soviet Union is incapable of switching sides should opportunities arise and conditions alter. One might conceive of at least three circumstances that might alter Moscow–New Delhi relations.

Rajiv Gandhi, left, Secretary General of the Indian National Congress and a Deputy of the Indian Parliament, meets with Soviet Politburo member and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in Moscow on July 8, 1983, during a visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

First, were Sino-Soviet relations to improve, neither Beijing nor Moscow would have as great an incentive to support what they believe to be their regional surrogates, Pakistan and India respectively. However, my view is that such an improvement is improbable.[19] Somewhat more probable are two other developments. One involves Soviet interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Should the Gulf's politics become more unstable, some Soviet strategists might argue that a warmer relationship with Pakistan—even at the cost of strained relations with India—might pay considerable dividends in a region where there already is a major Pakistani military presence. For the Soviets the calculation would involve comparing the relative values of India vis-à-vis China and of Pakistan vis-à-vis the Gulf and Afghanistan. Such a closer Soviet-Pakistan relationship might just detach Pakistan from Chinese and American influence as well. The present Pakistani leadership is unlikely to welcome such a policy, but there are those in the political community, and even within the military, who have argued for closer ties to the USSR.[20] From Pakistan's perspective this would

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[17]For an excellent survey, see Walter K. Anderson, "Soviets in the Indian Ocean: Much Ado About Something—But What?" *Asian Survey*, September 1984, pp. 910–30.

[18]The amount of Soviet equipment pouring into India is not inconsistent with Edward Luttwak's scenario of a possible Soviet attack on China. See Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

[19]Two recent collections, the hearings *The Soviet Role in Asia* and Zagoria's *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, present diverse views on the prospects for Sino-Soviet normalization, as well as on Soviet goals in Asia, which are seen as "equality," "hegemony," "world socialism," a "security glacis," or "defense." See especially the articles and testimony by Thornton, James Kelly, and William Brown in the former volume, and by Zagoria and Paul Langer in the latter.

[20]The author has met several Pakistani army officers who, in frustration at a perceived failure of the United States to support Pakistan adequately, have speculated that "perhaps we should turn to the Soviets." Among the military, such views have receded since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but they are held more widely among dissident Pakistani civilians.

From the Soviet perspective, the prospect of an extended occupation of Afghanistan makes the cultivation of Pakistan, with its good relations with the Islamic world, attractive despite Islamabad's current ties with the United States or China. Such calculations might yet prompt a change in Soviet policy.

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raise the possibility of delinking India from the Soviet Union. This would present New Delhi with a strategic dilemma. India is simply less useful than is Pakistan in any grouping juxtaposed to the USSR, and China (with a running border dispute with India very similar to that with the Soviet Union) therefore has little incentive to normalize relations with New Delhi except perhaps to embarrass the Soviets.

The third alternative to the present structure of Soviet influence in South Asia would be an increase in regional cooperation, free from Soviet control. Were India to conclude that closer ties to Pakistan lessened its own need for Soviet arms, and that its own power was more than sufficient to enable it to negotiate on an equal basis with China, it might strike deals with both Islamabad and Beijing and emerge as a powerful regional leader, free from the stigma of the Soviet military connection. The prospects for this occurring are slightly greater now than they were under Indira Gandhi. Her son, Rajiv, has not demonstrated much interest in external relations during his brief political career. India's domestic problems have sharply increased over the past few years, especially in the Punjab, and will demand considerable attention. Rajiv has also stressed domestic economic reform. All of these factors seem to point in the direction of caution in external affairs. However, Rajiv, fresh from a stunning electoral triumph, is not tied down by the prejudices of the past, and a bold international initiative would further establish him as a national leader. Both China and Pakistan have indicated their willingness to normalize relations with India, and a "window of opportunity" may thus be briefly opened in 1985.

Currently, South Asia confronts two major issues relating to the Soviet Union: one, the continued occupation of Afghanistan; the other, the future of Pakistan vis-à-vis both the USSR and India. Let us look at each in order.

Soviets in Afghanistan

It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for negotiating the Soviets out of Afghanistan.[21] Moscow has repeatedly stated that Afghanistan must not only continue to pursue a foreign policy that is compatible with Soviet interests, but that the "revolution" (really a coup) of 1978 must not be reversed. The USSR has been willing to pay a stiff price for its Afghan war, not

[21]The best overview of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is in Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1983.



Soviet tanks that were flown into Kabul during the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

—Henri Bureau/SYGMA.

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because it sees Afghanistan as a route to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean (or even the Persian Gulf), but because Afghanistan now falls into the category of allied border states that includes Mongolia and Eastern Europe. Having demonstrated its willingness to use force to save a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, Moscow is not likely to "trade away" Afghanistan for, say, Nicaragua or Cuba. The Soviets are content to talk indefinitely—that is, as long as they can continue the building of an infrastructure of loyal, if not happy, Afghans—and would welcome outside guarantees of the Kabul regime that would ease the process of Sovietization.[22] The support rendered to the mujahidin by Pakistan and Iran is troublesome, but the Soviets have the option of forcing even more refugees across the borders into those two countries, further destabilizing them.[23]

But the Soviets have found the Afghans to be a much tougher foe than they had expected. Moscow has gradually increased the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan over the past year (to about 150,000), and has adopted large-scale search and destroy missions aimed at the destruction of crops.[24] This change in Soviet tactics has been accompanied by a gradual improvement in mujahidin tactics, weapons, and coordination. The war, after five years, remains a stalemate—more violent, perhaps, but nonetheless a stalemate—with no sign that either side will bend, let alone yield and negotiate.[25] Meanwhile, the Soviets will take whatever benefits they can from Afghanistan. Natural gas and mineral resources are promising, and balance some of the cost of the war and occupation. One also cannot preclude the use of Afghan territory by Soviet forces that are oriented towards the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, or further afield.

What impact have events in Afghanistan had on the Soviet position in South Asia generally? Prior to the invasion, the Soviet role in the rest of South Asia was at low ebb. While the Janata government in New Delhi had negotiated a major arms deal with the Soviets, it had preferred Western weapons when they were available.[26] The dominant strategic issue on the subcontinent was India's growing military power vis-à-vis Pakistan, not the possibility of a Soviet invasion.[27] Pakistan had earlier responded to India's growing muscle by embarking upon a covert nuclear program,[28] and by adjusting its strategy along more defensive lines, as all three Indian services had begun to embrace a more offensive-minded approach. Yet, Pakistan's chief concerns were with domestic order, as the military regime led by Zia ul-Haq had not yet stabilized. Despite Pakistan's relative weakness, it had responded to Janata's moves to normalize relations between the two countries. Janata lost power in mid-1979, and Pakistan itself took the initiative two years later, offering India a "no war" pact.[29]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan aroused universal disapproval in South Asia. All states in the region—including India—called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, although New Delhi softened its appeal by referring only to the withdrawal of "foreign" forces. There was even some hope that the Soviet presence might bring India and Pakistan closer together. However, this has not happened. To be sure, both countries mutually adjusted some of their policies after 1979, and have cooperated in the South Asian Regional Council (SARC),[30] first proposed by

[22]The most sensible proposal for a combined political-military approach to the problem is contained in Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1982, pp. 139–53. Mehta suggests that a regional military force, drawn largely from Islamic states, serve as an occupation power while the Soviets withdraw and a new national government is formed.

[23]About one-quarter of Afghanistan's population have been killed or live as refugees in Pakistan (almost 3 million) or Iran (almost 1 million). See Dr. Hasan Askari-Rizvi, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance, and Implications," *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), No. 1, 1984, pp. 40–61.

[24]It is hard to obtain accurate information about the state of the war in Afghanistan. For a survey, see Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future," *Asian Survey*, April 1984, pp. 373–91.

[25]Projections about the course of the war vary considerably. Two European scholars, basing their work on guerrilla war patterns elsewhere, speculate that the mujahidin position will improve over the next decade. See Pierre Allan and Albert A. Stahel, "Tribal Guerrilla Warfare Against a Colonial Power: Analyzing the War in Afghanistan," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Beverly Hills, CA), December 1983. However, recent published reports indicate that other experts, including some US government observers, believe that recent changes in Soviet tactics, the increase in Soviet forces in and adjacent to Afghanistan, and the still-small number of weapons flowing to the mujahidin foretell a decline in their fighting capabilities. See Leslie Gelb, "US Aides Put '85 Arms Supplies to Afghan Rebels at $280 Million," *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1984.

[26]My own conversations with Indian civilians and military officials in New Delhi in 1977–78 indicate their concern about the need to diversify weapons sources. However, the US and various other Western powers have been unable to match Soviet prices and terms. For a case study, see Raju G. C. Thomas, "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force: The Context and Implications of the Jaguar Decision," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Spring 1980, pp. 85–101.

[27]Indeed, Moscow's action took all South Asians by surprise, even though leaders in Islamabad had warned visitors in April 1978 that the coup in Kabul was irreversible and that the Soviets had gained a foothold in the subcontinent. From conversations the author had in Islamabad and New Delhi in 1978.

[28]The matter of a Pakistani nuclear weapon is discussed in Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984, pp. 152ff.

[29]This proposal was made by the government of Pakistan on the same day it announced the acceptance of a military assistance program from the US (Sept. 15, 1981). Ibid., pp. 112–13. The proposal originally dated back to an Indian initiative of Dec. 22, 1949, which had since been rejected by Pakistan. For the views of the leading Pakistani advocate of normalization between India and Pakistan, see Lt.-Gen. A. I. Akram (ret.), *Make Peace, Not War*, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1982.

[30]The SARC has not attempted to deal with strategic or military issues, but has rather concentrated on common economic, cultural, and social problems. For a

(continued on p. 26)

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Bangladesh. But, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan also jolted the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan by causing the renewal of the US-Pakistan military tie.[31] Thus, India's chief strategic antagonist, Pakistan, was indirectly aided by the Soviet invasion, yet New Delhi itself was irrelevant to the purposes of that invasion and of little immediate utility to the Soviets in prosecuting their war in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's Precarious Position

As a consequence of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan now finds itself with a three-front security problem. The first threat, from India, dates to the partition of British India in 1947. It has grown in recent years as the Indians have developed their military infrastructure in Rajasthan and have acquired aircraft (the British Jaguar) that can reach every corner of Pakistan from Indian bases. India expects Pakistan to accept its permanent inferiority and fit itself into an India-dominated system of regional security, although the post-1979 US rearming of Pakistan somewhat moderated the imbalance of forces on the subcontinent.[32] The second threat is internal: Pakistan has major dissident groups and regions, most notably in Sind and Baluchistan, and the military regime of Zia ul-Haq remains less than popular. Paradoxically, the most recent threat—from the Soviets or their Afghan clients—has the oldest heritage. It is the latest manifestation of the very old "great game" of imperial expansion, a game that began in the 19th century, but which had been virtually absent from public consciousness for the past 25 years.[33]

The image of Pakistan as threatened on two external fronts, and also at home, led many outside observers to view the military situation as hopeless and to question the wisdom of extending military support to Pakistan, on the grounds that it might provoke the Soviets to foment rebellion in Baluchistan.[34] Inside Pakistan, too, many civilians and even some in the military threw up their hands at the prospect of resistance and urged a policy of conciliation with the Soviet Union and even India.[35] Others have argued that Pakistan is not serious about the danger to its west and is using its new arms to build up capacity against India rather than reinforce the Durand Line.[36]

However, careful analysis of the actual terrain involved, of the level of Soviet forces presently in Afghanistan, and of historical precedents would indicate that Pakistan's military situation is not as desperate as many believed. First, the Soviet force level now in Afghanistan is only adequate to control the major cities and intermittently control major road routes. Soviet/Afghan airpower operates unopposed over Afghanistan, but would meet a technological equal in the Pakistan Air Force. A major increase in enemy forces based in Afghanistan could be quickly detected and matched by a smaller increase in defensive forces.[37] Thus, Pakistan's current deployment in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) along the Afghan border seems reasonable if it is regarded as a forward defense force with the rest of Pakistan's army treated as a ready reserve available for that front.

Second, the combat record of the Pakistan Army is such that the Soviets could expect a stiff battle. The Pakistan Army may be the best army that never won a war. Its performance in the invasion of India in 1965 was exceedingly zealous; it fought well in East Pakistan in 1971 even though demoralized and often ineptly led; and there is no evidence—despite a great deal of insinuation—that its involvement in politics since 1977 has seriously hurt its fighting spirit.

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comprehensive and perceptive study of types of regionalism in South Asia, see Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1984, esp. Ch. 6, "Cooperation, Strife, or Hegemony?"

[31]US assistance comprised a US$3.2 billion program of economic aid and military sales plus, most significant, the separate sale of forty F-16 aircraft. All sales were made on strictly commercial terms, with relatively high rates of interest. For a summary of the program, plus government and private testimony, see US Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, International Economic Policy and Trade, and Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Hearings and Markup on H. Con. Res. 211*, Apr. 27, Sept. 16, 22, 23; Nov. 17, 19, 1981, Washington, DC, Committee Print, 1981.

[32]See, e.g., Cassandra (pseud.), "India's Military Ascendancy," *The Muslim* (Islamabad), Apr. 15 and 16, 1983.

[33]For two perceptive surveys of the historical significance of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, see Milan Hauner, "The Last Great Game," *Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Winter 1984, pp. 72–84; and Robert L. Canfield, "Soviet Gambit in Central Asia," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* (Villanova, PA), Fall 1981, pp. 10–30.

[34]For informed criticism of the arms sales program, see the testimony of Selig Harrison and William Richter in *Hearings and Markup* (see fn. 31).

[35]There is a considerable range of opinion on these issues in Pakistan. The writings of Lt.-Gen. A. I. Akram are most conciliatory toward India (see fn. 29). The Pakistani periodical *Viewpoint* (Lahore) has been critical of the government for failing to press for a settlement that would return the Afghan refugees to their homeland. The daily newspaper *The Muslim* has also taken an independent line in foreign policy matters, within the constraints imposed by press censorship in Pakistan.

[36]This has been the burden of many Indian statements since 1980. Actually, Pakistan has improved its infrastructure along the Durand Line, but it has never hid the fact that it regards India as a major military threat. See Cohen, op. cit., pp. 134ff.

[37]The British developed several plans from 1926 onward to defend what was then northwest India from a possible joint Afghan-Soviet military attack. Their 1939 defensive deployment along the Durand Line would have required only five or six divisions (about what the Pakistanis now have there), plus air superiority. See Historical Section (India and Pakistan), Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, *Defense of India: Policy and Plans*, New Delhi, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, distributed by Orient Longmans, 1963, pp. 23, 39.

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Units of the Pakistan Army on maneuver.

—SYGMA.

Third, a direct Soviet attack on Pakistan would raise the prospect of American, Chinese, and other support for Islamabad. A Soviet buildup of ground forces would give these and other countries sufficient time to coordinate their assistance. A rapid buildup of Soviet air units in Afghanistan would be possible, but this could be quickly matched if foreign states and Pakistan were willing to base foreign aircraft and crews in Pakistan on an emergency basis (as India accepted US and Commonwealth aircraft in 1963). As for increased Soviet/Afghan air strikes on Pakistan, this would be ineffective militarily and possibly counterproductive politically. Such pressure, whether on the ground or in the air, might force Pakistan to reduce its support for the mujahidin, but there are limits to Pakistan's ability to restrain the Afghans.

Taken in isolation, then, the Soviet military threat to Pakistan has been exaggerated. Pakistan has maintained its precarious security with a modest increase in its forces. What throws such calculations to the wind, however, is the possibility of a two-front war, with Soviet and Indian pressure applied at the same time, overwhelming Pakistan's defenses. Pakistan's reserves for the Rajasthan/Sind front with India include many of the same troops that would be deployed in case of a Soviet/Afghan attack in Baluchistan; if these reserves were frozen in place by Soviet action, Pakistan would be at a severe military disadvantage. If this took place at a moment of heightened internal disorder, then Pakistan's situation could become desperate. The critical question is therefore whether joint pressure might be applied by the Soviets and the Indians.

India's Calculations

To assess the prospects for such a development one must first attempt to determine what impact the Soviet action in Afghanistan has had on Soviet-Indian relations. The Soviet invasion of 1979 came as a considerable surprise to India, which had not been told in

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

An F-16 aircraft, the first of 40 purchased by the Pakistan Air Force, in its initial flight, on October 13, 1982, at Ft. Worth, Texas.

—General Dynamics.

advance about Soviet intentions. Compounding India's embarrassment, India's polite private suggestions to the Soviets that they withdraw have simply been ignored.

However, the Indian government's greatest concern has been with the indirect consequences of the Soviet invasion—namely Pakistan's rearmament. New Delhi launched a vehement campaign against US military support for Pakistan, lobbying intensively in Washington.[38] Nevertheless, in the context of the Indo-Pakistani military balance, the modest expansion of Pakistan's weaponry was quite significant. Thus, the Soviet invasion—by contributing to Pakistan's rearmament—had the somewhat paradoxical result of increasing India's reliance on the Soviet Union for arms.

To be sure, India could have managed the crisis by taking up Pakistan's offer of negotiations over arms levels, troop disposition, and other security-related issues; by moving more quickly in its negotiations with China; and by accepting American offers of arms sales. This would have reduced its dependence upon Soviet weapons and the very need for such weapons. But the Indian military has stuck to its goal of ensuring complete dominance over Pakistan, and the 1980 arms deal with the Soviets has been followed by two other deals of equal or greater magnitude.[39] India is buying the most advanced Soviet aircraft (MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29) and may produce some of them in its own arms factories. The Soviets have offered to let India handle the entire spare-parts production of such older weapons as the MiG-21, and will allow India to manufacture the T-72 tank. Indian defense experts remain divided over whether to accept such offers. While they would strengthen India's defense production sector, it would be at the cost of Soviet control over sales and transfers (the Soviets refused to allow India to sell MiG-21 spare parts to Egypt after that country cut its Soviet military ties). The technology is

[38]The Indian Ambassador met personally with several individuals invited to testify, and embassy officials attended the hearing en masse, distributing an unattributable "Fact Sheet" that rebutted some US government statements about the Indian-Pakistani military situation.

[39]The Soviet Union supplies about 70 percent of India's arms imports, which now run about $1 billion or more per year, although details about exact numbers, cost, and terms of agreement are usually kept secret. See Singh, loc. cit.; and Raju G. C. Thomas, *Indian Defense Policy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

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attractive, but the terms and political restrictions violate directly India's long-term goal of autarky in defense production.[40]

The paradox of increasing Indian dependence upon the Soviet Union at just the moment when the Soviets have entered Soviet Asia as a military power is explained by some as one manifestation of India's client status, and by others as an indication of a long-range plan in which both countries will join forces to swallow up Pakistan.[41] If either of these arguments is correct, then the situation in South Asia is grave indeed. Ultimately, we could expect the joint pressure of these two giant states to overwhelm Pakistan, and it is unlikely that Pakistan's distant friends could do much about it. The Soviets would obtain a foothold in Pakistan itself either directly or through client states along the Afghan border. Finally, the alleged Soviet "dream" of a warm-water port could be fulfilled, as these client states knuckle under to Soviet demands.

However, there are a number of reasons why it is very unlikely that India will join with the Soviet Union in pressuring Pakistan or risk a solo attack on Pakistan. First, though Pakistan is an irritant to India, it does not pose a vital threat. India has uncovered no substantial evidence that Pakistan intends to attack it, that the Pakistani nuclear program would be a threat, or that Islamabad supports any of the several terrorist or insurgent movements that exist in India. Pakistan's rearmament does, however, make it more difficult for India to maintain rough superiority on land and in the air, and New Delhi can no longer count on a quick victory in any war with Pakistan, even if in a long war India would still have the advantage in numbers.

Second, the Indian armed forces are themselves temporarily vulnerable. Many indigenously built weapons systems are no longer modern, and the Indian defense industry is incapable of producing adequate replacements. Although India has, for many years, enjoyed a numerical superiority over Pakistan of some 1.6:1 in armor and 2.5:1 in aircraft,[42] it now must turn abroad for wholesale replacement of its aging inventory in both categories. Moreover, the disaster of Operation "Bluestar"—the June 1984 seizure of the Golden Temple in Amritsar from Sikh opposition forces—revealed inadequate intelligence, poor civil-

[40]The most comprehensive statement of Indian strategic goals is in an "Address" 43 pages long by the then Indian defense minister, C. Subramaniam, "India's Defense Strategy in the Next Decade," delivered in late 1979. Another comprehensive and authoritative summary of Indian strategic objectives is in K. S. Bajpai, Ed., *India's Security*, New Delhi, Lancer's, 1983.

[41]The latter suspicions surfaced most recently during a briefing before the Joint Intelligence Committee of the US Congress in September 1984. See "India-Pakistan Tension Causes Concern to U.S.," *The New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1984. According to this account, two senators indicated that Mrs. Gandhi had been advised to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities.

[42]Data from International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1983-1984*, London, IISS, 1984. Richard Nations mysteriously comes up with figures indicating a "4:1 or better" ratio of Indian superiority, which is certainly wrong. See *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 16, 1984, p. 23.

In any case, the use of these ratios is highly misleading, and successful attacking countries have often had inferior weapons ratios. Terrain, climate, leadership, and the quality of manpower and weapons are also critical in the calculation of military relationships. For a discussion of these and other factors in the India-Pakistan case, see Cohen, op. cit., pp. 22ff.

Leonid Brezhnev signs a major agreement for Soviet arms sales and economic assistance to India during an October 1980 visit to New Delhi, as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi looks on.

—Raghu Rai/MAGNUM.

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Afghan refugees, some of nearly 3,000,000 now in Pakistan, at a camp in that country's North West Frontier Province.

—MAGNUM.

military coordination, and the temporary unreliability of some Sikh units. A quick Indian strike to incorporate Kashmir and its hinterlands (such as Gilgit) and install a more pliable Pakistani government seems unfeasible without a substantial improvement in weapons, intelligence, and AWACS (airborne warning and command systems). It probably would also require active Soviet assistance.

But this raises a third point. The alleged Soviet "connection" is problematic for India. Any Soviet proposal for joint action aimed at Pakistan would be analyzed carefully in New Delhi in terms of Indian gains and losses. The political, economic, and military costs of being perceived as a Soviet proxy would be high for India. Relations with China and the United States would be gravely injured. Informed Indian strategists also recognized that while a weak Pakistan suits Indian interests, a broken Pakistan does not, because it would only bring Soviet forces closer to Indian territory. Would the Soviet frontier be extended to the Hindu Kush, the Durand Line, or the Indus? What states might emerge from the ashes of Pakistan? Would they be Soviet, Chinese, or Indian clients? What would India do if a new state backed by New Delhi became embroiled in a conflict with a Soviet client state? In such a conflict, or in a heightened conflict with China, good relations with the United States would be essential, but these would surely not survive a joint Indo-Soviet operation against Pakistan. India might choose to participate in the dismemberment of Pakistan should the USSR attack the latter, but there is a fair chance that India might disregard its current dependence on the USSR for weapons and offer tacit assistance to Pakistan to prevent the latter from disintegrating. This latter course would allow New Delhi to avoid antagonizing China, the United States, and Pakistan's Islamic supporters.

An Indian decision to come to the aid of Pakistan might depend on who was in power in New Delhi, but the idea is an old one, and one that makes good strategic sense.[43] It may be that the Soviets will yet inad-

[43]British generals of the Indian Army made this point when India and Pakistan were partitioned. Indo-Pakistani strategic cooperation was also urged by various American administrations, from 1947 onward. See Robin J. Moore, "India in 1947: The Limits of Unity," and A. J. Wilson and Dennis Halton, Eds., *The States of South Asia*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1982; and the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee for the Near and Middle East, "Appraisal of US National Interests in South Asia," Washington, DC, April 19, 1949, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, Vol. 6, pp. 8–28.

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vertently push India and Pakistan to a common strategic outlook. India might thus opt for regional dominance within the context of a sharing of the military burden of regional defense. The alternative for India is to engage in an arms race propelled by the actions of its own major arms supplier.

Conclusion

I have focused the discussion on extreme cases. It is important to do so, if only to show their relatively low probability. The real threat to Pakistan from the Soviet Union lies at a level below that of all-out attack. Joint Indo-Soviet attack is even less likely. Pakistan's ability to meet external threats, or at least force a would-be attacker to greatly increase its force level for any aggression, is greater than most observers recognized five years ago, when even Pakistanis were tending to exaggerate their security problems. Despite its domestic political problems, Pakistan remains a powerful state with an effective military establishment. This reality has several implications for the future of South Asia and the Soviet presence there, particularly in Afghanistan.

The Soviet decision to enter Afghanistan reflected a combination of hubris, ignorance, and—above all—the wish to ensure that a proper ally on its border did not fall. This immediate motivation, does not mean that the USSR may not yet exploit its position in Afghanistan for adventures further afield. But it is not likely to be in the direction of South Asia. To the degree that Moscow has expanded its presence in this part of the world, it has been as a function of the weakness of individual states, as witnessed in Afghanistan in 1978–79. Pakistan is a more significant obstacle to Soviet ambitions. At present Pakistan's own internal situation is the greatest likely source of change. If that country can continue its very slow march toward stability and can broaden the scope of political participation so as to include the many dissident groups in Pakistani society, external forces are unlikely to be effective. If it cannot, then outside pressure could have considerable impact.

Pakistan is likely to continue its tacit support for the Afghan mujahidin. Indeed, Islamabad would be hard pressed to stop the mujahidin activity should Moscow increase pressure on it to do so, although it recently put Aghan rebel groups on notice that they can no longer operate openly in Peshawar.[44] Meanwhile it continues to advocate negotiations that would lead to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the honorable return of the several million Afghan refugees to their own country.

India is unlikely to join with the Soviet Union in pressuring Pakistan, or to launch an attack upon Pakistan by itself. The latter action would involve considerable military risk and would entail full-scale war; the former would be a colossal political blunder that would leave India facing the Soviet army across an uncertain frontier.

The old conflict between India and Pakistan still blocks a coordinated regional response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. India missed its moment in 1980–81, but in the post-Indira setting there is perhaps a new possibility to forge a joint regional response that could apply serious diplomatic and even military pressure on the Soviets to accept some sort of plan that would ease them out of Afghanistan, with or without their dignity intact.

[44] *The Washington Post*, Nov. 24, 1984.

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Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia

H. Gordon Skilling

In comparison with the exciting movement for reform in 1980–81 and subsequent widespread resistance to military rule in Poland, Czechoslovakia often appears to be a country of stagnancy and stillness where "dissent" has been extinguished by the regime and has little potential for affecting the future of that benighted land. Charter 77, once admired, seems to have disappeared or to count for little as a factor of change. In a world rife with protest and opposition, often violent in form and massive in scope, the peaceful and predominantly verbal dissident activity of Czechs and Slovaks is ignored or forgotten by the world public. Those who act independently in Czechoslovakia neither aspire to be a political opposition nor enjoy widespread popular support. Thus, to the outside observer, they appear lacking in political significance. The repression of relatively few "dissidents," viewed as severe by the victims and their associates, pales in comparison to the physical liquidation of opponents practiced in an Iran or El Salvador, and arouses only limited concern.

To assess properly the phenomenon of dissent in Czechoslovakia requires not only an updating of the continuing work of Charter 77, but also a better understanding of the broader context of independent thinking, writing, and action within which this takes place. Moreover, the somewhat misleading term "dissent," commonly used to describe such activities in communist countries, needs to be clarified. Václav Havel, Czech playwright and outstanding proponent of independent action, has analyzed the nature of "dissent" in a brilliant essay, "The Power of the Powerless."[1] Those who are called dissidents, he wrote, are not "professionals," defending a "group interest"; still less are they political persons presenting themselves as an alternative ruling group. Rather, they are "'ordinary' people, living with their 'ordinary' worries, and differing from others only in that they say aloud what others are unable to say or dare not say." The so-called dissident is "simply a physicist, sociologist, worker, or poet, who only acts as he feels he must, and who has been led, simply by the inner logic of his thinking, behavior and work...without consciously striving for this or even deriving any pleasure from it ...to an open clash with those in power." In Havel's view, persons who thus contribute to "the independent spiritual, social, and political life of society" include:

writers who write as they wish, without regard for censorship or official requirements and who publish their work in"samizdat"; philosophers, historians, sociologists, and other scholars, who go their own way in independent scholarly research...and disseminate their work in "samizdat," or arrange private discussions, lectures and seminars; teachers, who privately teach young people what is concealed in the regular schools; clergymen who try in their pastorate or, if they are deprived of their office, outside of it to foster a free religious life; painters, musicians, and singers, who create independently regardless of what official institutions think of their creations; all persons who

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[1] Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," *Cross Currents, A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1983, pp. 3–22. This is a translation of a part of Havel's October 1978 essay of the same title that was included in a samizdat symposium, *O Svobodě a moci* (On Freedom and Power), that circulated in Czechoslovakia in 1979 and was published abroad under the same title by Index, in Cologne. It is scheduled for publication in English in 1985. Citations were translated from the Czech typewritten original (pp. 29–32, 35–38) and are not included in the English-language version cited above.

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share in this independent culture and disseminate it further; people who try...to express and defend the authentic social interests of the working people, to return real meaning to unions or to found independent unions; people who are not afraid constantly to draw the attention of the authorities to injustice and who strive for the observance of laws; various associations of young people who strive to free themselves from manipulation and to live their own lives, in the spirit of their own hierarchy of life's values, etc.

An organized "dissident movement," Havel argued, is "but one of the manifestations of the independent life of society...*the most visible,* at first sight *the most political,* and...*the most clearly articulated*...although not necessarily the most mature or the most important." It is but the "tip of the iceberg" and "unthinkable without the background of the whole entity from which it grows, of which it is an integral part, and from which it derives its vital strength." Independent activity may be carried on by individuals outside official structures, and within narrower limits, within official institutions. It may also be practiced by individuals in their private lives. Whether acting alone or with others, such people seek to "live in the truth," to use Havel's phrase, and thus to escape from the pervasive controls of party and state.

Therein lies the significance of such independent activity and the reason for the regime's hostility to it. It challenges the central principle of the system of real socialism, namely, "the leading role of the party." No matter how limited or personal a manifestation of independence may be, the authorities fear it as something that defies the ruling ideology and threatens their exercise of control over all aspects of life. However nonpolitical, such activity is at once defined as political by the authorities and treated accordingly. If a manifestation of independence threatens to spread and to link up with other forms of independent action, the authorities try to destroy it without compunction. Hence the refusal of the Soviet Union and its East European followers to countenance a broad program of independent reform such as was launched by the party in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or initiated outside the party by Solidarity in 1980–81. Hence also the strenuous efforts to limit or prevent the more modest

Czech playwright Václav Havel photographed in his study in June 1984.

—Photo by a visitor.

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forms of independent action by Chartists and other Czech and Slovak citizens, which will be discussed in this essay.

Charter 77

Charter 77 enters the ninth year of its existence in 1985.[2] When the original declaration with 241 signatures was issued in January 1977, the signatories had no idea that they were bringing a durable entity into being. However, the number of signatories had risen to 750 by mid-1977, and reached over 1,000 by June 1980. Very few persons, some 15 in all, have withdrawn their signatures. Perhaps a hundred or so who were unable to endure systematic police harassment and job discrimination, or who lost hope of change in their life-time, have gone into exile. The losses caused by withdrawal or emigration, and by a few deaths, have been balanced numerically by additional signatories, announced in groups once a year.[3] The number of signatories is now almost 1,200, of whom some 1,000 remain in Czechoslovakia. Although many are now not active, a substantial minority, in spite of persecution and sometimes imprisonment, have assumed the heavy responsibilities and risks of sustained Charter activity.

Charter 77 remains a relatively small "community" united by a common resolve to work for civic and human rights, with no aspirations to become a mass movement. Its significance rests, it is said, not in the act of signing the Charter but in the spirit of independence thereby demonstrated. The signatories embody a certain pluralism,[4] representing different generations, occupations, religious persuasions, and political outlooks; they have quite diverse value orientations and had not previously been associated with each other. Although its leadership has come primarily from among intellectuals, Charter 77 includes a substantial proportion of workers.[5] Young people, including many who were children at the time of the Prague Spring or even at the start of Charter 77, have been well represented among later signatories. Initially, the Charter had supporters in towns and small cities throughout Bohemia and Moravia. However, persecution has forced many Chartists to move to the major cities or to emigrate, so that Charter 77 is now mainly a Prague and Brno phenomenon. It has always been almost entirely a Czech movement, with Slovaks scarcely present in its ranks.

A Czechoslovak secret police operative photographs visitors to the Prague apartment of Charter 77 signatory Jíří Hajek.

—Vincent Mentzel.

Although Charter 77 has deliberately eschewed anything but a minimum of organization, it has been guided by a succession of "spokesmen," who now rotate regularly at the beginning of each year. The three original spokesmen—philosopher Jan Patočka, diplomat and cabinet minister Jíří Hájek, and playwright Václav Havel, were well-known figures, as were some of their successors in 1978 and later.[6] More recently, spokesmen have been younger and less prominent. The older ones have usually remained active and served on the 15-member "collective of spokesmen," first formed in early 1980. Those imprisoned, such as Havel, Jaroslav Šabata, Václav Benda, Jíří Dienstbier, and Rudolf Báttek, have continued to be listed as spokesmen. The three spokesmen are not regarded as representing specific groupings among the signatories. In practice, however, they tended to include former leading communists, prominent noncommu-

[2]On the first five years of Charter 77, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981. See also an essay prepared by Vilém Prečan for a conference in Franken, West Germany, in 1979 in *Vývoj Charty, Záznam z konference ve Franken* (The Charter's Progress, Record of a Conference in Franken), Index, Cologne, 1981.

[3]Lists of new signatories, as well as letters of withdrawal, were published in *Informace o Chartě 77* (hereafter cited as *Infoch*), a Czechoslovak samizdat bulletin.

[4]Prečan, loc. cit., pp. 23–24.

[5]Among the first 1,000 signatories, the proportion of workers was about 40 percent (Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 40–41). In later listings, signatories who called themselves workers numbered 30 among 44 (*Infoch*, Apr. 27, 1981); 21 of 36 (ibid., Feb. 5, 1982); 21 of 37 (ibid., Mar. 3, 1983); and 11 of 25 (ibid., Feb. 7, 1984).

[6]For biographical sketches of spokesmen up to 1981, see Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 20–36; for others, see successive issues of *Infoch*.

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nists, persons with a strong religious affiliation, and cultural figures (categories that frequently overlapped). There has usually been a woman among the spokesmen. As time goes on, it becomes more difficult to find persons who are both willing to assume the risks and burden of spokesmanship and who are suitable for this responsible and demanding task.

Closely associated with Charter 77, but a separate organization, is the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (known by its Czech acronym, VONS). VONS was formed in 1978, with 17 publicly named members.[7] At the end of 1984, 27 names were given, of whom two were then in prison. Eleven others continued as members although they live in exile. In late 1979, VONS became a member of the International Federation of Human Rights and adopted the supplementary name of Czechoslovak League for Human Rights. Between April 1978 and December 1984, VONS issued a total of 409 numbered communiqués (*sdělení*), each containing a brief report on a case of prosecution or persecution. In a comprehensive listing of cases still outstanding, issued on November 8, 1984 (No. 400), VONS recorded 22 persons in prison and 50 under investigation or with suspended sentences. The communiqué also noted that VONS had reported on 179 cases that were now closed, and on 402 cases of extrajudicial repression (detentions, house searches, surveillance, limits on freedom of movement, beatings, etc.) and appealed for assistance from those who could provide data on other cases since VONS alone could document only a small proportion of existing cases.

While not regarded as the organ of either Charter 77 or VONS, the bulletin, *Informace o Chartě 1977* (Information on Charter 77), which has been appearing regularly approximately every month since its first issue in January 1978, publishes documentation about both.[8] *Infoch,* as it came to be called, is issued by an "independent editorial group of Charter signatories," and lists as editors Petr Uhl and his wife, Anna Šabatová (daughter of Jaroslav Šabata). It was she who bore the brunt of editing this journal from 1979 to 1984, while her husband was in prison. Usually 9 to 20 pages in length, *Infoch* contains most Charter documents and other materials, VONS communiqués, as well as individual protests and letters, biographical sketches, and feuilletons.

The "politics" of Charter 77. Initially, Charter 77 was important for bringing together for the first time people of differing political standpoints and world outlooks—noncommunists and former communists, democratic and revolutionary socialists, Catholics and Protestants. They were all seeking, after the disillusionment of 1968 and the discouragement of the 1970's, to discover new personal values and orientations, and they found a common bond in a concern for human rights. In its initial declaration, Charter 77 denied that it was in any sense an opposition or that it offered a program of political and social reform. Rather, in the exposition of its purposes by Charter spokesmen, it was described as a moral challenge. Nonetheless, the Charter could not help but be implicitly "political," since the full implementation of the rights the Charter defined would have transformed or even undermined the existing system in Czechoslovakia. In its later statements, Charter 77 adopted a critical attitude toward economic or environmental policies having little or nothing to do with human rights. Thus it challenged the regime on basic issues and offered alternative courses of action. As might have been expected, its offer of dialogue was rejected by the authorities, who, by attacking the movement as an opposition force, made it into a highly political phenomenon. In opening up a dialogue with the people, Charter 77 sought to extend its influence and win broader support so as to exert an influence on the regime and the course it was pursuing.

Although there was a wide consensus among signatories on the nature and the purposes of the Charter, there were differences of view and, during the early years, a good deal of controversy and open polemics

Professor Jan Patočka, a signatory of Charter 77, talks with representatives of the foreign press in Prague in 1977, shortly before his arrest and death.

—Vincent Mentzel.

[7] Skilling, *Charter 77,* pp. 118–20.
[8] Ibid., pp. 94–95.

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among its leading figures. Some, such as Havel and Ladislav Hejdánek, conceived of Charter 77 as Jan Patočka had—namely, as primarily a moral challenge directed to individuals and not requiring a high degree of organization. At most they favored a "nonpolitical politics," in Hejdánek's phrase, that would encourage various kinds of activity in the cultural and other fields outside the framework of the Charter proper. Václav Benda dubbed these "parallel institutions," which together might constitute "a parallel polis." Others, such as Uhl, Šabata, and Jan Tesař, would have liked to see the Charter be avowedly more political and challenge the regime more directly even at the risk of open confrontation. They also advocated a greater degree of organization of the movement. Some of them engaged in "surrogate" politics by informally grouping themselves on the basis of common ideas—"reform communist," "independent socialist," or "revolutionary socialist"—and issued joint statements. There were also heated debates among nonpolitical Chartists such as the writers Ludvík Vaculík and Havel, who strongly disagreed on tactics. Vaculík preferred what he called small-scale work (*drobná práce*) by ordinary persons in their normal life. Havel defended the more heroic and challenging actions, even at the risk of imprisonment.[9]

By 1984 these controversies had largely faded away. The passage of time had diminished the importance of disagreements about the Prague Spring and sustained common activity had tended to iron out differences and to mold a consensus on tactics. Moreover, the chief spokesmen of the more radical and political views had either been jailed for many years (Šabata and Uhl) or had gone into exile (Tesař and Julius Tomin). In any case, some of their organizational objectives had been achieved with the formation of VONS and the publication of *Infoch,* although the regular rotation of spokesmen militated against a tighter organization of the Charter as a whole. The long imprisonment of Havel and the withdrawal of Vaculík from active involvement in Charter affairs had blurred the differences between their standpoints.[10] More recent spokesmen have been younger and often had no distinctive political profile. It was also felt that there was no need to change methods or approaches. In fact, no feasible procedure existed for making changes, since the consent of all signatories would be required.

Thus, in striking contrast to the Polish scene, there were no organized political groupings or presentations of political views or programs in Czech samizdat materials. Although vestiges of the groupings mentioned above continue to exist, they are but minor or marginal tendencies, each represented by a handful of persons, and do not constitute even potential political parties. The so-called reform communists or Eurocommunists have had no leader of stature since the emigration of Zdeněk Mlynář in 1977, and have become less unified and exclusive than originally. As a result of the decline of Eurocommunism in Western Europe, they can no longer look abroad for firm support except, on occasion, to the Italian Communist Party. The independent or democratic socialists, with their leading figure, Rudolf Battěk, in prison for many years and their most militant member, Tesař, in exile, have been reduced to a tiny group (Jiří Mueller and others, mainly in Brno), and were disappointed in their hope for recognition by the Socialist International. The revolutionary socialists or Trotskyites ceased to be a political grouping with Uhl's five years' imprisonment and the emigration of his chief associate, J. Suk. Šabata, who might be called an "independent communist," emerged from prison as one of the most politically minded Chartists who enjoys the respect of all groupings and seems capable of perhaps formulating long-term political conceptions. Similarly, Václav Havel, who enjoys widespread esteem and admiration, serves as an integrating force—but in the intellectual rather than the political realm. Somewhat ironically, it is the nonpolitical Catholic grouping that has become more influential among Chartists in recent years.

Charter documents. In spite of the decline of "politics" among Chartists and the absence of controversy over Charter 77's purposes and tactics, there continue to be undercurrents of conflict arising from differences of personality and general outlook. At present, differences seem to focus not on tactics but on the substance of documents.

The principal activity of Charter 77, and the chief responsibility of its spokesmen, has been the issuance of various types of typewritten materials that are circulated among interested persons, and in appropriate cases, sent to relevant government departments or officials, to international organizations, or to individuals at home and abroad.

[9]For the political groupings and earlier polemics, see Skilling, *Charter 77,* pp. 43–51, 66–80, 181–83. On the nonpolitical character of Charter 77, see Prečan, loc. cit. pp. 21–23.

[10]Vaculík had also given up his independent publishing activities and concentrated on the preparation of a long diary-novel, which circulated in samizdat form and was eventually published as *Český snář* (Czech Dreamer), Toronto, Sixty-Eight Publishers, 1983. In it he recounted his own activities in the independent literary community, including the controversy with Havel. His book was highly praised by the latter in a review in *Kritický sborník*, No. 1, 1984, pp. 1–8.

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The exclusive use of the typewriter, motivated by the hope of avoiding prosecution for illegal publication, limits the distribution to the number of copies which can be made in several typings. In the early years, the materials were described as declarations, open letters, and communiqués or "documents," the last of which were numbered and dealt at length with a major theme.[11] During 1980 and 1981, as a result of heightened repression and the imprisonment of leading Chartists in 1979, almost no numbered documents were released, although several thematic analyses were issued under other designations. In early 1982, however, a new practice was adopted and has continued ever since, namely, to number all materials signed by the spokesmen, whatever their content or character. Also, when Charter 77 had to disavow a forged document, it was decided to list periodically all documents that had been issued by it during a six- or twelve-month period.[12]

The preparation of thematic documents is arduous and time-consuming, often taking months, and is sometimes not completed at all. The drafts usually reflect the specialized knowledge of the draftsmen, but are subject to modifications and amendments to satisfy the many persons drawn into the process. Sometimes the result is an approved final version that is colorless or lacking in clarity. Collective consultation is hampered by police surveillance, confiscation of drafts and typewriters, the lack of telephones, and the need for hand-to-hand distribution. Occasionally, however, a document is released without adequate consultation and produces criticism by other Chartists. All materials are signed by the three spokesmen, who vouch for their authenticity and assume responsibility for them, and sometimes names of some from the collective of spokesmen or of other Chartists associated with the preparation of a document are added.

During the first two years of Charter 77's existence the numbered documents reflected the original emphasis on human rights and dealt with violations of international agreements in areas such as education, the economy, literature and scholarship, freedom of expression, treatment of prisoners, travel abroad, and the status of gypsies. Other Charter materials recorded details of individual cases of violation of rights and persecution, often relating to Chartists. Criticism among signatories of this predominantly legal orientation and of the failure to deal with matters of more direct concern to the population as a whole led to a gradual change of emphasis. This began in May 1979 when a document on consumer problems appeared, followed by a supplement on this subject in November. In May 1980, a study of the problems of pensioners appeared. After the lull in 1980 and 1981 the number of "documents" greatly increased, but only a few dealt with specific themes in detail. During 1982, for instance, 38 were published, including a review of the Charter's first five years (document No. 3), studies of price rises and the economy (No. 6), international covenants and the criminal code (No. 14), employment discrimination (No. 17), education and training (No. 20), prison conditions (No. 22), religion and the law (No. 23), and scientific research (No. 26). During 1983, 44 documents were released, including studies of the economic situation (No. 4 and 36), literature (No. 14), environmental problems in northern Bohemia (No. 26), popular music (No. 31), and the Madrid conference (No. 43). Up to the end of November 1984, 20 documents were issued, including studies on the economic outlook (No. 6), the proposed school law (No. 7), the right to history (No. 11), security, peace, and human rights (No. 12 and 13), health care (No. 14), the right to information (No. 20), to history (No. 20), as well as a tribute to Jaroslav Seifert, winner of the 1984 Nobel Prize for literature and a Charter 77 signatory (No. 17).

The sharpest controversy occurred over the document on history. For the first time some signatories condemned openly and in strong terms a statement issued by the spokesmen. The analysis of the "right to history," whose author remains anonymous, was not the product of the usual wide consultation, not even with Chartists who are professional historians. Some of them promptly issued statements of censure. Paradoxically, these scholars, who had been dismissed from their institutes in 1969, not only pointed out serious errors in the study but also objected to its categorical condemnation of historical work performed by scholars within official institutions. Historiography should not be divided into official and non-official, they argued, but into good and bad. The controversy

[11]Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 86–94. For a full list of Charter documents and other materials issued to the end of 1980, see ibid., pp. 331–36. English summaries or translations of excerpts are available in the *Bulletin* and the *Summary of Available Documents* (the title varies), published irregularly by the Palach Press Limited, London. The documents are usually given in Czech in *Listy* (Rome). For a full analysis of charter documents in 1983, see V. Prečan's supplement to *Listy*, No. 2, 1984. A collection of Charter materials is located in the Thomas Fisher Rare Books Library, University of Toronto. See also Prečan, *Human Rights in Czechoslovakia: a Documentation, September 1981–December 1982*, Paris, 1983, published for the Madrid follow-up conference by the International Committee for the Support of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia.

[12]The document of denial (No. 15) and the first list of documents (No. 16) were given in *Infoch*, April 1982, pp. 4 and 5. Full lists of documents for 1982 and 1983 were later given in ibid., December 1982 (No. 38), June 1983 (No. 25), and January 1984 (No. 44). *Infoch* caused some confusion by publishing some documents without numbers or inaccurately numbered, and then assigning correct numbers in the full list that appeared later.

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took on religious overtones when some critics censured the strongly Christian, even Catholic, spirit of the document and its implicitly pro-Habsburg tendency.[13]

Independent Activity

Charter 77 can be understood only within the context of society as a whole, and not as something isolated from the mood and the circumstances of the people in Czechoslovakia. The experience of 1968 and its aftermath, "normalization," and the consequent disappointment, frustration, and hopelessness, produced the environment in which Charter 77 was formed and had its being. Its birth represented the recovery by limited circles from the post-1968 depression, and the revival of a will to act independently in the "here and now," however slight the expectations of early and significant change might be. This could not help but exert some influence on others. In Havel's words, Charter 77, "by its rise and its consistent, persevering, and fearless efforts, broadened the space for diverse other independent activities and initiatives, especially cultural ones, which were not directly connected with it but which would probably, but for its existence, not have arisen at all or at least would not have developed to this extent."[14] An important benefit of the Charter lies therefore in its character as a stimulus or catalyst for independent thinking, writing, and acting, even though it is often difficult to distinguish its direct or indirect influence from other social forces generating such activity.

Independent activity may take modest and unspectacular forms, personal in character and not widely known, but always ferreted out and hounded by the regime as if harboring the germs of a dangerous social movement. A group in a small town prepares an amateur production of Smetana's *The Bartered Bride*; or people in a district of Prague put on a puppet show for children—both are censored. Some workers in a hospital form a travel club which hires a ship for evening cruises on the Vltava, with dancing—this is banned. Someone writes freelance, under a pseudonym, or publishes a book under someone else's name. An artist exhibits his work to a limited circle of friends and acquaintances. Parents seek to instill traditional values in their children and to protect them from regime propaganda. People grow their own vegetables and fruit at their cottages in the country, and may even sell some of their produce. Others earn extra income by "moonlighting" in the evenings or weekends, or even during working hours; or they speculate in foreign currency or Tuzex coupons. Groups of specialists in foreign affairs or economics meet every month to discuss their subjects. Amateurs of literature meet regularly to read poetry or the works of Milan Kundera. Historians meet over many years to prepare a large-scale study of Czech history. Every year, writers and philosophers hold "congresses" as in the old days. Young or old gather for "talk" in one of the thousands of inns or wine cellars, or go on excursions on weekends, sometimes pursuing historical or environmental interests. Thousands of young people gather to listen to a dozen or more rock bands. Tapes and cassettes containing popular music, or lectures and articles, pass from hand to hand. Graffiti appear on the walls of Na Kampě in Prague, reminding people that "Lennon is still with us" and, when painted over by the police, are replaced with other slogans on music or peace.

Four examples of independent activity that is broader in scope and better known will be discussed below. Their development suggests that changes in the mood and mentality of society are taking place. Most of these activities occur outside the official structures, but some take place within established institutions and organizations. Some are conducted by Chartists, and some have no direct connection with the Charter. One of these tendencies—independent activity in culture and scholarship—antedates Charter 77 and contributed to its emergence. A second, independent movements among youth in the sphere of popular culture, were one of the breeding grounds of Charter 77 and now are blossoming anew. A third, the revival of religion and a growing independence vis-à-vis the regime on the part of the Catholic Church's hierarchy and believers, represents a relatively new development that poses a difficult challenge for the regime. Finally, there is an entirely new phenomenon—the reaction of Charter 77 and of society generally to problems of peace and nuclear war. This reaction was stimulated by the West European peace movement and by the placement of Soviet missiles on Czechoslovak soil.

Independent writing and publishing. Charter 77, it has been said, stimulated "an explosion of typewritten

[13] See Charter documents No. 11, 1984 ("The Right to History") and No. 16, 1984, in which the spokesmen described the document as an appeal for discussion, and appended the critical comments made by historians M. Hájek, H. Mejdrová, J. Opat, and M. Otáhal (June 25, 1984). Other historians joined in with polemical criticisms, e.g., Milan Hübl, "Dispute Over Two Concepts of Czech History," *Infoch*, July–August 1984; Luboš Kohout, "The Historian's Responsibility," ibid., September 1984; Jan Křen, "On 'The Right to History'," and Petr Uhl, "Letter to Charter 77 Spokesmen," ibid., October 1984.

[14] An unpublished communication from Václav Havel.

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Ludvík Vaculík, a writer and signatory of Charter 77, who in 1972 founded Edice Petlice (Padlock Editions), which published more than 250 unofficial volumes.

—EASTFOTO.

material" and created "a typewriter culture."[15] This "parallel" culture, although not as prodigious as in Poland both before and after Solidarity, is rich and variegated, and includes hundreds of books, dozens of journals, and hundreds of feuilletons, essays, short stories, and poems. No one, including those actively engaged in creating it, is familiar with all of this outpouring, nor can anyone estimate how many copies are made—often by readers inspired to reproduce on their own typewriters something they value highly. In spite of the time and effort lavished upon its production, much of this material is not seen by the bulk of the population, many of whom would be interested in reading it but have no way of getting hold of it. Distribution is difficult and dangerous, since even possession of samizdat works is often made the basis for criminal charges. Yet these samizdat materials (as well as journals and books published in the West) are to be seen in private homes—and are often confiscated during house searches by the police. Complete collections do not exist, except perhaps in police headquarters. Relatively few copies are sent abroad, so that no complete archive could be established anywhere, although large collections are held in some private hands or in libraries in the West.[16]

The "publishing" of books in samizdat form by a number of "edice" (publishing houses) has produced, at a modest estimate, at least 600 and perhaps many more titles. Best known is Edice Petlice (Padlock Editions), initiated in 1972 by Ludvík Vaculík, who put out more than 250 volumes.[17] The author of each book, whose consent for "publication" was required, signed each copy. Edice Kvart (Quarto Editions) was started even before Petlice (as Vaculík found out to his surprise) by the writer Jan Vladislav, who issued about 120 books before he was forced into exile.[18] A third series, Edice Expedice (Dispatch Editions) was organized by Václav Havel, who selected the books on his own and signed them himself.[19] Other publishing ventures, such as Edice Popelnice (Ashcan Editions), were more short-lived due to the arrest of the respective chief editors. There were as many as seven religious or theological edice—one of which, in Olomouc, published 80 books before the arrest of its editors ended this venture. Duch a Život (Spirit and Life), Přátele (Friends), and Cesty myšleni (Paths of Thought) were put out in xerox or printed form and thus had a wider circulation than typewritten material.

The production of a book series is a thankless and time-consuming task, as the editors have reported.[20] As in all publishing, it requires the reading of many manuscripts and the selection of those to be accepted, often on the basis of readers' reports; editing and having the book typed and bound; correcting the typed copies; and distributing, personally, 25 to 50 copies all over Prague and to other parts of the repub-

[15]See Zdena Tomin, "The Typewriters Hold the Fort," *Index of Censorship* (London), No. 2, April 1983, pp. 28–30; Jan Vladislav, "All You Need Is a Typewriter," ibid., pp. 33–35.

[16]For religious materials, see the collections at Keston College, Keston, Kent, England. For other materials, see the collections in the Fisher Rare Book Library, Toronto.

[17]A bibliography of Petlice, with a foreword by J. Gruša, is being prepared by the Fisher Rare Book Library and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto. Vaculík issued several works by Jaroslav Seifert that were later published officially although in censored form.

[18]See Vladislav, loc. cit.; also V. Prečan, "Secret Reader, Secret Critic, and Secret Publisher," in Jan Vladislav, *Male morality* (Small Moralities), Munich, Arkýř, 1984, pp. 146–47.

[19]During Havel's imprisonment Expedice books were signed by his wife Olga, and a number of books appeared under the rubric Edice Svíce (Candle Editions).

[20]Vladislav, "All You Need is a Typewriter," loc. cit.; Vaculík, op. cit., passim.

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lic. The price, to cover out-of-pocket expenses, must be calculated and payments collected. Often the publisher must do almost everything himself, and thus loses time that he would rather have devoted to his own writing. Editors and authors are constantly harassed by the police, by frequent house searches, questioning, and sometimes confiscation of manuscripts or finished books, and occasionally by imprisonment. Typists, binders, and those possessing or distributing books are also prosecuted.

Another form of samizdat publishing is the literary or scholarly journal, which entails the same problems for editors and authors. In addition to *Infoch,* issued on Charter's behalf, many other journals have appeared as the result of a kind of spontaneous process by groups of friends, who put together articles which they or others had written.[21] Almost all are typewritten and usually not bound. Some are issued without even a title. Some last but a short time due to the imprisonment or emigration of the editors. Names of the editors are almost never given, but the authors usually sign their real names. At present, the best-known journal is *Kritický sborník* (Critical Review), which has appeared four times a year since 1981; it is usually 80 to 100 pages long, and contains articles by well-known writers and scholars. Others, such as *Obsah* (Contents) and *Vyber z čsl. čtenářské samoobsluhy* (Selection from Czechoslovak Readers' Self-Service), have appeared for several years.[22] Three theological journals having a large circulation due to the use of means of reproduction other than a typewriter are: *Vzkříšení* (Resurrection, appearing since 1979); *Informace o církvi* (Information on the Church, since 1980); and *Teologické texty* (Theological Texts, from 1980)—the successor to *Teologický sborník* (Theological Review, from 1977 to 1979). An annual, *Una Sancta Catholica,* appeared in 1983 and 1984. A novel development was the appearance of Slovak journals: a theological journal, *Náboženstvo a súčasnost* (Religion and the Contemporary World, since 1982); and two others—one without a name (identified only by an "X" on its cover), the other entitled *Kontakt*.

Another category included scholarly journals such as *Ekonomická revue* (Economic Review), which comes out irregularly, with Vladimir Kadlec (government member under Dubček) as a major contributor, and *Čtverec* (The Square), devoted to foreign affairs. The first issue of the latter was edited by Jiří Dienstbier, (formerly a foreign correspondent for Czechoslovak radio) although two others appeared after his imprisonment. More sustained was a historical journal, first issued under the title *Historické studie,* which has continued regularly since 1978, each number having a different name. The editors were not identified. After eight issues had been produced, the editors evidently differed on the content of future issues, since two separate journals with different titles appeared simultaneously in November 1982.[23]

Finally, one should mention one other type of samizdat publication, the *sborník,* a symposium or collection of essays on a single theme. The most significant of these in the field of history were a 750-page collection on T. G. Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia; a symposium on the 200th anniversary of the issuance of the Toleration Patent by Emperor Rudolf II; and two collections of essays on the First Republic.[24] An even more ambitious project was the multi-volume publication of the collected works of the late Jan Patočka.[25]

Youth and independent music. Another example of independent activity has been the attempt by young people to have their own life style as well as to express themselves in the writing or enjoyment of their own poetry and music. The persecution of rock musicians and their fans led a number of young people, including several well-known musicians, to sign the Charter and to take an active part in its work.[26] Within the Charter's leadership, Václav Havel was from the beginning a strong supporter of "underground music." During 1977, when one of the Charter spokesmen was the popular folk singer of the 1960's Marta Kubišová, Charter 77 issued a document that described the structure of official control of popular music and the measures taken to inhibit and ultimately liquidate any really independent musical expression. More recently, Charter 77 put out a fuller statement, which referred

[21]On journals see Skilling, *Charter 77,* pp. 113–14; George Moldau, "Samizdat Journals in the CSSR," *Listy,* No. 5, October 1983, pp. 59–61.

[22]Other journals include *Prostor* (Space), *Nový brak* (New Rubbish), *Nový Petřín* (New Petřín), *Horizont* (Horizon), *Moravská čítanka* (Moravian Reader), and *Čtení na dovolenou—(Výběr)* (Holiday Reading—A Selection).

[23]For a review of the first eight issues, see Skilling, "Independent Historiography in Czechoslovakia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Toronto) December 1983, pp. 518–39.

[24]Milan Machovec, Petr Pithart, and Josef Dubský, Eds., *T. G. Masaryk a naše současnost* (T. G. Masaryk and Our Contemporary World), typewritten, Prague, 1980; M. Machovec, Ed., *Sborník ke dvoustému výroči tolerančního patentu* (Symposium on the 200th Anniversary of the Toleration Patent), 1981; *Sborník k 65. výroči vzniku Československé Republiky* (Symposium on the 65th Anniversary of the Rise of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1983; *Studie z dějin předmnichovské republiky* (Studies from the History of the Pre-Munich Republic), Prague, November 1983. For a review article on the Masaryk symposium, see Skilling, "The Rediscovery of Masaryk," in *Cross Currents, A Yearbook of Central European Culture,* pp. 87–114.

[25]*Sebrany texty Jana Patočky* (Collected Writings of Jan Patočka), probably ten volumes in all, including volumes on Plato, Komenský, Masaryk, philosophy and art, and the natural world.

[26]See Skilling, *Charter 77,* Ch. 1, on popular music and the origin of Charter 77.

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Marta Kubišová, a leading Czech pop singer and one of the spokesmen for Charter 77 in 1977.

—EASTFOTO.

to the "mass discontent of youth as a result of the crisis of civilization and its basic values," and described this kind of music as "a revolt of conscience and spirit ... almost the main guide, or medium, of this important spiritual and social confrontation."[27] Various forms of popular music—jazz, rock and roll, folk, rock, and punk rock—and the lyrics of the songs—expressed the young people's distinctive values and challenged, explicitly or implicitly, the consumer society and the totalitarian polity in which they had to live.

The regime deemed popular music a threat to the conformity demanded of youth and made each style, in turn, the target of verbal denunciations and persecution of the musicians. Ivan Jirous, the moving spirit behind the group called the Plastic People of the Universe, was singled out for specially ruthless treatment and is now serving his fourth prison term.[28] Concerts were often cancelled or broken up by the police, and those who had come to listen were questioned and sometimes beaten up or arrested. Many fans were sentenced to prison merely for possessing musical tapes.

Jazz, once condemned and banned, is now accepted, at least in the form of nostalgic imitations of American songs of the 1920's. Some 10 jazz bands perform legally, for instance, the Prague Syncopated Jazz Orchestra, which may be heard in public concerts and on television. Rock, however, is still almost entirely taboo, except for several officially approved bands of poor quality. The Plastic People, forbidden to perform even privately, confine themselves to making recordings.[29] Recently, in an unusual collaboration with singer Kubišová, the Plastics have recorded a new collection, *Pulnočni myš* (Midnight Mouse). There are as many as 200 other rock bands that perform semilegally, usually outside the main cities on weekends. The "new wave," initiated by punk rock, also caught on, and some 50 bands have come into existence. Although many young people, concerned to protect their university studies and their careers, shun open participation in concerts, thousands of others do attend or listen to tapes and cassettes.

The fans of popular music have developed from an "interest group" of youth into a "social community," which includes older as well as young people, and extends its concern to other forms of art and culture.[30] The chief advocate of this community, and the main defender of "alternative music," is the Jazz Section (Jazzová Sekce or JS) of the Union of Musicians, which has so far survived persistent efforts by the Ministry of Culture to make its life difficult or even to terminate its existence. The JS has a membership of 4,000, each of whom pays an annual fee of 40 crowns, but it has a following estimated at close to 100,000. The JS receives no funds from its parent organization and depends on membership fees and income from some of its activities. Its staff is entirely volunteer, headed by Karel Srp, who has been subjected to police harassment and dismissal from his regular job and now faces trumped up charges of fi-

[27]Document No. 13, 1977; text given in ibid., pp. 252–56; document No. 31, 1983, summarized fully in *Západ* (Ottawa), No. 6, December 1983, pp. 1–4.

[28]Eighty-five young people in Moravia demanded the release of Jirous and others in a letter of Aug. 31, 1983 (*Infoch*, August 1983, pp. 3–4).

[29]Records have been prepared and distributed by Boži mlýn, Toronto, Canada. On the Plastic People and Czechoslovakia's underground culture, see "Banned in Bohemia," which contains an interview with Vratislav Brabenec of the Plastics and an article by Ivan Jirous, *Index on Censorship*, February 1983, pp. 30–34.

[30]See Charter document No. 31, 1983, and a report by the Jazz Section of the Union of Musicians (see below), given by Mary Novak in *Západ*, No. 4, pp. 16–21, and articles by Vladimira Burke, ibid., October and December 1983, and October 1984.

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An amateur jazz group at a private concert in Prague in the summer of 1984.

—Jazz Section of the Union of Musicians.

nancial irregularities. Although JS has no formal links with Charter 77 (Srp is not a signatory), it is described by the police as "a legal arm of Charter 77," and is treated accordingly. Its ability to survive is due to wide popular support as well as to its affiliation since 1979 with the International Jazz Federation under the Music Council of UNESCO.

The Jazz Section had as its main original purpose the promotion of jazz, and later of rock, and became well-known for organizing over a period of nine years the successful Prague Jazz Days, an annual festival that presented all kinds of popular music and included both amateur and professional bands, some from abroad. Lasting 10 days, the festival attracted capacity audiences. In 1981, the festival, although sold out, was cancelled by the authorities at the last minute, and similar bans in subsequent years have forced the JS to organize only private concerts.

The Jazz Section then turned to publishing, something permitted under its organizational statute. Despite increasing official persecution, the JS issued for its members a Jazz bulletin, a magazine of some 100 pages, dealing with art, theater, and literature, as well as music. It became a veritable publishing house, initiating several book series, usually printed, such as Edice Situace (paperbacks dealing with painting and containing reproductions), Edice Dokumenty, and Jazzpetit Edice, a series on subjects as varied as rock, poetry, E. F. Burian and John Lennon, Dada and surrealism, the music of the Terezín ghetto, and Czech rock and roll. Its program included even a book by Bohumil Hrabal, banned by official publishers, *Jak ja obsluhoval anglického krále* (How I Served the English King). It has also published, in three volumes, *Rock 2,000,* probably the largest bibliography of rock music in the world.

In the spring of 1983 the war of the regime against "the new wave" of popular music culminated in a savage attack in *Tribuna.* The attack was aimed at all non-conformist music, including even some rock bands hitherto officially approved, and it was immediately endorsed in *Rudé právo,* the party newspaper.[31]

[31] Jan Kryzl, "'New' Wave with Old Content," *Tribuna* (Prague), Mar. 23, 1983, given in *Západ,* October 1983, pp. 1–2; also Z. Bakešová, *Rudé právo* (Prague), Mar. 30, 1983.

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The article condemned musicians for "spreading among the youth opinions unacceptable to our ideology, a philosophy of nihilism and marasmus, a cynical approach to life and all its values," lamented the fact that such musical events were often sponsored by trade union and youth organizations, local authorities, and official cultural centers, and called for "strict control of their activities"and for strict measures against individuals. This vicious diatribe produced a wave of protest letters from young people (most of which were, naturally, not published) and a detailed response by the Jazz Section in a booklet entitled *Rock na levém křídle* (Rock on the Left Wing), which was distributed in large numbers.[32] This tried to correct the distorted picture of the history of rock at home and abroad, and charged that the official attitude toward this popular and socially conscious musical form had created distrust of the Communist Party among youth. Charter 77, in its own document (No. 31, 1983), warned that if young people "are constantly denied the music that they enjoy, this can only lead to a deepening of general frustration, feelings of hopelessness, of powerlessness, and of the emptiness of life—or on the other hand, to the nourishment of latent social tensions."[33]

By late summer of 1984 the regime had still not brought about the demise of the JS and its activities, in part because of the latter's dogged resistance to its own liquidation, in part because the Union of Musicians failed to dissolve the Jazz Section. In July, the Ministry of the Interior suspended the Union for three months and threatened to dissolve it if the Union did not liquidate the JS and its publishing activities. The Union was dissolved on October 22, 1984.

Religion and the church. Another illustration of independent activity is to be found in the "rebirth of religious faith" noticeable at the time of Charter 77's formation,[34] and, more recently, in the more self-confident stance adopted by the Catholic hierarchy. The most striking manifestation of the former was a turn toward religion by youth, who became a visible presence in churches and who took part in services held in private homes. The lack of attraction to Marxism-Leninism and of faith in communism caused young people to look for meaning in life in religion of all kinds, including Buddhism and other non-institutionalized belief. Priests and pastors (some 500 of whom have been deprived of licenses to perform their duties) conduct services privately in what some have called "the underground church" and have often been prosecuted and imprisoned for "obstructing state supervision of church affairs."[35] A number of pastors, priests, and theological students, as well as Catholic and Protestant laymen, have taken an active part in the Charter 77 movement and are the target of especially severe police harassment. As noted above, there has been a widespread dissemination of Catholic samizdat books and journals, published presumably with the tacit encouragement and perhaps with some concrete assistance from local churches. This has extended also to Slovakia, where such activity is carried out in greater secrecy. There have been similar tendencies, somewhat more limited, among Protestants.

This revival of faith has reflected itself in the past two or three years in a changed comportment by František Cardinal Tomášek, the Czech Primate, who celebrated his 85th birthday on June 30, 1984. He had long avoided public criticism of the regime and sought to rectify problems through private discussions with secular authorities. Largely as a result of the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła as Pope, and under his personal influence, Cardinal Tomášek has begun to take an increasingly independent stand and has sought to identify himself with the believers and the nation as a whole.[36] It is now his practice, after serving mass in St. Vitus Cathedral on a Sunday morning, to stroll slowly through the courtyards of the Castle across the square to his palace, greeting and blessing the faithful. They in turn applaud him and chant, "Long live our Father Cardinal," or sometimes, "Long live John Paul II." In a symbolic confrontation of church and state, Cardinal Tomášek then appears on the balcony of his palace, which is right across Hradčany Square from the President's residence in the Castle.

The starting point of this shift in the Cardinal's behavior has usually been considered to be the Vatican edict in 1982 banning political activity by the priesthood. In consequence, the Cardinal condemned Pacem in Terris, the pro-regime organization of priests, and the equally pro-regime Catholic newspaper, *Katolické noviny,* whose right to speak for Catho-

[32]Published by Edice Dokumenty, text given also in *Západ,* October 1983, pp. 2–6.

[33]In *Západ,* December 1983, p. 4.

[34]Jiří Lederer, "Charter 77 and Christians," *Studie* (Rome), No. 84, 1982, pp. 581–86.

[35]Charter 77 issued a document (No. 22, July 8, 1982) on the use of article 178 of the criminal code for the persecution of clergymen. See also document No. 11, 1982 (March 10, 1982), on the persecution of priests, believers, nuns, and others; document No. 8 (March 3, 1982) on the limitation of freedom of conviction, including religious faith; letter of April 23, 1983, signed by 3,397 Catholics and Protestants to Cardinal Tomášek protesting police harassment of believers.

[36]Bradley Graham interview with Cardinal Tomášek, *The Washington Post,* National Weekly Edition, May 28, 1984, p. 17.

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František Cardinal Tomášek speaking with the faithful in the courtyard of Prague Castle in June 1984.

—Photo by a visitor.

lics he firmly denied. On a later occasion, the Cardinal reacted to a personal attack on the Pope printed in *Tribuna,* and defended John Paul II as "a great humanist, indomitable defender of human rights, and one of the great popes of all time." He censured the author of the *Tribuna* article for not contributing to the relaxation of international tension and for breaching international covenants on human rights.[37]

Cardinal Tomášek took his strongest stand during the Prague World Peace Assembly meeting in the summer of 1983, when, in a brief appearance, he delivered a bold pronouncement on the indivisibility of peace and human rights:

He who threatens truth in the interest of propaganda threatens peace; he who threatens respect for justice for all without exception threatens peace; he who threatens basic human liberties, including religious freedom, threatens peace.... There will be no peace on a large scale unless there is peace on a small scale. This means peace within every community as well as within each individual.[38]

The Cardinal's attitude toward Charter 77 also underwent a change. Although some Catholics, such as the former priest Václav Malý and laymen such as Benda and Radim Palouš, had served as spokesmen, Tomášek had assumed an unsympathetic, if not unfriendly, posture and had been sharply criticized by individual Catholic Chartists. More recently, there seems to have been a gradual meeting of minds between Church and Charter, and an increasingly friendly attitude toward Benda. The culmination of this tendency was a petition for a visit by the Pope to Czechoslovakia which was circulated, probably with the knowledge of the Cardinal and perhaps with the aid of Chartist believers. It secured more than 17,000 signatures (lists with 11,000 more signatures were

[37]The Cardinal's statements were, of course, not published in Czechoslovak newspapers, even in *Katolicke noviny,* but they circulated in samizdat form, for instance in *Informace o církvi.* For the article attacking the Pope, see *Tribuna,* Mar. 28, 1984; the Cardinal's reply was dated April 9, 1984. His letter on Pacem in Terris, not dated, was given in *Infoch,* October 1982, pp. 3–4.

[38]English translation in *Czechoslovak Newsletter* (Washington, DC), Nos. 7/8 (82/83), July–August 1983.

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confiscated by the police). The Cardinal thereupon invited the Pope to come to Czechoslovakia to commemorate the 1100th anniversary of the death of the Slavic missionary, St. Methodius who, tradition has it, is buried in Moravia. The Pope accepted the invitation and explicitly thanked the thousands of believers who had supported it. His reply (dated May 1, 1984) was circulated in samizdat and transmitted by the Cardinal to the authorities, who rejected the visit almost at once.

There has been no comparable evolution within the Protestant churches, whose leading figures have remained largely unsympathetic to Charter 77 and have offered little moral support for pastors and laymen suffering persecution for their actions in the human rights movement. The Evangelical Synod, however, on several occasions expressed views on issues of public concern, e.g., it protested the arrest and imprisonment of a prominent Protestant Chartist Jan Litomiský and adopted a resolution which condemned the stationing of missiles in both East and West.[39]

Human rights and peace. Charter 77 derived much of its inspiration from the United Nations covenants on human rights and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and based many of its appeals on these and other international agreements that the Czechoslovak government had endorsed.[40] The opening of the Madrid CSCE review conference in 1980 led Charter 77 to renew appeals to its own government to honor its obligations under the Helsinki Accord and to take measures to bring the country's laws into harmony with these commitments. Charter document No. 29, 1982, urged the delegates to strive for a balanced concluding document, which would contribute to a peace that was not merely "a truce among states," but also to "a life within states which gave priority to values such as freedom, human dignity, responsibility, sacrifice for others, and respect for truth." Concretely, it suggested the establishment of an international coordinating committee that would supervise the fulfillment of obligations and would work closely with "civic initiatives" such as Charter 77. The appeal also called for the release of a number of prisoners, whose names were listed, and for the termination of proceedings against others.[41]

The concluding document agreed on at Madrid was welcomed by Charter 77 as a contribution to the solution of the "crisis of mutual confidence." The Charter praised the inclusion of provisions dealing with human rights and the emphasis on the equal validity of all ten principles of the Final Act. Charter 77 called for concrete measures to implement these principles, in particular the approval by Czechoslovakia of Article 41 and of the optional clause of the UN Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, and urged that the government guarantee the right of citizens to participate in monitoring human rights through such groups as Charter 77 and VONS. The document also demanded the release of prisoners and protested police raids in November 1983 in connection with the stationing of missiles in Czechoslovakia.[42] At the end of December, Charter 77 issued a detailed evaluation of the Madrid meeting and stated that the proceedings had "internationalized the whole problem of human rights" and had confirmed the legitimacy of groups such as Charter 77 which sought to monitor their government's record in this area.[43]

Charter 77 issued a number of documents on the international dimension of the struggle for human rights. Several of these expressed support for the Solidarity trade union and condemned the declaration of martial law.[44] On the anniversary of the Soviet intervention in 1968, Charter 77 usually released a statement condemning the use of armed force and calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia. Noting the social crisis produced by the intervention and by the policies followed during the subsequent 16 years, Charter 77 demanded that the crisis be resolved by the abandonment of these policies.[45] One of these, discrimination in employ-

[39]The texts of these resolutions were not available to this author. See a November 1983 criticism of the inadequacy of the latter resolution by the Protestant Chartist Miloš Rejchrt in *Summary of Available Documents*, No. 24, July 1984, pp. 67–68.

[40]For the international aspects of Charter 77, see Skilling, *Charter 77*, Ch. 8.

[41]*The appeal was dated Oct. 22, 1982 (Infoch*, October 1982, pp. 1–2). On earlier proposals, see Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 162–64. See document No. 14, 1982, on the Czechoslovak criminal code and the international covenants. See also VONS letter to Madrid protesting repressive actions against defenders of human rights, May 15, 1981 (*Bulletin and Summary of Available Documents*, No. 17, June 1981, pp. 11–12).

[42]Charter 77 document No. 39, Nov. 14, 1983, (*Infoch*, November 1983, pp. 1–3). *Infoch*, in an earlier report (September 1983, pp. 9–10), published paragraphs 8 to 17 of the concluding document, which had been omitted by *Rudé právo* (Sept. 24, 1983) in its text of the document. See Charter 77's letter of June 17, 1983, to the Czechoslovak Committee for European Security (document No. 12, 1984).

[43]Document No. 43, 1983 (*Infoch*, January 1984, pp. 1–8). For a full treatment of the Madrid conference, see Skilling, "CSCE in Madrid," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1981; also Skilling, "The Madrid Follow-up," in Robert A. Spencer, Ed., *Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984, Ch. 8.

[44]Documents Nos. 2, 5, 28, 30, in 1982; Nos. 34 and 35, 1983 (given in English in *Bulletin and Summary of Available Documents*, Nos. 18–20, 21–23, 24). On Feb. 2, 1984, a joint statement was issued by Chartists and members of KOR and Solidarity, later endorsed by 19 Hungarians (see *Summary*, No. 24).

[45]Documents No. 26, 1982, and No. 30, 1983 (*Summary*, Nos. 21–23, 24). Police raids on leading Chartists on August 16, 1984, confiscated a draft declaration on the anniversary, but a document calling for the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces was nonetheless issued on August 19 (No. 15), 1984.

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British participants in the June 1983 World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War in Prague.

—EASTFOTO.

ment, was the subject of repeated appeals to the government and to the International Labour Organization. Although admittedly there has been a slight change for the better after the ILO's 1978 condemnation of Czechoslovak practices, the discrimination continued, since the mass dismissals of 1969 and 1977 were not reversed and because political requirements for employment continued to be imposed.[46]

Although Charter 77 had from the start considered itself a constituent part of the worldwide movement for human rights in both East and West, the rise of peace movements in Western Europe added a new dimension to Charter 77's perspective and required it to formulate its own position on the peace issue. Chartists in general took a positive attitude toward these groups, regarding them as being, like their own movement, manifestations of "civic responsibility."[47] Charter 77, it was stressed, was a human rights movement, not a peace movement, but it also always regarded "the right to life" as one of the fundamental human rights without which others could not be assured. Conversely, peace, as the Helsinki Final Act had stated, was inseparably linked with the observance of human rights. Although this viewpoint was not always shared by Western peace movements, Charter 77 believed it desirable to develop an active dialogue with them. The holding of the World Peace Assembly in Prague in 1983 provided the first opportunity for direct contact with some Western peace activists.

Space prevents anything more than a telegraphic summary of salient viewpoints of Charter 77 on peace, as expressed in documents issued since 1981, usually in response to invitations to attend Western peace conferences or as messages to such meetings.[48]

[46]Documents No. 19, 1982, No. 18, 1983, and No. 10, 1984. See also a letter to the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, March 26, 1981, from a group of Charter signatories, which contained a long analysis of violations of ILO conventions and suggestions for their correction.

[47]Prečan, in *Vývoj Charty*, pp. 88–90.

[48]The most important Charter documents on peace were as follows: declaration of Nov. 16, 1981; document No. 13, Mar. 29, 1982 (open letter to the peace movements); No. 18, Apr. 21, 1982 (letter to peace movement in the GDR); No. 25, Aug. 27, 1982 (open letter to the Interchurch Peace Council, Holland); No. 9, Apr. 30, 1983 (letter to the European Conference on Nuclear Disarmament in West

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- Peace (the right to life) is but "one of the fundamental rights" and enjoys no special priority. There are other values for which life may have to be sacrificed (document No. 13, 1982).[49]
- "Peace at any price" does not guarantee an enduring absence of war as the Munich Agreement of 1938 demonstrated (No. 29, 1982).
- It is not enough to have "any kind of peace," but a peace of justice and of dignity is needed in which "internal peace" between state and citizen promotes "external peace" (No. 20, 1983).
- "There is no peace without freedom." (ibid). Only freedom guarantees "effective control" of governments and of international negotiations (No. 29, 1983).
- Peace is indivisible also in respect to the relationship between North and South, the poor and the richer nations, and the danger of ecological catastrophes and the devastation of nature (No. 9, 1983, and No. 20, 1983).
- Arms reduction creates a favorable environment for peace, but the military threat is not the main danger for peace and is but "one of the dimensions of that danger" (No. 20, 1983, and No. 25, 1982).

The world peace assembly in Prague in the summer of 1983 helped Charter 77 to have an impact on Western public opinion. When its request to participate was denied by the Prague organizers, Charter 77 submitted a long statement to the gathering, supplemented by a collection of documents by Chartists on peace.[50] The document included some of the arguments summarized above and advanced for the first time the proposal that negotiations on arms control and peace should be opened up to public control through the publication in each country of the proposals, arguments, and statistical data of both sides (document No. 20, 1983). The Chartist statement was read to the gathering by some Western delegates. Despite police interference, some Chartists managed to meet with a few Western delegates, and were able to issue several brief joint statements on the link between peace and human rights.[51] At the conclusion of the conference, and independently of Charter 77, some 300 young people succeeded in carrying out a short march under the banner of "peace and freedom" before it was broken up.[52]

Although the domestic media did not report on these events, they received much attention in the world media, especially on British television, and became known, from Western broadcasts, to people in Czechoslovakia. The official use of the world assembly for Eastern propaganda purposes was thus effectively counterbalanced by these unofficial actions. Moreover, police repression and censorship offered telling arguments in support of the proposition that the lack of freedom placed obstacles in the path of peace.

At the end of 1983 came the deployment of missiles on Czechoslovak soil—something that profoundly touched the emotions of many citizens and aroused their deepest fears. Leading Chartists were warned by police against any expression of opposition, under penalty of criminal charges.[53] Nevertheless, a Charter document turned the tables on the regime by quoting an official declaration to the effect that the stationing of missiles in Western Europe did not promote security.[54] Evidence of widespread apprehension was the petition against the stationing of missiles "anywhere in the world," initiated by several young people in Brno and signed by several thousand.[55]

During 1984, Charter 77 continued to stress the necessity of dialogue with kindred movements of "civic responsibility" in Western Europe, "across the fron-

Berlin); No. 19, May 30, 1983, and No. 20, June 15, 1983 (letters to the World Assembly in Prague); No. 29, July 26, 1983 (letter to the French peace conference in Larzac); No. 9, May 1, 1984 (letter to British peace movements, CND and END); No. 13, June 30, 1984 (open letter to Conference on European Nuclear Disarmament in Perugia).

For an excellent analysis, see "Charter 77, Its Relationship to Questions of Peace and War and to the Contemporary Peace Movement," by Vilém Prečan (in Czech), in Milan Schulz, Ed., *Mír, mírové hnuti, křestánská etika* (Peace, the Peace Movement, and Christian Ethics), Munich, Opus Bonum, 1982, pp. 75–100.

[49]See the phrase "one of the important human rights" in document No. 25, 1982. This was inaccurately translated as "that most basic of human right [sic] in Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomin, Eds., *Voices from Prague, Czechoslovakia, Human Rights and the Peace Movement*, London, European Nuclear Disarmament and Palach Press Ltd., 1983, p. 26.

[50]Document No. 20, 1983. The collection *Sborník, Charta 77 o míru* (Symposium—Charter 77 on Peace), Prague (presumably), 1983, contained documents issued by Charter 77 and by individual Chartists. Other samizdat symposia, entitled *Diskuse o míru* (Discussion of Peace), were issued in Prague (only No. 4, 1984 was available to the author). The Kavan-Tomin collection cited in fn 49 contained some of the same documents as the Prague collection and others, but the translation contains a number of errors. For reports on events surrounding the efforts of Chartists to attend the assembly and to meet Western delegates, see Charter documents Nos. 21 and 24, 1983.

[51]Document No. 24, 1983, gave the text of joint statements, one with the French peace organization, CODENE, the other with individual delegates from West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries. CODENE and some individual British leaders refused to attend the assembly because of the exclusion of Charter 77, and Green party delegates of West Germany protested the breaking up of the unofficial meeting in Prague. See also Charter 77 report on a meeting attempted later with French and Dutch peace movement representatives in Prague on March 3–4, 1984, which was also interrupted by the police and by the expulsion of the foreign visitors (No. 5, 1984).

[52]*The Times* (London), June 23, 1983.

[53]Charter document No. 38, November 1983.

[54]Charter document No. 39, 1983.

[55]*Infoch* (January 1984, p. 14) published an early report that 939 persons had signed. There were unconfirmed reports of a signature campaign in the Institute of Geophysics in Prague and of protests among workers in Kladno, Pilsen, and Ostrava.

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tiers of the blocs, of ideological schemata, and different experiences."[56] However, the two main documents issued in that year were strongly critical of tendencies in Western peace movements that were described in one document as "foolish and dangerous."[57] Both rejected "unilateral disarmament," "appeasement" or "peace at any price" (citing the experience of Czechoslovakia in 1938), and "one-sided pacificism," which confined its attention to armaments, especially nuclear. The message to the British peace movements favored a "firm stance, in spite of its risks." The document prepared for the conference on European Nuclear Disarmament held in Perugia, although expressing similar criticisms, was more vigorous in condemning "the politics of armed strength" (without distinguishing between the superpowers) and called for the withdrawal of both Soviet and American forces from Europe, as a way to end the division of Europe and to encourage the establishment of democracy in all of Europe. The world peace movement must build up a "mighty democratic coalition," which would seek "allies 'below' and 'above', in the East and West, in Europe and overseas."

The conference in Perugia (July 17–21) also witnessed a substantial success for Charter 77.[58] Among the 1,000 persons present were delegates of the official peace movements of the Soviet Union and other bloc countries (although not from Czechoslovakia or the GDR) and representatives of most of the disarmament and peace movements of Western Europe, as well as some exiles from Eastern Europe including Jiří Pelikan from Czechoslovakia. There were 59 empty chairs for unofficial East European delegates, including Chartists. In the discussions, the Soviet delegates found themselves isolated and often the target of censure. Although no Chartists were present, their ideas were widely discussed and had a significant impact on the European Peace Declaration issued at the end of the conference.[59] This document, which was, of course, not accepted by the Soviet and other East European official delegations, was signed by eight Chartists, five unofficial Hungarians, and 57 representatives of peace movements from six West European countries, including France, Italy, and West Germany. The declaration stressed the "indivisibility" of peace, and respect for human rights as a condition of peace. It condemned the arms race and the deployment of missiles in East and West. It called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all countries, the creation of an atom-free zone in Europe from Portugal to the Urals, the dissolution of the two blocs, and the overcoming of the partition of Europe. Charter 77 had thus helped to bring significant West European peace movements together with them and other independent spokesmen from Eastern Europe on a common platform of peace and human rights.

Conclusion

Charter 77 continues to be, as one of its supporters abroad has written, "a small island of civic activity in the sea of a majority of people who have adapted."[60] It has not been able to win the support of the mass of the population or to generate a social movement comparable to the one which swept Poland in 1980. Independent activity, such as described in this essay, remains limited to individuals or to a few sectors of society. Workers and farmers remain almost unaffected. Slovaks and the large Hungarian minority have—with a few individual exceptions—stayed aloof from Charter 77.[61]

Nonetheless Charter 77 has survived for eight years and constitutes what seems to be a more or less permanent political reality, exerting at least a limited impact at home and abroad. Shunning violence of any kind, and abstaining from marches or demonstrations, it has confined itself to verbal activity that seeks to express the interests and opinions of broad circles.[62] As Václav Havel has expressed it, Charter 77 is "a permanent appeal to the state power and a mirror of its

[56]Document No. 9, May 1, 1984.

[57]Ibid., and document No. 13, June 30, 1984. The first of these documents had been the subject of considerable criticism by some Chartists, especially for its critical attitude toward the Western peace movements and its reference to appeasement. The Perugia letter required long discussion before a consensus was achieved, and was signed by the three spokesmen, V. Benda, J. Ruml, and J. Sternová, and 10 others, including former spokesmen Hájek, Havel, Hejdánek, Malý, and Šabata, and, for the first time, by two persons from Slovakia, Miro Kusý and Milan Simečka. Apart from differences noted in the text, it did not depart fundamentally from No. 9. A partial text or summary is given in *RFE/RL Research* (Munich), Nos. 33 and 36, Aug. 17 and Sept. 7, 1984.

[58]For the proceedings, see the Radio Free Europe reports cited in fn. 57; and *The New York Times*, July 20, 1984.

[59]The text is given in Czech in *Infoch*, September 1984, pp. 15–17. Later, on November 22, 1984, sixteen Charter 77 signatories and seventeen East German peace activists issued a joint declaration protesting the deployment of missiles in their two countries and calling for a missile-free Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

[60]Prečan, *Vývoj Charty*, p. 18.

[61]Charter 77 did not itself issue an analysis of Hungarian problems, but protested the treatment of Miklós Duray, a Charter signatory, (document No. 37, Dec. 28, 1982; also VONS communiqués No. 317, 327, and 375). Individual Chartists from Slovakia also protested the prosecution of Duray in letters, e.g., see letters from Ján Čarnogurský, Jozef Jablonický, Milan Simečka, and Miroslav Kusý, June 27 and 28, 1984 (*Infoch*, July–August 1984, pp. 23–25).

[62]Prečan, in Schulz, op. cit., pp. 92–93.

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work," and "a continuing challenge to fellow citizens."[63] It is also in some degree a catalyst for independent activities by intellectuals, young people, and religious believers.

It is not easy to assess the impact of Charter 77, which is sometimes described by its own members as "a ghetto," isolated from the population not only by police repression but also by the legal and intellectual character of its documents, and their narrow circulation. Other Chartists, however, argue that its work is widely known as a result of Western broadcasts. Its documents thus contribute to the development of at least a limited public opinion. The regular reporting on injustice and persecution provides detailed documentation of value to foreign governments and media, and for international conferences.

Charter 77 has also a more subtle impact, impossible to measure. Amidst a population characterized by widespread indifference and passivity toward public affairs, and by tendencies toward opportunism and satisfaction of personal interests, Charter 77 may serve as a kind of "gauge" of honesty and courage against which people judge their own and others' behavior. It suggests what they too ought to do if they had the courage and the sense of responsibility to follow the example of Chartists. Even though Charter 77 may disavow this role, it may in fact serve as a kind of "conscience of the nation," nudging people to act more independently and decently. This may even be true of persons within the structure of power at every level. Others, impelled to be more active, may find in the Charter an example of how to do things, say, in collecting signatures on petitions, and even as a source of advice and assistance in such actions. To that extent Charter 77, as an "active minority," enjoys sympathy among the silent and non-active majority, and is thus endowed with moral authority.

In the stultifying environment of post-1968, "normalized" Czechoslovakia those commonly known as "dissidents" but who are better characterized as "independent spirits," see little or no prospect of basic change in the system, or even serious reforms, in the immediate future. Any thought of revolutionary action is regarded as quite out of touch with reality. Change will come, if at all, only after many years, perhaps in a generation or more, and not in their lifetime. Independent activity, including that of Chartists, is concerned with the "here and now," with living as freely and honestly as possible.[64] In a more general perspective "speaking the truth out loud" may contribute to the "rehabilitation of man, with...his personal conscience and his personal responsibility, as the real creator of history."[65]

This attitude of mind is accompanied by a reluctance to make predictions or to draw up blueprints for some future goal. The crushing of the hopes aroused in 1968 has produced an aversion to planning, or even to discussing the future, and a preference for concentrating on the present as expressed in work on a small scale and within narrow circles. Nonetheless, the conviction remains in the minds of many that there are currents at work beneath the surface that will eventually generate new ways. It is impossible to foresee what may happen, or when, or how. The Hungarian experience (not the Polish) is regarded with interest, but without real anticipation that it "could happen here." As in the past, a shift may come unexpectedly, triggered by a random event. This might occur tomorrow, or only in 10 or 20 years. It is not wise to entertain concrete expectations, but it is equally unwise to fall into hopelessness and inactivity. What is important is to prepare oneself and others for the time when change at last becomes possible so that one will then be ready to act.[66]

Viewed from this angle, Charter 77 and the autonomous activity "stimulated and enriched by it" are engaged in "a great work of preparing and recultivating the soil for future political changes." When a moment of crisis opens the way for them, they may not be the direct result of Charter 77 and may derive from other sources. But, as Vilem Prečan has written,

the quality of those future changes will be in part determined by the results of the preparatory work in that period of immobility and lifelessness that appeared to be a vacuum but that in reality was filled with strivings to preserve, regenerate and re-cultivate. It will be determined, among other things, by the endeavors of those who did not give up hope yesterday and today, who refused, as incompatible with their conscience, or for other reasons, to live in the lie, and who took the path of their civic right and duty, even though to the majority of their contemporaries this seemed merely the dangerous conduct of a handful of fools.[67]

[63] Private communication to the author.

[64] Prečan, *Vývoj Charty*, p. 22.

[65] Private commmunication to the author.

[66] Prečan, *Vývoj Charty*, p. 27.

[67] Ibid.

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Ceauşescu's Socialism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

The political order prevailing in Romania today, which can be labeled incipient "dynastic socialism,"[1] cannot be explained without taking into account the personality of Nicolae Ceauşescu, who dominates the country's public life. Ceauşescu has been able to install members of his family and his personal followers in key posts of the party and state apparatuses and in this way has emasculated the institutional role of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). Moreover, Ceauşescu has increasingly been able to impose his own interpretation not merely of the history of the Romanian communist movement but also of the essence of socialism in Romania—a combination of neo-Stalinism at home and neo-Titoism abroad. Thus, developments in Romania entail a high degree of personalization of political power.

Ceauşescu's brand of communism needs to be analyzed from two angles—the biographical and the institutional. There is no doubt that Ceauşescu's style of rule has been shaped by his experiences as an activist in the Romanian Communist Party which he joined in 1933 at age 15. It is also true that the history of the RCP contains at least some features that make it unique among the East European communist parties. The RCP was principally an instrument—indeed a creation—of the Communist International. This meant that its policies and personnel were in effect imposed by the Comintern and, as a consequence, that the party had little concern for Romanian national issues, and very little support among the Romanian population. It was also subject to endemic factional battles that were for the most part personal power struggles and not contests over policy. This mix of personal rivalries and foreign direction, as will be elaborated below, goes a long way toward explaining the sui generis brand of Ceauşescu's socialism.

Several key events in the history of the Romanian Communist Party must be outlined here.[2] The party was founded on May 8, 1921, in Bucharest, as a "Section of the Communist International." It operated legally until April 1924, when it was outlawed by the Liberal government then in power. After its delegalization, some of its members continued to operate underground in Romania, while others formed a major center in Moscow. In 1928–30, the various groupings within the RCP engaged in such intense personal struggles and sectarian rivalries that the Comintern intervened by appointing an outsider, the Polish communist Alexander Stefanski, as secretary general of the RCP.

The party first gained prestige in 1933 by organizing a workers' strike in Bucharest at the Griviţa railroad workshop. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a leader of the strike, began to emerge as the outstanding personality in the domestic communist underground. Nicolae Ceauşescu became one of his adherents and collaborators. A demonstration organized by an antifascist coalition including the communists on May 1, 1939, against the Romanian fascist Iron Guard movement also enhanced the RCP's position. As a result of the two actions, many party activists were put in jail. Despite their imprisonment, however, they managed to keep up an active party organization. Toward the end of World War II, serious divisions again emerged among the groupings within the RCP over whether the

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[1] The readying of a "dynastic succession" in Romania is described by Walter M. Bacon, Jr., in his chapter on Romania in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1984,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1984, p. 363.

[2] An excellent overview of the RCP can be found in Robert R. King, *A History of the Romanian Communist Party,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

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Bela Kun, a Hungarian communist prominent in the Romanian Communist Party in its early years.

—EUPRA.

party should organize armed resistance against the German forces or wait for Soviet troops to "liberate" the country and impel a "revolutionary transformation."

Following the war and the return from exile of prominent party activists, the rivalries continued until Dej managed to gain predominance in the party in the early 1950's. As Dej rose, Ceauşescu's career also advanced. By the time of Dej's death in 1965, Ceauşescu's selection as secretary general was a virtual certainty, although he, too, had to face and eliminate opponents within the party.

Crucial to the history of the RCP—and of other communist parties as well—was Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign launched at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. The varied responses by communist parties to this shattering of the Stalin myth meant a break in the pattern of conformity to Moscow's dictates. The Chinese deviation from the Soviet line gradually developed into the Sino-Soviet split.[3] In Romania, Dej temporized on de-Stalinization. Initially, he seemed to encourage a correction of Stalinist abuses in the RCP, only to purge those who dared to try it. With regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, he did not offer the CPSU the unqualified support that Moscow asked of its satellites. In fact, he shifted from being a "neutral" mediator in the quarrel to supporting China. In the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Dej defied Soviet wishes by refusing to agree to a "socialist division of labor" on the grounds that it would discriminate against less developed Romania. Thus, it can be argued that the seeds of Romania's autonomous foreign policy and eventual identification with developing countries can be found in Dej's reaction to de-Stalinization. One can also argue that Ceauşescu's policies sprang from the same roots.

Unfortunately, there are numerous obstacles to a factual inquiry into the history of the RCP. They include scarcity of reliable documentary sources on the power struggles inside the party, inaccessibility of government and party archives and of memoirs of prominent party activists, and endeavors by Romanian propagandists to obscure the truth. Also, survivors of the RCP's clandestine interwar period as well as of its Stalinist era refuse for the most part to share their memories with outsiders. Therefore, some misunderstandings and inaccuracies persist in Western writings on Romania, although several thorough and well-documented studies do exist.[4]

I believe that I have had perhaps a unique opportunity to interview veterans of the RCP apparatus and the Balkan Bureau of the Comintern, as well as Romanian communists who fought in the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War and in the FTP-MOI (Francs-Tireurs et Partisans français-Main d'Oeuvre Immigrée), the communist units in the French Resistance, many of whom now live in France and other Western countries.[5] In addition, I have been able to obtain some party documents previously unavailable to scholars, including materials from the interwar period relating to its clandestine congresses and factional struggles.

[3]For one of the earliest and best accounts of the development of the quarrel, see Donald Zagoria, *Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1962.

[4]See, for example, Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania, 1944–1962*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964; Ghita Ionescu, *The Politics of European Communist States*, New York, Praeger, 1967; Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944–1965*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1971; Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1967.

[5]My personal and intellectual interests led me to seek out and interview a number of participants in the Romanian communist movement while I still lived in Romania. Subsequently, in 1981–82, I had the opportunity to meet many former activists of the RCP in Paris. Regrettably, I cannot identify my sources by name as this could put them and their families at risk.

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I shall attempt to contrast the information from these sources with the interpretation of Romanian developments offered by the Ceauşescu entourage. Since Ceauşescu became engaged in constructing a personality cult that rivals Stalin's, many events and actors in the history of the RCP have been played down or ignored by propagandists in Romania. It is my hope that this essay will help to provide a much-needed corrective.

The Formation of the RCP

The RCP was formed in 1921 as a result of a split in the Romanian socialist party. As in other socialist parties, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Communist International in Moscow in 1919 led to divisions among the socialists in Romania over their attitude toward and connection with both.[6] Among those pushing for close ties between Romanian socialists and the Bolsheviks and the Comintern were such figures as Bulgarian-born Christian Rakovsky, who later served as a leading diplomat for the Soviet government. In 1920, a six-member delegation of Romanian socialists went to Moscow where they had a historic meeting with Lenin to negotiate affiliation with the Comintern. Some of the delegates objected to the subordinate position of the "national sections" in relationship to the Comintern.[7] Subsequently, the RCP was founded by the leftwing members of the socialist party who accepted the principle that the RCP should be a Leninist vanguard party subject to the discipline of democratic centralism and form an integral part of the Comintern.

The chief features of the RCP—sectarianism and a propensity toward factionalism—were thus imprinted upon it from the very beginning. The socialist party did not have a particularly large following in Romania. The RCP had an even smaller one. Moreover, many of the members and influential figures in the RCP were not Romanian by nationality. Thus, for example, Bela Kun, the Hungarian communist leader whose short-lived Soviet republic in Hungary was suppressed in part by Romanian troops, was delegated by the Comintern to be a sort of "tutor" to the RCP. Like Christian Rakovsky, he became an inspiration for many decisions adopted by the Romanian communists. Both Rakovsky and Kun disregarded Romanian cultural and political traditions. They denigrated the Romanian socialist movement, underrated the nationalist aspirations of the Romanian intelligentsia as well as of the working class, and ignored the interests of the Romanian peasantry. The Romanian communists, too, were largely indifferent to the problems of the people they claimed to represent, as well as to Romanian national-patriotic values.[8] These tendencies became accentuated after the Romanian government banned the RCP in 1924. Even if the party had remained legal, it would have had a difficult time in attracting a sufficient following to allow it to participate in Romanian political life. As it was, the RCP functioned increasingly as a branch of the Comintern and, by extension, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its policies were dictated by Soviet foreign policy considerations, and its leadership was changed whenever Soviet policy was modified in the course of the factional struggles in the CPSU that spilled over into the Comintern following Lenin's death.

A major split occurred within the RCP in 1928, following its 4th Congress which took place in Khar'kiv, then the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It separated the followers of the "elected" secretary general, Vitaliy Holostenko (known as Barbu), a member of the Bolshevik Party, from the supporters of Marcel Pauker (Luximin), whose base was the Union of Communist Youth in Bucharest. Irritated by the exacerbation of the rivalry between the two factions, the Comintern Presidium decided to put an end to this "unprincipled factional struggle" by adopting a resolution ordering the dismissal of both men and the appointment of different leaders with a new political program. The new leader was Alexander Stefanski (Gorn), whose task was to enforce the Comintern's line by ensuring the Bolshevization and normalization of the RCP's internal activity in the aftermath of the squabbles.

The Comintern's resolution followed the post-Bukharinist line, the so-called third period strategy.[9] Predicated on the assumption that capitalism was on the verge of collapse and a communist revolution imminent, the resolution branded as "rightwing deviationism" all collaboration between the communist and social-democratic parties, on the principle that the proletariat should not ally itself with "social fascists." The resolution also criticized the lack of

[6] See "Communist International" in *Marxism, Communism and Western Society. A Comparative Encyclopedia*, Vol.II, New York, Herder and Herder, 1972, pp. 89-99.

[7] The first secretary general of the RCP, Gheorghe Cristescu, who was expelled from the party in the 1920's, recalled these events in his memoirs, excerpts of which were published in Romanian historical journals after 1965.

[8] This applied especially to territorial claims. See Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1951, pp. 247-54.

[9] See, for example, Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch, "The Third International" in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Ed., *The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864-1943*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1966, pp. 185-86.

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"Bolshevik intransigence" in the Romanian communist leadership, advocated the strictest ideological vigilance, and called for the expulsion of "traitors" from the party.[10]

The victims of the ensuing purge of the RCP belonged to the Leninist generation who had imposed the Bolshevik style on much of the Romanian revolutionary movement but who, abiding by their original faith, expressed doubts about the validity of the Comintern's line. In particular, they questioned the growing bureaucratization of the Comintern and the applicability of its directives to Romania.[11]

The 5th RCP Congress, held in Moscow in 1931, brought another change of tactics and another set of leaders. The new policy blended the revolutionary optimism of the Comintern's third period strategy with a more realistic assessment of Romanian socio-economic and politico-cultural conditions. The realization that the RCP was isolated from the Romanian population led to an emphasis on social revolution as a gradual process that could occur only after a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution had taken place. This was held to apply especially in an underdeveloped country like Romania that had a large peasant majority and a comparatively small working class that lacked a strong revolutionary consciousness. This strategy called for the infiltration of labor unions and peasant organizations.[12]

As noted earlier, the communists under Gheorghiu-Dej's leadership managed to organize a strike of railroad workers in 1933. Although Dej was arrested before the actual strike began, his trial made him known in Romania and considerably enhanced his reputation within the party. It was also in the 1930's that the RCP began to attract some prominent Romanian intellectuals and journalists, who had become alarmed by the growing political strength of the Iron Guard and dissatisfied with the policies of King Carol II. Moreover, in 1935 after the Comintern decreed its "united front of democratic forces" policy in order to combat fascism,

Nicolae Ceauşescu in the early 1930's, when he was elected a member of the National Anti-Fascist Committee.

—EUPRA.

the RCP tried, but with only limited success, to become a part of the forces opposed to the Iron Guard and the King's dictatorial proclivities.[13] It is difficult to measure accurately the importance of the RCP in the anti-fascist coalition largely because Dej and, after him, Ceauşescu have been able to impose their own interpretation of this period. Nevertheless, it is true that RCP activists played an important role in organizing an anti-fascist demonstration on May 1, 1939. Among the organizers was Nicolae Ceauşescu, then a leader of the Communist youth movement. He was arrested for this activity and remained imprisoned until summer 1944.

Factional struggles subsided after 1931 in the sense that all the groups within the RCP became more responsive to the Comintern's directives. Nevertheless, the party continued to have a divided leadership that engaged in bitter personal rivalries. After 1933, three centers existed—one in Moscow and two in

[10]King, op. cit., p. 19.

[11]After 1965 the Political Publishing House in Bucharest published a series of biographies of the first generation of Romanian communists, including Elek Köblös, Eugen Rozvanyi, Marcel Pauker, Gilbert Moscovici, Timotei Marin, Alexandru Dobrogeanu-Gherea, David Fabian, Ecaterina Arbore, and Imre Aladar. Despite many distortions, these studies have contributed to a better understanding of the conflicts between the Comintern and the Romanian communists.

[12]Most important among the activists who shaped this major change in strategy was Elena Filipovici (Maria Ciobanu), Stefanski's closest collaborator, who was elected to the Politburo at the 5th Congress. She delivered the political report at the congress and was later appointed the RCP's representative to the Comintern. Unlike many other party leaders, she was born to a Romanian working class family and was more concerned than many of her comrades with the everyday life of the proletariat. During the Great Purge, she was accused of being a Trotskyite and was killed.

[13]For Romania's political situation in the 1930's, see Roberts, op. cit., pp. 170–222.

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Romania. Of the domestic centers, one was led by the elected secretary general and the other coalesced in prison around Dej. Although some of the communists who had been arrested with Dej were released or managed to escape earlier, Dej remained imprisoned until 1944.[14] The jailed communists had sufficient room for maneuver to maintain their organizational structure, hold discussions, and communicate with their comrades outside. Soon the party organization in the prisons began to compete for preeminence with the formal leadership. It was during his first imprisonment for party activity in 1936–38 that Ceauşescu had established ties with Dej—ties that were then cemented when he was serving his term following the 1939 protest demonstration.

After the 1936–38 purges, the party leadership in Romania was transferred from Stefanski to Boris Stefanov and then to another team headed by Stefan Foris, a Hungarian. Foris had a solid intellectual background, but he was also a doctrinaire who loyally carried out the Comintern's policies. His selection was supported by the Moscow-based center of the RCP, many of whose members worked in the Comintern apparatus. In 1940 the leadership of the Moscow center also changed, following the imprisonment or execution of a number of Romanian communists in Stalin's purges.[15] Stefanov, a Bulgarian, was Romania's representative to the Comintern at that time and also briefly headed the Moscow center of the RCP; he was removed for committing some political blunders and replaced by Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca.[16] Both belonged to the old guard of the RCP and had the full trust of the Comintern Presidium. They also had the support of a group of political refugees that included many of the veterans from the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War and RCP old-timers mostly of Bessarabian origin, who had followed the directives of the RCP and left Romania for the Soviet Union after the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in 1940.[17] During World War II, directives were regularly transmitted via the Soviet consulate in Varna, Bulgaria, from the Moscow group to the two domestic centers of the RCP (Dej's "center of prisons" and the Foris group).[18]

One of the facts obscured by contemporary official Romanian historiography is the competition that existed during the war between the two domestic groups within the RCP. The party was theoretically led by the Central Committee and its secretary general, Foris. But his leadership was seriously challenged by the center of prisons especially after the start of the Soviet-German war in 1941. Apart from some personal animosities that nourished the competition, the two groups differed in their views on strategies for anti-fascist resistance in Romania. It is almost certain that Foris and his supporters, among whom Remus Koffler was the most influential, opposed the idea of organizing a partisan movement, while the center of prisons favored it.[19]

The center of prisons was unquestionably dominated by Dej. My interviewees characterized him as being imbued with a sense of political mission and responsibility, eager to exert total control over the party organization, and combining power of persuasion with ruthlessness toward potential rivals. Dej's principal supporters in Doftana prison included his fellow railroad workers and militants who had organized the 1933 strike: Dumitru Petrescu, Constantin Doncea, and Gheoghe Vasilichi.[20] Other communist activists in Doftana were Gheorghe Apostol, Teohari Georgescu, Iosif Chişinevschi, Alexandru Draghici, Chivu Stoica, Iosif Ranghet, Bela Brainer, Alexandru Moghioroş, as well as a group of Soviet agents charged with espionage. The most prominent among the latter was Pintilie Bodnarenko (Pantiusha) who would become the chief of the Romanian secret police in the 1950's.

Dej's group was split up in 1940 after the establishment of the military regime of General Ion Antonescu. Some prisoners, including Dej and Ceauşescu, were sent to the Tirgu-Jiu concentration camp, while others, mostly Jews, were deported to camps in Transnistria, an area of the Soviet Union then being administered by Romania. After 1941, Dej's faction allied itself against Foris with Petre Gheorghe, Foris's

[14]Some of my sources ascribe Dej's intense dislike for the Comintern and some of the RCP leaders to the fact that Dej was among the few prominent activists whose rescue from jail was never arranged.

[15]For the purges, see Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.

[16]Stefanov had written an article in 1939 which anticipated the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in 1940. Upon the strong protest from the Romanian government, the Soviets disavowed any such intentions and had Stefanov dismissed.

[17]King, op. cit., pp. 28–29.

[18]In its striving for total independence from the USSR, the RCP has done its best to conceal the Varna channel.

[19]Personal communication to the author.

[20]These three escaped from Doftana in 1935 with help from the RCP. They went to the USSR where their paths diverged. Vasilichi went to France in 1936 and later became a key figure in the FTP-MOI. Doncea fought in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, then returned to the USSR where he worked at the Romanian department of Radio Moscow together with Dumitru Petrescu. Both Doncea and Petrescu became political officers in the Tudor Vladimirescu division organized in the USSR from among Romanian prisoners of war. Doncea and Petrescu were expelled by Dej from the Central Committee in June 1958 but were rehabilitated by Ceauşescu in 1968.

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Nicolae Ceauşescu, center, with his wife Elena at a Bucharest youth rally in August 1944.

—EUPRA.

deputy and the secretary of the Bucharest party organization.[21]

In early 1944, two emissaries were dispatched from Moscow to Bucharest to report on the situation within the RCP; they were Emil Bodnaras and Constantin Pirvulescu, two of the most trusted of Stalin's agents in the Romanian party.[22] They judged the Foris team to be politically bankrupt, and recommended that Foris be removed from his position of secretary general and that Moscow back the center of prisons. For the CPSU's emissaries, the Foris Central Committee was too isolated, rigid, and sectarian to transform the RCP into a mass party. On the strength of these recommendations, Dej, an ethnic Romanian, benefited from Moscow's decision to build up the national base of the RCP so as to counteract the negative impression created by the dominance of foreigners in the party leadership.[23]

The RCP in Power

A coalition government—of the National Peasant, National Liberal, Social Democratic, and Communist parties—was established following the coup of August 23, 1944, which deposed General Antonescu's regime and switched Romania's allegiance from the Axis to the Allied powers. By that time, the Soviet armies were in Romania. Their presence naturally enabled the RCP to gain the political preponderance in the government that the RCP could not have achieved by itself. RCP membership also increased very rapidly.[24] By 1948, the RCP was able to dispense with its coalition partners.

Dej's domestic center and the group of Romanian communists returning from Moscow merged. Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, together with Dej and Georgescu, became the RCP's ruling quartet. Their first goal was to eliminate their common enemies, namely, the faction led by Foris. Foris was removed from the RCP leadership, accused of having acted against the revolutionary movement, placed under house arrest by the party, and executed without trial in 1946.[25] This union of the Dej and the Pauker-Luca groups was only a provisional alliance against adversaries inside and outside the party.[26]

The 6th Congress of the RCP (the 1st Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party), which took place in February 1948, sanctioned the destruction of the Romanian Social Democratic Party through its "merger" with the Communist Party into the Romanian Workers' Party. The decisions taken at this congress emasculated the anti-fascist front and firmly established the communists in power. The Social Democratic leaders who had opposed the merger with the RCP were imprisoned, while those who cooperated with the communists became their pawns. Dominated by Dej and Ana Pauker, both of them tempestuously acclaimed, the congress codified the new strategy that would turn Romania into a people's democracy.[27]

[21] Gheorghe was captured and killed by the Gestapo. In 1944, Dej's faction accused Foris and Koffler of informing on Gheorghe and other communists.

[22] Bodnaras was an officer in the Romanian Royal Army when he was exposed as a Soviet agent. He defected to the USSR and returned to Romania during World War II to organize communist paramilitary units. In the Stalinist era, he was a member of the Politburo and defense minister. Although he maintained close contacts with the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death, he became one of the architects of Dej's autonomous foreign policy. He was also a close adviser to Ceauşescu, among the few from the old guard to be retained.

[23] Robert King, op. cit., p. 43.

[24] Ibid., p. 64. Membership rose from an estimated 1,000 in August 1944 to over 1,000,000 by February 1948.

[25] Foris was arrested by the military secret service of the RCP on April 4, 1944. The decision to execute him was made by the four secretaries of the RCP in 1946; the operation was carried out by the Soviet agents inside the RCP, led by the chief of the administrative department of the CC, the NKVD officer Pintilie Bodnarenko. Bodnarenko also organized the assassination of Foris's mother. His wife, Victoria Sirbu-Foris, was arrested and convicted as her husband's accomplice; she survived her prison term and was invited by Ceauşescu to speak at a meeting of the Bucharest party cadres in April 1968, when both Foris and Patraşcanu were rehabilitated.

[26] François Fejtö, *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin*, New York, Praeger, 1971.

[27] For a history of the economic and social policies introduced in Eastern Europe, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1967.

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The late 1940's in Eastern Europe were years of Stalinist terror and dictatorship by the political police which was in turn controlled and manipulated by Soviet advisers and agents.[28] Yugoslavia's conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948 contributed to the tightening of political screws. According to Stalinist thinking, the "class enemy" had infiltrated the communist parties. Purges were launched to root out "hidden conspirators."[29]

The purge of Lucreţiu Patraşcanu in 1948, and his trial and execution in 1954, is one of the least studied of the East European political trials and one of the most disgraceful episodes in the history of Romanian communism. It falls into the second phase of Stalinist repression—the persecution of prominent national leaders of communist parties who had been active in the anti-Nazi underground (László Rajk and later Janos Kádár in Hungary and Władysław Gomułka in Poland).[30]

Patraşcanu undoubtedly was one of the party's most gifted and popular leaders.[31] A long-time RCP activist, Patraşcanu had been in charge of the RCP's negotiations with the Liberal and National Peasant parties in preparing the anti-fascist coup and was appointed minister of justice in the first post-coup coalition government. He was a member of the delegation that went to Moscow in September 1944 to negotiate an armistice between Romania and the Soviet Union. There, some of his remarks were interpreted by the Soviets as an indication of "nationalist arrogance." He was also a member of the Romanian delegation to the 1946 Peace Conference in Paris. Later that year he was publicly attacked by Dej for a speech he had made before Romanian students in the city of Cluj in

Ana Pauker, center, and Soviet Marshal Kliment Voroshilov meet the widow and family of Georgi Dimitrov at the Sofia railroad station after accompanying the body of the well-known communist figure from Moscow in 1949.

—BLACK STAR.

Transylvania, following ethnic incidents there. In that speech, Patraşcanu had tried to emphasize the RCP's commitment to Romanian patriotic values. His ideas were distorted by Dej and invoked as an argument against him in the Secretary General's report to the Central Committee in November 1946. Patraşcanu was dismissed from his posts and was not permitted to speak in his own defense at the Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in 1948. Georgescu declared before that body that the former minister of justice had "fallen under the influence of the bourgeoisie," "become an exponent of bourgeois ideology," and had constantly "overestimated the forces of the enemy."[32] He was also accused of being a "Titoist-Fascist" agent and a spy working for Western intelligence services. He was imprisoned together with his wife and several close associates and subjected to exhaustive interrogations.[33]

Although there is no room here to discuss Patraşcanu's trial in detail, the idea prevails in Western scholarship that he was a potential Tito. This impression has to be rectified. There is nothing in Patraşcanu's writings to suggest a blueprint for an "independent" approach to socialist revolution.[34] It is

[28]Materials published during the Prague Spring describe the system of repression operated by the political police and confirm the involvement of the Soviet secret police in the show trials in Czechoslovakia. (See, for instance, Eugen Loebl, *My Mind on Trial*, New York, Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1976; and Jiří Pelikan, Ed., *The Czechoslovak Political Trials*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1971.) In Romania, Soviet agents had an even more decisive role since they were officers of the Romanian political police and members of Dej's entourage. When the Romanian-Soviet conflict broke out, the agents were removed from their positions but continued to live as privileged citizens of Romania.

[29]Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1952; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Le grand frère. L'Union Soviétique et l'Europe sovietisée* (The Big Brother: The Soviet Union and Sovietized Europe), Paris, Flammarion, 1983.

[30]In the first phase, the "bourgeois" political parties were attacked; the third phase was directed against some of Moscow's most faithful supporters who had been involved in the Comintern's operations and "were linked to Stalin throughout their personal histories." See Carrère d'Encausse, op. cit., pp. 115–27.

[31]A Western-educated lawyer who joined the RCP in 1921, Patraşcanu served as defense lawyer in several trials of communists in the 1920's. He was one of the organizers of the Griviţa strike. In the 1920's and 1930's he was elected to parliament as a member of the Workers' and Peasants' bloc. See Roberts, op. cit., pp. 256, 290; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 40, 151–60, 354.

[32]Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 151–56.

[33]His wife survived and reemerged in public life after 1965. His mother was drowned in the Cris river in Transylvania by agents of the political police.

[34]His work, *Problemele de baza ale Romaniei* (Fundamental Problems of Romania), Bucharest, 1944, was a pragmatic political piece that intended to strengthen the ideology of the RCP. His other writings, particularly *Curente si*

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worth noting that Patraşcanu was tried and sentenced to death together with Koffler, Foris's deputy, whose dismissal from the Politburo in 1944 Patraşcanu had supported. Thus, the trial's purpose was not to stamp out Titoism in the Romanian party but to remove rivals from power and discredit the party's old guard. At the trial, many "old-timers" became the accusers of their former comrades. It seems, however, that Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu did not share Dej's obsessive hostility toward the two men.[35]

Patraşcanu was not executed until 1954. It also seems that his execution was the outcome of a Romanian initiative rather than a Soviet-dictated action, although the Romanians had used Soviet advice in preparing the trial. His imprisonment for nearly six years would not, however, have been possible without Soviet approval and—in view of the subordination of the Romanian secret police to Moscow—without direct Soviet involvement in the investigation of the case. Patraşcanu's execution, one year after Stalin's death, resulted from Dej's awareness that times were changing and that Patraşcanu might become an alternative that could be dangerous to a group that was heavily identified with the worst Stalinist excesses. Thus, Dej and his adherents feared Patraşcanu as a potential catalyst for an anti-Stalinist reaction in the party that could challenge their position. Moreover, they feared that he could be used as a political card by the Soviets in their search for alternative solutions in Eastern Europe.[36]

Ceauşescu was not a member of the Politburo that endorsed Dej's and Chişinevschi's decision to execute Patraşcanu.[37] This meant that he was not personally implicated in the verdict. Later, Ceauşescu was able to capitalize on this dubious political innocence in order to make himself out to be an anti-Stalinist and to discredit Dej's policies.[38]

Much better known in Western historiography is the purge by which Ana Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu were removed from power in 1952.[39] The elimination of his remaining serious rivals enabled Dej to impose uniformity upon the party. The successful enforcement of party discipline and a structural reorganization of the party that brought a new generation of cadres into the apparat helped Dej consolidate power further. Ceauşescu's political career also benefited from these changes.[40]

In April 1954, Dej initiated a redistribution of power in order to prevent the Soviets from imposing changes similar to those that had forced Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary to share decision-making with the reform-minded Imre Nagy. At the Second RWP Congress held in December 1955 Dej emerged as the party's uncontested ruler. At this congress Ceauşescu presented a report on the modification of party rules. This was his first major political speech. In it, he listed the preservation of monolithic party unity, of the "indestructible alliance with the Soviet Union," and of the "glorious, invincible doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin" as his chief tenets.[41]

The RCP's Independent Line

The 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 dramatically affected the relations of Moscow with its satellites. By attacking Stalin's leadership of the CPSU, Khrushchev also brought into question Moscow's leadership of the international communist

tendinte in filosofia romanesca (Currents and Trends in Romanian Philosophy), reedited, Bucharest, Political Publishing House, 1971, were clearly ideologically orthodox.

[35]In 1968, at a meeting of the Bucharest party cadres, Ceauşescu revealed that Dej had criticized Georgescu in 1952 for not managing, as minister of interior, to uncover all the "evidence" of Patraşcanu's "guilt."

[36]For the evolution of Eastern Europe in the post-Stalin era, see François Fejtö, op. cit.; Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Vol. III, *The Breakdown*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978; Wolfgang Leonhard, *Three Faces of Marxism*, Paragon Books, 1979; Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964; Leopold Labedz, *International Communism After Khrushchev*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1965; Imre Nagy, *Un communisme qui n'oublie pas l'homme* (Communism That Does Not Forget Man), Paris, Plon, 1957; Tibor Meray, *Ce jour-là: 23 octobre 1956* (That Particular Day: October 23, 1956), Paris, Robert Laffont, 1966; Tamas Aczel, Ed., *Ten Years After. The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History*, New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1966; for a "critical Marxist" approach see Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller, *Hungary 1956 Revisited. The Message of a Revolution—A Quarter of a Century After*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

[37]Chişinevschi, Stalin's henchman in the RCP who masterminded the communist takeover of Romania, turned against Stalin following the 20th CPSU Congress.

[38]As part of his offensive against Dej's barons after 1965, Ceauşescu rehabilitated Patraşcanu, Foris, and the other victims of the Stalinist period. He attacked Alexandru Draghici, minister of interior from 1952 to 1965 and Dej's heir apparent, for the Stalinist purges; he also spoke of Dej's direct responsibility in ordering them. "We must stress that a great responsibility falls on the Political Bureau members, who contented themselves with the conclusions presented without asking for firm proof, as they should have done in light of their special party responsibility and of the gravity of the case involving a prominent militant of the party." Nicolae Ceauşescu, "Speech Delivered at the Meeting of the Party Aktiv of Bucharest Municipality on April 26, 1968" in *Romania on the Way to Completing Socialist Construction: Reports, Speeches, Articles*, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1969, p. 178.

[39]See Annie Kriegel, *Les grands procès dans les pays communistes: la pédagogie infernale* (The Communist Countries' Great Trials. An Infernal Pedagogy), Paris, Gallimard, 1972. Accused of conspiratorial activity together with Georgescu, the so-called rightwing deviationists were removed from their positions and imprisoned. Ana Pauker was released after a short term in prison (1952–53), but was kept under permanent surveillance in Bucharest and was periodically attacked by the party's leaders and propagandists until her death in 1960. Luca died in prison in 1963.

[40]King, op. cit., pp. 91–94, and Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*.

[41]*Congresul al II-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român* (The Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party), Bucharest, Editura de Stat pentru Literatura Politica, 1956.

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Petru Groza, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ambassador S. I. Kawtaradze, and Vasile Luca in 1952.

—EUPRA.

movement. Indeed, communist parties—the Chinese, French, Italian, Albanian, and Romanian—began to question Soviet policies. According to Miron Constantinescu, a member of the Romanian delegation to the 20th Congress, Dej was profoundly upset by the revelations in Khrushchev's secret speech. In Dej's view, by denouncing the idol of world communism, Khrushchev was committing a historical blunder. The Romanian leader shared Mao Zedong's contempt for Khrushchev's "sensationalism."[42] This was the first step in the development of the Romanian-Soviet dispute. Dej began to court the Chinese; indeed, after 1956, the Romanian communists had more in common ideologically with Mao's China and Hoxha's Albania than with Gomułka's Poland. Yet, Dej also used his maneuvering skills to improve his country's relations with Yugoslavia, whose leaders he had stigmatized at the 1949 Cominform meeting as a "gang of assassins and spies."[43]

Since he was personally threatened by the new line adopted at the 20th CPSU Congress, Dej had to temporize in the debates that developed in the RCP. Some of the party old-timers reproached Dej and his Politburo for alienating the working class and for stifling democracy and criticism within the party. At the Politburo meetings of March and April 1956, such old Stalinists as Chişinevschi, Constantinescu, and Constantin Pirvulescu challenged Dej's authority. They invoked the slogan of the 20th CPSU Congress about the "restoration of Leninist norms to internal party life" in order to weaken Dej's position and restructure the party's leadership. Ceauşescu's role in these political debates was somewhat ambiguous. According to statements he made later, he took a "liberal" stance, criticizing Draghici and the political police for the "inadmissible practice of ignoring the party's control over the security organs."[44]

[42]One of the best analyses of the origins of the Romanian-Soviet dispute can be found in Georges Haupt, "La genèse du conflit soviéto-roumain" (The Genesis of the Soviet-Romanian Conflict) in *Revue française des sciences politiques* (Paris), August 1968. See also Branko Lazitch, *Le rapport Khrouchtchev et son histoire* (The Khrushchev Report and Its History), Paris, Seuil, 1976.

[43]See, e.g., King, op. cit., p. 52. The RCP played an important role in Moscow's anti-Yugoslavian campaign. When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in June 1948, the organization's headquarters was moved from Belgrade to Bucharest.

[44]Ceauşescu, "Speech Delivered at the Meeting of the Party Aktiv." A few days earlier, the April 1968 plenum had rehabilitated Patraşcanu, Foris, Koffler, Constantinescu, Dumitriu Petrescu, Constantin Doncea, and others. An official record of the plenum has not been published, but Georgescu's denunciation of Dej's involvement in the Patraşcanu affair was revealed at the April 26 meeting; Georgescu himself had been principally responsible for arrests and interrogations. Bodnarenko was also attacked at the plenum and later expelled from the party. In May 1971, however, on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the RCP, Bodnarenko was decorated, although only his Romanian name, Gheorghe Pintilie, was used in the

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The Hungarian uprising and the Polish crisis in the autumn of 1956 placed Dej in an advantageous position in his behind-the-scenes confrontations with the Khrushchev leadership. These events also reinforced his fear of "anarchic-liberal" developments in Romania. Dej succeeded in having the June 1957 Plenum stigmatize the Chişinevschi-Constantinescu group for alleged anti-party activities. In reality, the alliance between Chişinevschi and Constantinescu had been dictated by pragmatic considerations. They believed that Dej's leadership was so compromised as a result of the revelations about Stalinist abuses that it should be removed from power. They tried to persuade other members of the Politburo to join in their efforts to topple Dej. Although they were successful in drawing Pirvulescu, the president of the party control commission, into the conspiracy, they did not manage to win over Alexandru Moghioroş, who informed Dej about the plot.[45]

Subsequently, Dej extended his control by initiating a purge of the party as a whole. In this situation, Ceauşescu could once again demonstrate his loyalty and his determination to combat the "revisionist" deviators and troublemakers attempting to undermine the party's unity. In his capacity of CC secretary responsible for cadre policy, he was the organizer of the purge of those party members who had voiced doubts about Dej's policies. The purge permitted Ceauşescu to staff the propaganda apparatus and the higher echelons of the party with his own supporters.

After the Hungarian revolution, Dej's leadership attempted to frighten the party and the population into believing that any challenge to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy or even advocacy of modestly liberal policies would bring about Soviet reprisals.[46] Dej criticized the Hungarian revolution and expressed his support for the Soviet military intervention. In 1958, Khrushchev made the unexpected decision to withdraw the Soviet troops that were stationed in Romania.[47]

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong welcomes Romanian Communist Party Political Bureau member Ion Maurer to Beijing on March 10, 1964; behind Maurer is Nicolae Ceauşescu; at center, Chivu Stoica.

—EASTFOTO.

At the plenum of the Central Committee in December 1961, Ceauşescu delivered a speech in which he attacked Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu for "rightwing deviationism." This speech helped Ceauşescu to ingratiate himself even more with Dej. Ceauşescu already had a following in the party through his involvement in the day-to-day running of the party apparat, which grew accustomed to his style and habits. After his 1961 speech, moreover, Dej made Ceauşescu the chief of the organizational directorate, which included the CC's section for party organization and the section that supervised the "special organs," that is, security, military, and justice.[48]

The outbreak in 1962–63 of open hostile polemics between the Soviet and Chinese parties, and Khrushchev's difficulties following the Cuban missile crisis, enabled the Romanian communists to escape Moscow's domination. Dej cast himself into the role of mediator between the two competing communist centers. Rather than following Moscow's lead in relations with other communist parties and other states, Dej began to develop independent ties with them. Ceauşescu also became involved in Dej's diplomacy. Together with Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer,

official record of the ceremony. His wife, Ana Toma, who had been one of the principal witnesses against Patraşcanu and Koffler and one of Dej's closest supporters, was awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labor," a distinction given by Ceauşescu to many other prominent personalities of the Stalinist period.

[45]Constantinescu, a sociologist and historian who had been active in the prewar antifascist press and in the Union of Communist Youth, became a member of the Politburo and held the posts of editor-in-chief of *Scînteia*, head of the State Planning Commission, and minister of education. He was downgraded in 1957 and then rehabilitated by Ceauşescu in 1968.

Moghioroş, a Hungarian, joined Dej's faction during the war. After the war he became a secretary of the CC.

Others punished for the plot included Constantin Doncea and Dumitru Petrescu, Dej's comrades during the Griviţa strike, as well as Liuba Chişinevschi, Iosif's wife and a vice president of the party control commission.

[46]See Robert R. King, "Romania," in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, Eds., *Communism in Eastern Europe*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979, p. 152.

[47]Ibid., pp. 152–53.

[48]King, op. cit., pp. 66–67, 92–93.

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he went to China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union in 1964 for talks with Mao, Kim Il-song, and Khrushchev.

The Romanian-Soviet dispute became overt in 1962–63 as a result of differences about CMEA's long-term strategy and Khrushchev's goal to have Romania provide an agricultural base for the industrially more developed CMEA countries. In this framework, Ceauşescu became one of the most ardent advocates of Romania's "independent" line. However, he avoided any deviation from what he perceived to be classic Leninist dogma. In a confidential lecture he delivered to students of the party academy in 1964, Ceauşescu emphasized the relevance of Stalinist ideology. His audience was apparently astonished to hear him praise Stalin's theoretical legacy, particularly the work *The Problems of Leninism;* Ceauşescu referred to it as obligatory reading for anyone wanting to understand Marxism-Leninism.[49]

Ceauşescu in Control

After attending the Warsaw Pact summit conference in Poland in February 1965, Dej was immobilized by lung cancer. He died on March 19. A few days later, Ceauşescu became the party's secretary general, and Chivu Stoica, one of Dej's closest collaborators since the war years, became chairman of the Council of State. Ceauşescu had apparently been in full charge of the party Secretariat even before Dej's death and was generally considered Dej's heir apparent. His rise was fiercely opposed by Draghici and Apostol. To counter them, Ceauşescu gained the trust and support of Maurer, Bodnaras, Leonte Rautu, and Alexandru Birladeanu. The last two were rewarded for their support by being appointed secretary of the CC and full member of the Politburo, respectively. Ceauşescu further strengthened his control of the party by making Paul Niculescu-Mizil a secretary of the CC and by having Manea Manescu and Ilie Verdet elected to the party Secretariat.[50]

Nicolae Ceauşescu in 1965, when he became Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

—EASTFOTO.

Ceauşescu now acted to impose his own style on the party. At the CC plenum in May 1965, he proposed a motion to change the party's name from the Romanian Workers' Party, adopted in 1948, to a "more revolutionary and mobilizing" one, the Romanian Communist Party. The plenum also rehabilitated the victims of the 1958 purge by annulling the resolution of the June 1958 plenum on penalties applied against a number of prominent party members who had criticized Dej in the spirit of the resolutions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.[51] At this time, Ceauşescu

[49]Private communication to author by persons present at that meeting.

[50]Draghici was accused of staging the Patraşcanu trial and expelled from the party in 1968.

Apostol, a member of the Politburo and a vice president of the government, for a long time considered Dej's heir designate, was ousted by Ceauşescu in 1969. He is currently Romania's ambassador to Uruguay.

Maurer, a defense lawyer for the RCP in the 1930's, participated in the plot against Foris but fell out of favor with Ana Pauker. In 1955 he reemerged in public and became the minister of foreign affairs, president of the National Presidium, and then prime minister from 1961 until his retirement in 1974.

Rautu, head of the Romanian department of Radio Moscow, returned to Romania in 1945 and became a member of the CC. As head of the Directorate for Propaganda and Culture, he assisted Chişinevschi in his campaign of Russifying Romanian culture and shaped Dej's cultural policies until 1965. In April 1964, he was one of the authors of the declaration of Romania's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Under Ceauşescu, he became a secretary of the CC, then a vice president of the government. In 1971 he was appointed rector of the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy for Training Cadres in Socio-Political and Economic Activity and State Administration, but lost his job when one of his daughters applied to emigrate to the United States.

Birladeanu, an economist, was vice president and minister of foreign trade. He was ousted by Ceauşescu in 1969.

Niculescu-Mizil became the party's chief ideologist. He represented Romania at many international communist meetings and played an important role in shaping the RCP's relations with other communist parties. He was demoted in 1974.

[51]See Stephen Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, pp. 204–05.

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presented himself as an anti-Stalinist and a liberal. During meetings with the Union of Writers in the spring of 1965, he took a firm stand against "vulgar sociologism" and "socialist realism," and encouraged criticism of Stalinist abuses in the fields of culture and ideology. He encouraged critics of Zhdanovist aesthetics and supported their outspoken criticisms of the Russification of Romanian culture.[52]

Ceauşescu advanced his ideological, political, and economic goals at the RCP's 9th Congress in July 1965. The congress adopted a new interpretation of the country's history, stressed the national values neglected during Dej's term, emphasized national self-determination and neutrality in the conflict between Moscow and Beijing, and explicitly criticized Dej's autocratic leadership.[53] Ceauşescu also strengthened his control over party structures by establishing both the Political Executive Committee (a body larger than the traditional Politburo) and the Permanent Bureau. This move aimed at weakening Dej's "barons" in the Politburo and promoting a new political elite loyal to Ceauşescu.[54]

Once his power was consolidated, however, Ceauşescu returned to tighter ideological control that resembled the Stalinist era. After an official visit to China in 1971, he apparently became convinced that a cultural mini-revolution would cure the centrifugal tendencies within the RCP and the "liberalism" among the Romanian intelligentsia. He presented his views in the so-called July Theses, which are a model of political obscurantism and unrepentant Stalinism.[55] This was followed by the November 1971 plenum's rehabilitation of Zhdanovist-Stalinist aesthetics, an attack on liberalism within the party, and a call for combating "intellectualism."[56] The policy of cultural freeze has remained in effect ever since.

Ceauşescu has maintained Dej's course of distancing Romania from the USSR. Despite its membership in the Warsaw Pact, Romania does not allow the pact to conduct military maneuvers on its territory. The pact forces' invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—without Romanian participation—led Ceauşescu to take an unequivocally anti-Soviet stand in a speech he gave in Bucharest on August 21, 1968,[57] and to reject the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Ceauşescu applies the concepts of national sovereignty and equality not only to state-to-state relations but also to communist party relations. He had consistently rebuffed Moscow's attempts in the late 1960's and 1970's to enlist Romania in its anti-Chinese campaigns. In 1968 he supported the Greek communists who founded the Greek Communist Party (Interior) in exile in Romania and expelled the pro-Soviet Kollyannis faction from the country. He had regular consultations with the Yugoslav leadership. In addition to maintaining close ties with the People's Republic of China, Ceauşescu has cultivated Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov and North Korea's Kim Il-song. He has defended the leaders of the Spanish and Italian communist parties against Soviet attacks, despite his own reservations about the Eurocommunists' strategies.

Romania's distance from Moscow has also been stressed in Romanian interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. The concept of the "multilaterally developed socialist society" has been conceived as a Romanian reply to the Soviet concept of "developed socialism." For Romanian doctrinaires—Miron Constantinescu was the most prolific writer on this issue until his death in 1974—the difference between the two outlooks consists of the emphasis placed on the dimension of "socialist consciousness," and on the interpretation of history aimed at creating the "new human being, builder of the new society."[58]

The RCP's ideologues have credited Ceauşescu with many ideological innovations, including explication on antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions in socialism. For Ceauşescu, the essence of socialist society precludes the emergence of antagonisms, but he insists that under certain circumstances nonantagonistic contradictions can turn into antagonistic ones, if the political leadership loses touch with the aspirations of the masses. It is the role of the "subjective factor," i.e., the Marxist-Leninist party, to discover and solve potential conflicts.[59]

With regard to relations with noncommunist states, Romania began to develop good state-to-state relations earlier than other Warsaw Pact members. It also has the distinction of being the only pact country to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. At the RCP's 11th Congress in 1974, Ceauşescu began to focus on

[52]King, op. cit., p. 126.

[53]Fischer-Galati, op. cit., pp. 183–224.

[54]While the Executive Committee grouped a large number of party apparatchiks, the Permanent Bureau became the supreme body of the party. In reality, power was already divided between these two bodies, and Ceauşescu increasingly manipulated them to enhance his personal power.

[55]In 1971 Ceauşescu launched a campaign to order ideological, cultural, and educational activity along Marxist lines. See, King, op. cit., p. 117.

[56]Ibid.

[57]*Scînteia*, August 22–26, 1968. This was the most liberal week in the history of the Romanian Communist press, but this democratic mood was suppressed after Ceauşescu met with the Soviet ambassador.

[58]King, op. cit., p. 119.

[59]Robert Wesson, Ed., *1983 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA. Hoover Institution Press, 1983, p. 328.

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Nicolae Ceauşescu addresses the Congress of Political Education and Socialist Culture in June 1976.

—EASTFOTO.

the problems of socialism in developing countries. According to Ceauşescu, nonaligned countries have to challenge the superpowers' domination of the world and band together to provide solutions to international conflicts.[60] Calls for the establishment of a "new international economic order" have become a regular feature in major Romanian foreign policy statements. Romania has "guest" status in the Nonaligned Movement.[61]

Dynastic Socialism

Romania's once orthodox Marxist-Leninist regime is steadily evolving into Ceauşescu's personal despotism. The Secretary General and the privileged caste—in this case largely members of his own family—dominate the party and the state and are apparently intent on establishing hereditary power. Personal rule of this sort requires appropriate ideological adjustments. Legitimacy is being increasing sought not through Marxism-Leninism and the vanguard party but through appeals to the spirit of the Romanian nation reputedly embodied in Ceauşescu.[62]

The Secretary General is presented by official propaganda as the incarnation of the eternal spirit of the Romanian people, whose historical mission he is fulfilling. His ideas and actions are made out to represent the contemporary equivalent of the political and moral will that inspired the struggles for independence waged by Romanian feudal princes and, earlier, the Dacian kings.[63] Despite Ceauşescu's reassuring statements, many Hungarian, German, and Jewish intellectuals have felt threatened by the increasingly nationalistic pronouncements and writings.[64]

[60]Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1975 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1975, pp. 75–76.

[61]Romania became an "invited guest" at the Nonaligned Movement's Colombo conference in 1976. Although Ceauşescu seemingly has ambitions to become another Tito in the Nonaligned Movement, in fact, Romania is much less influential than Yugoslavia, which was a founding member.

[62]See, for instance, Trond Gilberg, "Romania's Growing Difficulties" in *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), November 1984, pp. 375–89.

[63]Part of the interpretation of history under Ceauşescu is that the ancestors of the Romanians, the Dacians, had already established a centralized modern state extending over much of Eastern Europe around 100 B.C.

[64]The publication of anti-Semitic writings was brought up by an Israeli official at a meeting with Ceauşescu in June 1984. According to a report published in the Israeli newspaper *Yedi'ot Aharonot,* Mordechai Tzipori, the communications minister, thanked Ceauşescu for censuring Corneliu Vadim Tudor, author of some anti-Semitic poetry. Tudor and the book's editor were the only people to be penalized. Eugen Barbu, the editor of the cultural magazine *Saptamina* and an influential representative of the xenophobic trend in Romanian culture, retained his position as editor but was stripped of his candidate membership in the CC at the 13th party congress in November 1984.

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Numerous volumes have been put out by the Political Publishing House to celebrate Ceauşescu's "creative thought." With the exception of translations of classical and contemporary Marxist philosophical works, all publications on the social sciences, ethics, and aesthetics mention Ceauşescu's contributions to the development of "scientific socialism." References to Marxism-Leninism have been replaced by ceremonial evocations of the universal truths of "historical materialism," and the Romanian philosophical dictionary gives more space to its entry on the President's "doctrine" than to entries on Marx, Engels, and Lenin combined.[65]

Articles and essays that idealize Ceauşescu's achievements appear regularly in the press. Historians and social scientists attempt to define the Ceauşescu "doctrine." Ceauşescu is described as the most orthodox interpreter of Marxist doctrine, a prominent figure in international communism, a champion of the "new international economic and political order." He is extolled as a "genius of contemporary diplomacy," the incarnation of "the purest virtues of the Romanian people," the "morning star of Romania's national destiny." Other phrases used to describe him, for instance at the June 1984 plenary meeting of the RCP's Central Committee, include "the most beloved son of the people, brilliant revolutionary strategist, builder of modern Romania, eminent party and state leader, ... illustrious communist thinker, revolutionary tribune steeled in the working class' fight for safeguarding the Romanian people's vital interests."[66]

Those of my interviewees who knew Ceauşescu before the war already then detected qualities in him that would be reflected in his behavior and beliefs once he was in power. The young Ceauşescu combined communist doctrine with a mystical romanticism. He was inspired by Stalin's personality cult and saw the Soviet Union as the universal proletarian motherland. His ideological education in the prewar years was acquired from the popularized Marxist texts published and distributed by the RCP and from the discussions in prison.

He resisted all deviation from the party line. Available information does not support the thesis that Ceauşescu always cherished Romanian national sovereignty. Nothing suggests that the many Comintern actions that were contrary to Romanian national interests led Ceauşescu—as they had some other Romanian communists—to doubt the correctness of the Comintern line. Ceauşescu presumably remained undisturbed even by the June 1940 ultimatum by which the Soviet government compelled Romania to accede to the annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Unquestionably obedient to his superiors, Ceauşescu yearned to exert his authority over the party members subordinate to him. My interviewees noted too that Ceauşescu needed approbation and accepted criticism grudgingly.

Ceauşescu has the most personalized style of rule among East European leaders. Indeed, according to Trond Gilberg, the "most important decisions in Romania today are being made in response to Ceauşescu's personal initiative.... The apparatchiks either wait for an initiative from the general secretary or attempt to anticipate his wishes."[67] Apparatchiks such as Niculescu-Mizil, Virgil Trofin, Ion Iliescu, or Ilie Verdet,[68] who had been pillars of Ceauşescu's offensive against Dej's "barons" but who began to mistrust his increasingly adventurous course and the appropriation of power by his family and followers, have been gradually removed from positions of influence. The constant purges and rotations imposed by the Ceauşescu clan, and the suppression of all signs of opposition by the political police have paralyzed the

[65] Publications and TV documentaries annually celebrate the President's and his wife's birthdays, as well as the anniversaries of his various "historical" initiatives. See *RFE Romanian Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter RFE/RL Report), Jan. 29 and Feb. 19, 1983. One of the more sycophantic eulogies to Ceauşescu's genius was delivered by Dumitru Popescu, rector of the party academy, at the 11th RCP Congress in November 1974. Popescu compared Ceauşescu to Julius Caesar, Peter the Great, and Napoleon. According to my sources, in the first draft of his speech, Popescu also mentioned Lenin's name, but the Romanian leader decided to abandon this comparison in order not to annoy the Soviets. See Popescu's speech in *Congresul al II lea al P.C.R.* (The 11th Congress of the RCP), Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1974. Adrian Paunescu, editor-in-chief of the weekly *Flacara*, is one of the most offensive poets; for example, he once thanked Ceauşescu for having built "schools and universities instead of prisons."

[66] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-EEU), June 28, 1984, p. H/3.

[67] Trond Gilberg, *Modernization in Romania since World War II*, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 84. Several of the most important American contributions to the interpretation of the social, political, and intellectual evolution of Romania in the last few decades are David Floyd, *Rumania: Russia's Dissident Ally*, New York, Praeger, 1965; Daniel N. Nelson, *Democratic Centralism in Romania: A Study of Local Communist Politics*, Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1980; John M. Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Romania*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1967; Daniel Chirot, "The Corporatist Model and Socialism: Notes on Romanian Development" in *Theory and Society*, 1980, pp. 363–81; Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?" in *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1980; Myron Rush, *How Communist States Change Their Rulers*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1974; Richard F. Staar, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 4th ed., Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982; King, op. cit.

[68] Trofin, who died in 1984, was expelled from the Political Executive Committee in 1982 and became a target for Ceauşescu's violent criticism, because he spoke up about the dangers of Ceauşescu's personality cult. Ion Iliescu who, like Trofin, was a leader of the Union of Communist Youth in the early 1960's, was criticized for "literal-intellectualist" inclinations and dismissed from his post of secretary of the CC. However, he remained a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee for several more years.

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Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu and his wife, Elena, meet with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn during an October 1984 visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.

—Gaby Sommer/Gamma-Liaison.

party. The present elite manifests few signs of diversity.[69]

Ceauşescu's principal partner in power is his wife, Elena Petrescu. They had met and married in 1939 when both were activists in the Union of Communist Youth. From 1945 to 1954, she was a functionary in the International Department of the party's Central Committee. She then enrolled at the Polytechnic Institute in Bucharest and immediately became one of the leaders of its party organization; she graduated with a degree in chemical engineering. In 1958 she became a research fellow at the Central Institute of Chemical Research (ICECHIM) and was appointed the secretary of its party organization. In 1973, she was elected to the Central Committee, subsequently rising in the party hierarchy to the Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee, and to head of the CC's section for party cadres, the second most important position in the party. Currently, she is also the director general of ICECHIM, a member of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, chairman of the National Council for Science and Technology, and first deputy prime minister of the Romanian government. Convinced of her scientific vocation and her historical mission in promoting Romania's technological development, Elena Ceauşescu matches her husband in ambition. In recent years, she has been accorded public adulation on a par with him.[70]

The RCP's 12th Congress in November 1979 marked the visible establishment of the Ceauşescu clan and its cult. Only Constantin Pirvulescu, a member of the party's elite until demoted by Dej in 1960, dared to challenge Ceauşescu's monopolization of power. This defiance deprived him of his seat at the Congress.[71] The active promotion by the Ceauşescus of their youngest son Nicu's political career can also be dated from the 12th congress.

Born in September 1951, Nicu has been the only one of the couple's children to be interested in becoming politically active.[72] He was made leader of the Union of Communist Students' Associations of Romania in 1972; in 1983, he became first secretary of the Union of Communist Youth. He became a candidate member of the CC and a secretary of the Grand

[69]The apparatchiks on the Political Executive Committee owe their positions to Nicolae Ceauşescu. Coman and Ciobanu are secretaries of the Central Committee, Pana is the first secretary of the Bucharest party municipal committee, and Dascalescu is the prime minister. The fact that official AGERPRESS reports mention Elena Ceauşescu's name before that of the head of government serves as flagrant proof of their subordination to the Ceauşescus.

[70]For an analysis of Elena Ceauşescu's personality cult, see *RFE/RL Report*, Feb. 24, 1984.

[71]See a statement about this incident by AGERPRES (Bucharest), Nov. 23, 1979.

[72]The other two children, Valentin and Zoia, are both researchers, the former in nuclear physics and the latter in mathematics, and they have reportedly refused to become involved in politics, despite their parents' encouragement.

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National Assembly at the 12th congress. At the RCP's National Conference in 1982 he became a full member of the CC, and at the 13th congress in November 1984 a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee. Nicu's international contacts and initiatives, particularly his activities as chairman of the United Nations Youth Year commission, have been widely publicized in the Romanian press.[73] Nicu's wife, Poliana Cristescu, is the head of the Pioneer Organization and secretary of the Union of Communist Youth; at the 13th congress in November 1984 she was elected a full member of the RCP Central Committee.

The President's extended family holds key positions within the party and the government. One brother, Nicolae A. Ceauşescu, is secretary of the Political Council of the Ministry of Interior; another brother, Ilie, a general, is deputy head of the Higher Political Council in the Ministry of National Defense and a member of the CC; Ion, another brother, is the vice chairman of the State Planning Committee, secretary of the National Council for Agriculture, Food Industry, Sylviculture, and Water Management, and a member of the Central Auditing Commission; Marin, another brother, holds a post in foreign trade; Florea, a brother, is a member of the staff of *Scînteia,* the party daily; a sister was the deputy minister of education until her husband Vasile Barbulescu, also a CC member, became party first secretary in Olt County in 1983. Elena Ceauşescu's brother, Gheorghe Petrescu, is a deputy chairman of the General Union of Trade Unions, and member of the CC, the Council of State, and the Executive Bureau of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front. The President has also been known to promote people originally from his native village Scornicesti in Olt County.

The 13th RCP Congress in November 1984 was devoted to boundless adulation of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu. The speech by Petru Enache, a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and secretary of the CC in charge of cultural-ideological problems, was characteristic in this regard:

In the years that have elapsed since the 12th party congress, the party and the Central Committee led by Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu personally, have carried out an extensive and multifaceted activity. At a time when, as the party secretary general of our party has so tellingly stressed, the world is like a sea with "huge boulders caused by earthquakes, storms, and economic, political, and military hurricanes," the party has adopted the most realistic solutions and has led the country to new victories with great prospects for our homeland in terms of time and space leading up to a new national epic. Romania has successfully traveled a long, important stretch on the bright road to socialism and communism.

The unprecedented achievements in the economy, education, and culture lend our time the image of an impressive renaissance. The great victories won in these years have been possible due to the fact that our bold ship that bears the wonderful name of Socialist Romania has always had as watchman at the tricolor mast a competent and wise steersman, an experienced leader, namely Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu, the politician who, constantly concerned with fervent patriotism, with the destiny of his people, and acting toward the constant progress of the homeland, has also asserted himself as a great thinker and present-day strategist.[74]

Ana Muresan, a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and minister of domestic trade, spoke about Elena Ceauşescu as follows:

With feelings of great esteem and love we want to convey our appreciation and recognition to Comrade Elena Ceauşescu for the extensive activity she is carrying out in the party and state leadership in drafting and implementing the domestic and foreign policy promoted by Socialist Romania, in developing scientific research, education, and culture; for the valuable guidance granted to the National Women's Council; for the generosity and devotion with which she acts toward the country's progress, the people's well-being, toward strengthening and protecting the family, and toward raising and educating the young generation.[75]

Although Nicu did not receive similar praise, he succeeded in promoting his close associates as members of the Central Committee. Cornel Pacoste, the former secretary of the party committee of Bucharest University, is now a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and first secretary of the Timis County committee. Pantelimon Gavanescu, Nicu's predecessor as leader of the Communist Youth Organization; Eugen Florescu, former editor-in-chief of the official newspaper of the Communist Youth Organization; and other cohorts of his are now members of the CC.

[73] See *RFE/RL Report,* Jan. 20, 1984.

[74] *FBIS-EEU,* Dec. 3, 1984, p. H/3.

[75] Ibid, p. H/2.

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Among the very few old-timers who have survived in prestigious positions are Gheorghe Radulescu, Manea Manescu, and Mihail Florescu. Although he remains a member of the Political Executive Committee and vice president of the State Council, Radulescu has no real influence in the decision-making process. Manescu, who reemerged after 1982 as a member of the Political Executive Committee, is thought to be one of Elena Ceauşescu's confidants and a loyal follower of the Secretary General. Florescu, a former fighter in the International Brigades and perhaps the last Jewish member on the CC, is Elena's right hand at the National Council for Science and Technology. He owes his survival to her since she relies on him in the field of chemical industry.

It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the few remaining intellectuals of stature were dropped from the Central Committee at the 13th Congress. Among them are Eugen Jebeleanu, a distinguished poet and one of the leaders of the liberal wing of the Union of Writers; George Macovescu, formerly foreign minister and until 1982 president of the Union of Writers; and Mihnea Gheorghiu, president of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences. As Romania moves into an ever deepening economic morass, there is no one left either to challenge or correct the policies of Romania's ruling family. Thus, the official resolution adopted at the 13th RCP Congress appears to mirror accurately the political system prevailing in Romania:

In the comprehensive work of building the new system, the great achievements in the period opened by the ninth party congress are particularly noticeable, achievements which are indestructibly linked to the extensive activity carried out with clear-sightedness and in a profound, creative spirit, with revolutionary devotion and fervent patriotism by Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu, party secretary general and president of the Republic, founder of modern Romania, the national hero who with boundless devotion serves the supreme interests of all our people, and under whose wise leadership the Romanian people have registered the richest accomplishments—in their entire history—in the past 20 years, a period that has definitely entered our nation's awareness as the "Ceauşescu era."[76]

[76] Ibid., Nov. 29, 1984, p. H/4.

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Notes & Views

Doublethink in the USSR

James P. Scanlan

ALTHOUGH the action of George Orwell's *1984* was set in a future England, the society imagined by Orwell in 1948 bore a striking resemblance to the Stalinist Soviet Union of his day, and it is widely assumed that the Soviet Union of our day is still marked by the active use of "doublethink" and the other devices of thought control described so chillingly by Orwell. To a large degree this assumption is quite correct. But there is also a sense in which the assumption is incorrect or at least misleading, and may for that reason cause us to misunderstand the intellectual culture of the USSR in the 1980's.

It is difficult to separate Orwell's portrait from the true condition of culture in the Soviet Union because our view of the latter has been powerfully shaped by the former. A close study of contemporary Soviet philosophical thought, however, suggests that Orwell's direst prophecies concerning intellectual life under totalitarianism have not been borne out in the USSR. "Doublethink" may be found, but it is not eagerly promoted by the Communist authorities. Control of the dictionary, which they have enjoyed for decades, has not given them complete control of the mind. Constriction of the permissible vocabulary has not made subversive thoughts altogether unthinkable. Especially ironic and instructive has been the ability of individual Soviet citizens to turn doublethink and related devices *against* the authorities. Intellectual life in the USSR is not free; it is tragically repressed and confined. But neither is it dead—though its very vitality may be called Orwellian.

By way of assessing the level and the character of that vitality, let us survey the uses of doublethink in current Soviet philosophical discussions, beginning with the standard Orwellian use of doublethink to support "goodthink," or orthodoxy, and proceeding to other uses that do not correspond to the stereotype bequeathed us by Orwell.

Doublethink in Soviet Philosophy

Although Orwell's characterization of doublethink in *1984* is loose enough to accommodate a number of different varieties of intellectual incoherence, in its root meaning the term signified for him the willingness and the ability to accept as true both sides of a logical contradiction, whether it be in the form of a pair of contradictory statements such as "Today is Monday" and "Today is not Monday" or in the form of a single, self-contradictory assertion such as the famous devices "War is peace" and "Freedom is slavery" which adorned the facade of the Ministry of Truth in the novel.[1]

Is doublethink of this fundamental sort promoted in Soviet philosophy and ideology today? Certainly it is not aggressively flaunted as it was in Orwell's imaginative picture. Although the ideological devices found on Soviet buildings today include many patent falsehoods ("The Party and the people are one," "Labor is our joy"), none can be called directly contradictory or self-contradictory. But if contradictions are not vigorously advertised, are they nonetheless advanced in more subtle ways in Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy, with an eye to imposing on the populace views that are logically incoherent in fact if not in appearance?

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[1]George Orwell, *1984*, New York, New American Library, 1961, p. 32.

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Perhaps the most noticeable and at the same time the most revealing case of genuine Orwellian doublethink in current Soviet orthodoxy is one that may be found in the Soviet theory of the state. Marx's and Lenin's earlier characterization of the socialist state as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" had long seemed unnecessarily harsh to many Soviet ideologists. Even Stalin was moved to exclude that expression from the 1936 Constitution, calling the Soviet state instead a "socialist state of workers and peasants."[2] With the end of Stalin's rule, Khrushchev saw the opportunity to do away not only with the expression but with the very idea that the Soviet state continues to function as an instrument of class domination. Accordingly, in the Communist Party Program of 1961 it was announced that "the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission" and hence is no longer needed in the USSR, and that the Soviet state has become "a state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole."[3] This new development was immediately taken up in the theoretical literature, where the "all-people's state" (*obshchenarodnoye gosudarstvo*) was trumpeted as the first state in history that is not an instrument of coercion used by one class to oppress others, but instead represents the entire population. This notion subsequently received the blessing of the Brezhnev leadership, and its ultimate authoritative recognition came with its enshrinement in the new, Brezhnev constitution in 1977.[4]

Although no Soviet writer has questioned the theoretical merits of the new political conception, outside the Soviet bloc it has been roundly condemned by Marxists and non-Marxists alike for its manifest departure from classical Marxist theory. Frederick Engels defined the term "state" as "a special repressive force" in the hands of a dominant class,[5] and Marxist theorists from Marx through Lenin persisted in holding that it was the very nature of the state to be an instrument of class domination. And the socialist state, in the eyes of the theoretical founders of Marxism, is no exception. "Between capitalist and communist society," Marx wrote in his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, "lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*."[6] Lenin, too, consistently regarded the socialist state, like all states, as a class weapon. "The essence of Marx's teaching on the state," Lenin wrote in *State and Revolution,* "has been mastered only by someone who has understood that the dictatorship of a *single* class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the *proletariat* that has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire *historical period* separating capitalism from 'society without classes,' from communism."[7] It is only such a conception, of course, that imparts sense to the notorious notion that once communism is achieved the state will wither away—i.e., the state will atrophy from disuse when there is no longer a subordinate class to be oppressed. In Engels's words in *Anti-Dühring,* when the state "at last ... becomes the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary."[8] Hence the idea of a "people's state," Lenin insisted in *State and Revolution*, is "nonsense" and "a departure from socialism."[9]

At this point it seems clear that there is a contradiction between current Soviet orthodoxy concerning the socialist state and the classical Marxist conceptions. It becomes a case of doublethink when we find that Soviet theorists vigorously deny that any inconsistency is present. In fact, the actual definition of the term "state" found even in the most recent of Soviet texts and reference books continues to rely on the old, genuinely Marxist formulas that exclude the "all-people's state." The latest (1980) edition of the Soviet *Philosophical Dictionary,* for example, defines "state" as "the political organization of an economically dominant class that seeks to preserve the existing order and to suppress opposition from other classes."[10] Yet by this definition, of course, the all-people's state cannot qualify as a state, for according to Soviet Marxism-Leninism there are no antagonistic classes in the USSR. The new political organism is said to represent the interests and will of the entire society; hence to accommodate it, the concept "state" can no longer require class suppression as a necessary condition for

[2] *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as Amended by the 7th Session of the 5th Supreme Soviet of the USSR,* Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, Article 1, p. 11.

[3] *The Road to Communism. Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. October 17–31, 1961,* Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d., p. 547.

[4] *Konstitutsiya (osnovnoy zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublic* (The Constitution [Fundamental Law] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1977, pp. 4, 6.

[5] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume,* New York, International Publishers, 1968, p. 430.

[6] Ibid., p. 331 (emphasis in original).

[7] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), 5th ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1967–1970, Vol. 33, p. 35 (emphasis in original).

[8] Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science,* Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1947, p. 333.

[9] Op. cit., p. 66.

[10] I. T. Frolov, Ed., *Filosofskiy slovar',* 4th ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1980, p. 77.

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its application. A broader generic concept of state is required, within which class-coercive and non–class-coercive states would form separate species. Yet Soviet philosophers do not advance such a broader conception, preferring instead to retain the classical Marxist conception, whose direct implication is that the state of all the people is not a state.

This inference, however, is not explicitly drawn in Soviet reference works or other philosophical writings. Certainly it is not proclaimed from housetop or billboard. Rather, it simply appears to be accepted without notice or fanfare. And because no special attention is drawn to it, we cannot say that there is any effort in current Soviet ideology to utilize precisely the *contradictory* aspect of the notion in the controlling of thought.

But why, then, it might be asked, have the dictionaries not simply been rewritten to express the broader concept required for the new, non–class-coercive state and thus avoid the contradiction? One reason, of course, is that Soviet theorists do not admit that any change has taken place; the all-people's state is not, they insist, a "revisionist" notion. But another reason may be fear of opening a conceptual Pandora's box. General recognition that the state is no longer to be seen as class-coercive by nature might encourage a search for other historical states—or worse, possible future states—to swell the non–class-coercive species, thus upsetting the claim of the all-people's state to be its one and only member. Considerations such as these may thus limit the power even of an absolutist ruling body to manipulate meanings by controlling the dictionary. It may be thought preferable to muddle along with the present confused situation, mouthing one definition but thinking another in the attempt to accommodate the conflicting demands of classical Marxism on the one hand and contemporary Soviet statism on the other.

If we may generalize from this one prominent case of doublethink in current Soviet orthodoxy, it would appear that Soviet philosophers are not so much blatantly employing doublethink to promote Marxism-Leninism among the population as they are responding to the reality that dictionary control cannot dissipate logical inconsistency in their ideology. If dictionary control could accomplish this, there would be no need for doublethink. Hence, the existence of the latter is testimony to the limitations of the former. They are not, as we might have thought from Orwell, independent but mutually reinforcing mechanisms of thought control.

Defensive Doublethink

Indeed it would appear that in the tangled world of Soviet thought the device of doublethink is used as much by independently minded writers *against* Marxist-Leninist dogmatism as it is by Soviet authorities in the name of that dogmatism. Here the contradictions in question are again not explicitly drawn by writers, and they are certainly not *believed*. But many examples may be found in current Soviet thought of the tacit appeal to contradictory conceptual structures as a device for expanding intellectual horizons beyond what would otherwise be allowed. This "defensive doublethink," as it might be called, is surely as deliberate a use of formal incoherence as Orwell envisaged, but it is employed for the purpose of liberating thought rather than repressing it. Let us consider a few examples.

In Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, "materialism" is a positive term, and whatever can be identified with materialism is thereby rendered worthy of consideration. Realizing this, Soviet writers are not slow to call "materialist" any views they wish to defend, up to and including views that directly contradict materialism. A case in point may be seen in the works of A. F. Losev, the distinguished Soviet classicist and philosopher. Losev, whose monumental study of the philosophy of Plato would be a credit to the scholarship of any nation, recommends attention to that philosopher on the ground that the ancient Greeks were all materialists at heart.[11] This contradictory identification of Platonic idealism with materialism is not drawn explicitly, but in Losev's writings it functions to justify respectful examination of Platonism.

Similarly, in Soviet philosophy of art, some writers use the label "realism" to legitimize attention to artistic standards and styles to which, objectively speaking, that term in no way applies. Thus in a 1978 article on monumental art in the journal *Dekorativnoye iskusstvo*, A. V. Vasnetsov seeks a word for the ideal toward which the monumental artist should strive, and he writes as follows: "I shall find no better term than 'realism,' understanding this term in the present case simply as an ideal of perfection contained in the truthfulness—that is, in the appropriateness and proportionality—of all the parts (ideas, material, vital and integral pictorial vision, architectural surroundings, and so on)."[12] Using such a definition, wherein "truthfulness" means not the accuracy with which a

[11] A. F. Losev et al., *Antichnaya literatura* (Classical Literature), ed. by A. A. Takho-Godi, 2nd rev. ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo prosveshcheniya, 1973, p. 186.

[12] A. V. Vasnetsov, "Criteria of Intrinsic Value . . .," *Dekorativnoye iskusstvo* (Moscow), No. 1, 1978, p. 15.

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representation portrays reality but rather the cohesion of the various elements of the work, one can call even the most abstract (i.e., unrealistic) creation "realist." Vasnetsov is in effect using the term "realism" to stand for purely formal values, but under contemporary Soviet conditions, it is difficult to fault him for asserting that he can find "no better term" for those values.

One of the most remarkable uses of defensive or liberating doublethink in recent Soviet philosophy may be found in an unlikely place—in the definitive and authoritative Soviet *Philosophical Encyclopedia*. Not surprisingly the work contains a lengthy article on the subject of *partiynost'* (party spirit, party-mindedness)—a quality which, in the eyes of Marxist-Leninists, is an unavoidable feature of any philosophical perspective and a particularly important feature of Marxism-Leninism.[13] Since the interests of the Communist Party are held to be in harmony with the objective course of history, *Communist* partisanship coincides with scientific objectivity. But this encyclopedia article is no standard brief for devotion to the party's cause. The author of the article, G. S. Batishchev, presents a stinging rebuke to those whose first concern is for party loyalty—who believe, in his words, that "militancy provides *a guarantee* of objectivity in science, that subjective conviction in the service of the interests of communism and even the verbal declaration of devotion to communism in themselves assure one's correctness in an argument and a true position in the resolution of every problem." This, Batishchev argues, is a perverted conception, which (following Hegel) he calls "subjective partisanship." It reduces philosophy, he contends, "to the role of a handmaiden of religious, political, legal, and other ideological forces and institutions." True Marxism, on the other hand, stands for "objective partisanship," which he lauds in a remarkable litany:

The former [subjective partisanship] is the partisanship of the biased, prejudiced distortion of the objective logic of a subject; the latter [objective partisanship] is the partisanship of the unbiased, unprejudiced pursuit of logic all the way to its ultimate conclusions. The former means foisting onto a theory conclusions and evaluations demanded in advance; the latter means accepting and defending only those conclusions and evaluations to which we are bound by the investigation itself.... The former transforms philosophy into an obsequious tool of external ends; the latter signifies the discovery of ends through sovereign philosophical investigation. The former looks at the whole world solely from the point of view of its usefulness or harmfulness to dogma; the latter always places the objective dialectic of the creative quest for truth above subjective considerations of expediency based on previously elaborated principles.

Subjective partisanship, Batishchev argues, appeals to "canonized texts" and leads to "the militarization of the methods and the language of debate." Objective partisanship, on the other hand, speaks for "the most eternally living science"; it opposes all dogmatism and is "the partisanship of science itself."

It would be difficult to imagine a more ardent defense of objectivity *against* partisanship than is found in Batishchev's defense of "objective partisanship." In fact there is nothing "partisan" at all, in the usual sense, in his conception: the word "objectivity" could be substituted *simpliciter* for every occurrence of his expression "objective partisanship." When Batishchev turns his praise of communist "partisanship" into an argument for an "objective partisanship" devoted to "sovereign philosophical investigation," i.e., to logic and facts, the tacit conclusion is that objective partisanship is not partisan, and Batishchev's readers are quite capable of finding the moral in that paradox.

In each of these cases, defensive doublethink is a means of enlisting the approbative force of authorized terms—e.g., "materialism," "realism," "partisanship"—behind sympathetic attention to the exact opposite of what they stand for officially. And if there is no genuine double*think* here (since no contradiction is *believed*), at least it behooves us to note that not all double*talk* in Soviet philosophy is "doublethink" of the standard, pejorative variety. Some of it, in the convoluted intellectual world of the USSR, is a device for evading the limitations on philosophical thought imposed by Communist authorities.

Toleration of Ambiguity

A feature of Soviet intellectual life that is still more important than defensive doublethink, however, and is perhaps the single most important respect in which the Soviet intellectual scene differs from Orwell's imaginative picture, consists in what might be called the continued toleration of ambiguity in Soviet thought. A principal feature of Orwell's "Newspeak"—the imposed language of the controlled society—is its attempt to strip authorized words of unwanted meanings, so that the words cannot be used to entertain or

[13] F. V. Konstantinov et al., Eds., *Filosofskaya entsiklopediya*, 5 vols., Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1960–1970, Vol. 4, pp. 217–19.

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to express unwanted thoughts. It is indisputable that efforts of this sort do take place in the Soviet Union—efforts not only to limit the lexicon of acceptable terms but to impose a single desired meaning upon each of the words that remain. But in Soviet practice these efforts have in no way produced a philosophical discourse that is perfectly unambiguous and incapable of heterodoxy. The continued ability of thinkers to entertain and employ different and sometimes contradictory meanings for the same "approved" term is another form of liberating doublethink in Soviet society.

A survey of recent Soviet philosophy shows that, in field after field, even the more orthodox Soviet philosophers are engaged in exploring, and in many cases in expanding, the variety of meanings that still attach to the most hallowed and elementary terms in the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary. Does the term "matter" mean the whole of objective reality, or does it name a particular class of ontological entities with specific properties? Does "infinity" signify spatio-temporal endlessness, the unceasing variety of material forms, or the epistemological inexhaustibility of the universe? Does "logic" stand for the study of formal relationships or of "dialectical" connections among things? Is what is called a "real contradiction" a logically consistent physical opposition in the material world (such as the antagonism of economic classes), or is it an antinomian, formally contradictory relationship among real things? Does the expression "economic base" extend to intellectual and emotional forces (such as science, and the morale of the socialist worker), or is it limited to strictly "material" factors? Is "art" a name for a particular kind of ideological reflection of economic interests, for the workings of material productive labor, or for a special kind of sign system?

Each of the alternative answers to each of these questions has champions among Soviet philosophers, and for that reason one cannot say that the semantic usages of Soviet Marxism-Leninism have been reduced to Newspeak poverty. If anything, they are marked by an openness that allows the kind of imprecision in discourse about which the prominent Soviet philosopher B. M. Kedrov complained when he said that some Soviet philosophers deliberately use terms in such a way that the reader may invest them with whatever meaning he pleases.[14]

Furthermore even when philosophers do generally agree upon a single meaning, unless the term in question is a purely invented or technical one with little if any bearing on the lives of the great mass of people, the meaning promoted by the philosophers (and the ideologists behind them) must still compete against the other meanings associated with the term in the culture at large. Any term in common usage—"matter," "logic," "art," or any other—brings with it from the broader culture and especially from the past a rich content of meaning. Its semantic freight is bound up not only with everyday activities and concerns but with a literary, artistic, and scientific heritage that Soviet Marxists have not rejected, despite certain tendencies in that direction among the early Bolsheviks. The term "freedom" (*svoboda*) is a prime example, and there is perhaps no clearer, more characteristic, or more significant case of the persistent toleration of ambiguity in Soviet intellectual culture than the failure of Soviet authorities to reduce the term "freedom" to a Newspeak uniformity of content that would preclude subversive and anti-totalitarian thoughts.

A single sense of the term "freedom" is advanced in the Soviet philosophical literature. Freedom is defined in every philosophical text and reference work as consisting in "the recognition of necessity"—the acknowledgment of, and the acquiescence in, the objective inevitabilities that structure the world around us.[15] With regard to history, freedom so conceived consists in the acceptance of the objective laws of social change, in accordance with which society marches unswervingly toward communism; the free individual is the one who marches along, not the one who ignores or resists the laws. In the context of ethics, freedom is the recognition of the communist moral norms that are more and more disclosed as mankind progresses from the hell of class conflict through the purgatory of revolution toward the classless paradise. The ideological usefulness of this conception to Soviet authorities should be evident. The idea that there are inescapable external standards to which the individual's behavior must conform would appear to be just the sort of meaning a totalitarian order would seek to give to the word "freedom," assuming that the word is to be retained at all.

When we turn to a current standard Soviet dictionary of the Russian language, however, we find no such univocal definition of "freedom."[16] Assuredly, a version of the prescribed sense is given pride of place as the first entry under the heading "Freedom." But

[14] *Dialekticheskoye protivorechiye* (Dialectical Contradiction), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1979, p. 320.

[15] Engels, op. cit., pp. 136–37.

[16] S. G. Barkhudarov et al., Eds., *Slovar' russkogo yazyka v chetyrëkh tomakh* (A Dictionary of the Russian Language in Four Volumes), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo inostrannykh i natsional'nykh slovarey, 1957–1961, Vol. 4, p. 73.

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its domain is explicitly restricted to "Philosophy." This orthodox meaning yields immediately to a long list of conflicting meanings that reflect the full range of senses in which the term "freedom" is actually used in Soviet society, as it was in earlier Russian society as well:

FREEDOM . . . Philos. *The ability to realize one's goals and aspirations on the basis of knowledge of the laws of development of nature and society. "Freedom is not arbitrariness, but agreement with the laws of necessity." Belinsky. . . . 2. The condition of one who is not a slave or serf. . . . 3. The absence of political and economic oppression. . . . 4. The condition of one who is not imprisoned or in captivity. . . . 5. Personal independence, the absence of dependence on something or someone. . . . 6. . . . The ability to act in some area without limitations or prohibitions, without hindrance. . . . 7. Easiness, the absence of difficulties. . . . 8. Noncompulsoriness, the absence of constraint.*

Why, we may ask, have Soviet authorities not exercised their manifest power to control the dictionary, and simply eliminated all meanings after the first? No doubt because they realize that such a tactic would not prevent people from *using* the word in the other senses as long as those senses are alive in the broader culture and are appropriate responses to the events of intellectual and practical life. To strip the word of those contradictory meanings it would be necessary, for one thing, to suppress all of the Oldspeak literature in which the term "freedom" appears and is defined explicitly or contextually in any of the alternative senses. But Soviet Russia's Communists have shown themselves unwilling to take so drastic a step. They have not turned their backs on Russian folk literature or on the great Russian novelists, poets, and essayists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but instead have resolved to tolerate the semantic diversity this rich national heritage contains. Since alternative and conflicting meanings are thus allowed to live, the controllers of the dictionary may reason that those meanings may be kept within bounds by clearly subordinating them to the prescribed philosophical definition in the dictionary listing.

But of course people do not learn their basic vocabulary from dictionaries or philosophy books, and in the everyday life in which their language is formed, alternative senses of "freedom" abound. They crop up in the most formulaic of Socialist Realist literature. Soviet leaders unwittingly employ them in their public pronouncements, as in their continued references to "free time" (*svobodnoye vremya*) as opposed to working time. And the alternative senses are of course prominently and deliberately displayed in samizdat writings; when in 1971 the authors of *The Sower* demanded "intellectual freedom and freedom of information" in the USSR, they were not asking for permission to acknowledge supposed historical or moral laws.[17] No doubt the most influential uses of "freedom" to mean personal independence, the absence of constraints, and the like, however, appear in the writings of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy, and the other prerevolutionary authors whose works are treasured by the Soviet public as great products of the Russian national genius. It is to that literature above all that contemporary Soviet intellectual culture is indebted for the vitality it retains. Largely thanks to that literature Soviet students are still capable of the liberating doublethink that allows them to give one definition of "freedom" in a philosophy examination and to assume another in the events of daily life.

On a snowy November afternoon in Moscow not long ago, a group of Russian schoolchildren, released at last from a regimented tour of the Tret'yakov Art Gallery, burst out the door with gleeful shouts of "Freedom!" Had these young people been thoroughly imbued with the Marxist-Leninist notion of freedom as the recognition of necessity, they would have exclaimed "Freedom!" when they were trooped into the museum, not when they were let out. But surely no such cries of acquiescence in the inevitable have ever been heard in those halls. And that is a fact full of hope. As long as there are Soviet children who proclaim their freedom when they are released from constraints rather than when constraints are placed upon them, there will be Soviet philosophers who know the difference between free thought and intellectual regimentation, and who understand the importance of striving to find, for whatever words are permitted them, the meanings those words must have if they are to describe the world correctly and fruitfully. The work these thinkers produce may fail to make a major contribution to world philosophy, but it will stand as a monument to the resourcefulness of the human spirit in pursuing significance and truth under the most difficult of circumstances.

[17] "Samizdat. *Sotsial-demokraticheskaya partiya*. From 'The Sower.' A Call for a Liberal Opposition Party in the Soviet Union," *Intellectual Digest* (New York), January 1973, p. 16.

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Books

Technology and the Soviet System

Dale R. Herspring

BRUCE PARROTT. *Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union.* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1983.

ERIK P. HOFFMANN and ROBBIN F. LAIRD. *The Scientific-Technical Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy.* New York, Pergamon, 1982.

M. M. KIR'YAN, Ed. *Voyenno-tekhnicheskiy progress i vooruzhënnyye sily SSSR* (Military-Technological Progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982.

V. M. BONDARENKO. *Sovremennaya nauka i razvitiye voyennogo dela* (Contemporary Science and the Development of Military Affairs). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976.

THE GROWING salience of high technology in the arms race has important implications not only for the USSR domestically, but for East-West relations and for the West's ability to gauge developments within the Soviet Union as well.

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For the Soviets, advanced technology permeates all aspects of East-West competition. It is the key to the strategic balance of forces. Despite some suggestions that the Soviets are catching up with the West in the technological race, the Soviet press and specialized journals give the clear impression that Moscow is convinced that it remains in second place. Furthermore, since high technology is inherently dynamic, the Soviets appear to believe that all major breakthroughs (e.g., a stealth bomber) will occur in the United States, thereby forcing the USSR to devote a considerable amount of time and effort to matching them.

The American decision to restrict high technology exports to the USSR will further complicate Moscow's ability to compete, especially in the strategic arena. To make matters worse from the Soviet perspective, the absence of meaningful progress on arms control negotiations in the past few years means that one of the key instruments for attempting to restrain the development of American weapons systems has been weakened. Finally, the recent downturn in US–Soviet relations combined with the perception—at least on the part of the Soviet writers—that the US is acting to regain the strategic superiority it lost in the 1970's by intensifying the arms race in high technology areas has heightened concern in the minds of the Kremlin's leaders and focused their attention on a Soviet response.

In addition, as is clear from the four books under review, technology is having a major impact on the Soviet Union itself. This is particularly true of the military sphere where, as Soviet writers note, the development of increasingly complex weapons systems has generated the need for major adjustments in the administration and management of its gigantic military bureaucracy.

BOTH of the Western books focus on the impact of modern technology on Soviet society. Bruce Parrott's excellent study examines the interaction between politics and technological performance from the founding of the USSR to the present. He analyzes the role of technological progress in Soviet thinking about the outside world; Moscow's strategy for dealing with the challenge of obtaining needed technology (i.e., of achieving the proper mix of foreign and domestic sources for developing new technology); and how this search for technology has influenced Soviet domestic institutions.

The equally useful book by Erik Hoffmann and Robbin Laird is, however, somewhat more narrowly focused. It deals primarily with the Brezhnev period and concentrates

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on the question of the extent to which the Soviet leadership wants to rely on the West for modern technology. Echoing a theme from the Parrott book, the authors argue—persuasively, in this writer's opinion—that there has long been a major debate in the USSR between "conservatives" and "modernizers" (Parrott labels them "traditionalists" and "non-traditionalists" respectively). Both groups, Hoffmann and Laird argue, advocate the selective import of Western industrial and agricultural technologies. They differ, however, in their views of how much the USSR should open itself to contacts with the West. Conservatives tend to favor an autarkic approach, i.e., place primary emphasis on generating technological innovation within the Soviet system itself. They do not object to stealing technology from the West, but they want to minimize contacts with the outside world. Modernizers, on the other hand, look to cooperative arrangements with the West as a means of increasing the efficiency of Soviet industry. They are also far less concerned with the potential for subversion that, according to the conservatives, accompanies increased contacts with the West.

In this writer's opinion, greater reliance on technology, whether developed at home or acquired from abroad, presents a number of difficult problems for Soviet leaders. First, on the autarkic approach. Emphasizing the role of domestic factors as the principal source of modern technology only reinforces the already strong tendency to isolate the favored military sector from the rest of the economy. This in turn severely limits the chances that technological innovations adopted by the military will find their way into the civilian economy. Such an approach also intensifies autarkic tendencies in other ministries. In addition, many Soviet leaders seem to be convinced that major structural reforms will be necessary before the USSR can hope to generate the needed technology. Such changes will inevitably cause important systemic dislocations, an anathema to Moscow's conservative party and state bureaucracies. It also would mean allocating still more funding and materials to the priority defense sector, thereby potentially starving the civilian sector of the resources needed to satisfy consumer demand. Finally, while technology stolen from abroad can sometimes be useful, it can also be inefficient. One can never be certain what type of equipment will be obtained, or how to integrate it into ongoing Soviet programs.

Obtaining technology from abroad legally through trade and cooperative arrangements also presents problems. First of all, it requires scarce hard currency. The bill can run into hundreds of millions of dollars, especially when entire factories are purchased. Second, buying technology abroad can create a dependence on foreign suppliers, conceivably giving the outside world an unacceptable degree of leverage over the USSR (the greater the quantity and value of the technology, the greater the dependence). Given the Soviets' suspicions regarding the outside world—not to mention the centuries-old Russian penchant for autarky—it is not surprising that a number of Soviet leaders oppose developing a dependence on the West. Third, some Soviets argue that extensive trading with the West to obtain advanced technology opens the door to ideological subversion. Similarly, scientific exchanges bring not only technological benefits but an influx of Western ideas and influence. Moreover, in the minds of some Soviet leaders, such an expansion of contacts increases the risk of political and military espionage. On the positive side, it is more efficient to obtain technology legally than to steal it. Production cycles can be structured to incorporate the technology at the proper moment and in such a way as to maximize its contribution to productivity.

REGARDLESS of the means of acquisition, advanced technology also creates a need for serious modifications in existing political structures. Given their penchant for control and secrecy, Soviet leaders abhor such changes, particularly for the threat they might pose to centralized party control. For example, the use of computers—if only on a limited scale—implies greater access to information by individuals. Although computers can strengthen the party's control, they can also make it difficult for Moscow to maintain a monopoly over information. Yet, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union can hope to remain competitive in the international arena without permitting greater participation in decision-making—at least by specialists—in areas dealing with high technology.

Both the Parrott and the Hoffmann/Laird books make it clear that while the autarkic model has historically tended to be dominant in the USSR, the interdependent approach has at times also been influential in the Kremlin. For example, the autarkic emphasis of the Stalinist period gave way, under Brezhnev, to a conscious effort to rely more heavily on cooperative arrangements with the West. Both works argue, convincingly, that regardless of which tendency is dominant, the basic choice of approach is a *political* decision. As such, it reflects not only the correlation of

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forces within the senior Soviet leadership, but also the leadership's perception of East-West relations (the worse the situation, the stronger the pressures to avoid cooperative arrangements with the West).

While Soviet security organs and military have traditionally been thought by many in the West to favor any approach that maximizes access to foreign technology, this does not appear to be the case. The Parrott and the Hoffmann/Laird books both demonstrate that these two groups have strongly opposed close economic ties with the West. Evidently, while they do not mind stealing whatever technology they can obtain (the attempt to acquire Western computers by transshipping them through Sweden comes to mind), when it comes to open acquisition, their desire for technology seems outweighed by concern with the attendant exposure of Soviet society to outside influences.

BEYOND its impact on the Soviet system as a whole, modern technology also has major repercussions for the Soviet military complex. The book edited by M. Kir'yan chronicles the numerous major changes that have occurred in weapons systems in the past 60-odd years, and discusses how these changes have affected the structure of the Soviet military and its doctrine. For example, the book argues that in the 1930's, reequipping the armed forces with newer weapons led to Moscow's 1938 decision to transform the military from a territorial force to a cadre army (p. 101). Likewise, the introduction of nuclear weapons—seen by Kir'yan as the single most important technological development in this century—resulted in the creation of a new branch of the Soviet armed forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces. More important, the Kir'yan book leaves the reader with the impression that the Soviets continue to devote considerable time and effort to making their armed forces more responsive to the needs of modern technology.

Although written in 1976, the book by V. M. Bondarenko, a professor at the Moscow Military Political Academy, remains one of the best conceptual analyses of the impact of modern technology on military affairs published to date in the Soviet Union. Bondarenko's main theme is that modern technology, particularly the introduction of nuclear weapons and modern missiles, has revolutionized all aspects of military affairs. Today, decisions must be instantaneous; a higher level of combat readiness must be maintained; technical education/training becomes increasingly important; command, control, and communications—including the use of automated systems (i.e., computers)—play a greater role; and increased emphasis needs to be placed on the motivation of troops. A few examples will help to illustrate the profound implications that the problems raised by Bondarenko in particular have for the management of the Soviet military machine.

To begin with, the question of inspiring initiative continues to be a serious concern. How does one instill a sense of creativity—a characteristic that, Bondarenko argues, will be a vital one in a nuclear war—when the military system gives first priority to blind obedience? Both Bondarenko and Kir'yan mention this issue, but neither of them offers a satisfactory solution. Furthermore, while some progress has been made in reconciling ideological requirements for strict discipline with the pressure for a more managerial approach to administering highly technical branches of the Soviet military, it is clear from other Soviet writings that Moscow has not reached a decision on this matter.[1]

The Soviet military leadership is also confronted with the task of quickly analyzing and assessing ever-increasing amounts of information. How can commanders coordinate the actions of large numbers of dispersed personnel while at the same time retaining centralized control? The Soviet leaders' interest in the past 20 years in areas such as cybernetics and systems analysis suggests that they are attempting to find ways to deal with this issue. Likewise, the psychological stress likely to occur in a nuclear war creates special problems, as Bondarenko's study shows. Despite the importance of these concerns, there is no evidence in either of the Soviet works reviewed here that the leadership has arrived at satisfactory solutions.

The training of personnel qualified to deal with high technology is another problem for the Soviet military. A modern, highly technical military demands competent personnel to operate its equipment. While some of the more technical branches may be adequately staffed, areas of weakness are beginning to appear, particularly in the Ground Forces. For example, in a recent article in the journal *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil,* the chief of the political directorate of a military district criticized the low level of technical expertise of mili-

[1]See, for example, I. I. Anureyev, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i voyennoye delo* (Scientific and Technological Progress and Military Affairs), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1978; I. I. Potapov, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i flot* (Scientific and Technological Progress and the Navy), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1977; and A. B. Pupko, *Sistema: Chelovek i voyennaya tekhnika*, (System: Man and Military Equipment), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976.

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tary personnel.[2] Given the anticipated increase in the share of recruits from less-educated ethnic groups in the Soviet armed forces in the future, these problems can be expected to grow. Increasingly, recent Soviet articles give the impression that political officers devote an inordinate amount of their time to dealing with technical training.[3] Does the low level of education of many Soviet soldiers help account for the technical simplicity of many of Moscow's weapons systems, as at least one Western writer has suggested?[4]

The civilian-military relationship is another matter of concern, at least to Bondarenko who argues that those who do not possess a good understanding of military-technical questions are not qualified to make foreign policy decisions (p. 128). Although Bondarenko carefully avoids any criticism of nonspecialists, the implications of his statement are clear. Assuming that his sentiments are shared by his fellow officers, the military's dissatisfaction with civilian meddling in highly technical areas could emerge as a severe problem for Soviet decision-making in a crisis situation.

The issues raised in the Kir'yan and Bondarenko books deserve more attention from Western analysts and policymakers, who in assessing the Soviet threat have tended to place primary emphasis on military hardware, presumably because it could be quantified. The latter type of information, while vital, is far more sufficient for adequately understanding the Soviet military machine in general and the figurative height of the Soviet soldier in particular. The unresolved issues of technical training, troop control, and even potential disagreement between civilian and military leaders could have a serious impact on the combat readiness of the Soviet military and its ability to conduct a war. In some cases, these problems might turn out to be even more important than the equipment itself.

NEVERTHELESS, technology and equipment unquestionably can enhance the military might of the Soviet Union, which raises the contentious issue of technology transfer. The West is clearly ill-advised to allow the Soviet Union free access to the most sensitive technologies. Indeed, a good case can be made that illegally obtained technology has played a significant role in helping Moscow upgrade its military arsenal. Hence, tightening of the regulations on transfer of critical technologies is an appropriate step in attempting to limit the growth of Soviet power.

At the same time, excessively restrictive Western export controls could have a perverse effect on the ongoing debate within the Soviet Union regarding autarkic vs. interdependent approaches to the problem of technological progress. Few would argue that the West can exercise much influence on internal Soviet politics. But as the Parrott and Hoffmann/Laird books make clear, Soviet decision-making is based at least in part on leaders' perceptions of the outside world. If the West restricts exports to the USSR of items with only the most remote potential military application, it could bolster the political capital of "conservatives" or "traditionalists" in the Soviet leadership, who have been arguing all along against Soviet dependence on and openness to the West. Besides being the leaders who tend to favor the most repressive policies at home, the are also the most likely to pressure Moscow's East European allies to reduce their ties with the West. Were such elements to gain the ascendancy in the ongoing Soviet succession process, the West would find fewer opportunities for differentiating its policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies.

The dilemma for the West is therefore to devise a policy that carefully monitors technology transfer to the East while permitting enough East-West interaction to encourage greater openness and diversity in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

[2]Gen.-Lt. V. Arapov, "Weapons and Equipment—Outstanding Mastery," *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil* (Moscow), No. 12, 1983, pp. 20–26; also Gen.-Maj. A. Barabanshchikov and Col. A. Pupko, "A Scientific Base for Military Technical Training," ibid., *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil*, No. 1, 1984, pp. 62–66.

[3]This is particularly true of the Arapov article cited in fn. 2.

[4]General Sir John Hackett, *The Third World War, the Untold Story*, New York, Bantam, 1983, p. 44.

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Ustinov versus Ogarkov

George G. Weickhardt

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ and ROMAN KOLKOWICZ, Eds. *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War,* a special issue of *Soviet Union* (Irvine, CA), Vol. 10, Parts 2-3, 1983.

SAMUEL B. PAYNE, JR. *The Soviet Union and SALT.* Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1980.

D. F. USTINOV. *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles). Moscow, Politizdat, 1979.

N. V. OGARKOV. *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982.

D. F. USTINOV. *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause,* tr. by Penny Dole. New York, Pergamon Press, 1983.

OVER THE LAST two decades many inconsistent statements of Soviet doctrine on nuclear war have appeared in Soviet publications. Some of these statements, particularly those by civilian leaders and analysts, have sounded like the American concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Many military figures, on the other hand, have argued that the Soviet Union can fight, survive, and even win a nuclear conflict. The most typical approach of Western analysts to this dichotomy in the Soviet sources is to dismiss Soviet protestations of adherence to mutual deterrence as propaganda or disinformation. E.g., Benjamin Lambeth, in his essay in the collection *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War,* edited by Ellen Mickiewicz and Roman Kolkowicz, expresses doubt that the two superpowers will ever speak a common strategic language. He sees the true measure of Soviet military doctrine in the Soviet Union's massive buildup of all types of conventional and nuclear weapons, a buildup designed, Lambeth says, to bring Soviet capabilities into congruence with Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy's doctrinal edicts in *Military Strategy.* The latter work, first published in 1962, emphasizes such themes as counterforce, surprise, shock, preemption, superiority, and the feasibility of victory.[1] On the other hand, a minority of Western scholars, such as Raymond Garthoff,[2] find persuasive evidence of Soviet acceptance of mutual deterrence in authoritative military sources and in the statements of the top political leaders, including both the late Leonid Brezhnev and the current party chief Konstantin Chernenko.

Because of the contradictory evidence, it is difficult to resolve this dispute among Western analysts regarding the nature of Soviet doctrine. A potentially fruitful alternative approach is found in Samuel Payne's *The Soviet Union and SALT,* which treats the divergent trends in the Soviet literature as a circumscribed debate between competing factions. Payne's "arms controller" faction comes mainly from the civilian think tanks (Georgiy Arbatov and Igor Glagolev) and from the foreign ministry (Andrey Gromyko). They advocate strategic parity, guaranteed by arms control, and believe that there could be no victor in nuclear war. The most radical spokesmen of Payne's "militarist" faction work in the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the Armed Forces (Colonels Ye. I. Rybkin and V. Bondarenko), but the military's point of view is also reflected in the writings of the most senior marshals, such as Sokolovskiy. Payne's militarists believe that the Soviet Union should seek strategic superiority in order to be assured of victory should the imperialists start a new war.

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[1] V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy,* 3d ed., tr. and ed. by Harriet Fast Scott, New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1975.

[2] Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1978, pp. 112-47.

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The important question is, of course, who is winning the debate? Writing in the Mickiewicz/Kolkowicz volume, Ann Sloan detects significant influence of the "arms controllers" in the history of Soviet arms control positions. But in the same collection, Keith Payne and Dan Strode argue cogently that the USSR still has not accepted the basic American theory of arms control: to leave the two societies vulnerable to retaliation (countervalue), but at the same time to prohibit weapons that threaten the other side's weapons (counterforce).

The Soviet debate between advocates of nuclear-war–fighting and those of mutual deterrence has recently taken a most dramatic turn, with the latter side emerging the clear victor. The antagonists were not MPD colonels and civilian think tank analysts; instead the debate took the form of a veiled challenge by the Soviet Union's senior professional soldier and chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, to the minister of defense and Politburo member, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov. Ogarkov was obliged to recant his insubordinate nuclear-war–fighting views in late 1983, but the true dénouement to this drama came in September 1984, when Ogarkov was apparently demoted for what an unnamed Soviet source called his "un-partylike tendencies."[3]

As Payne indicates, Soviet polemicists never name their antagonist, nor do they attack his views directly. They merely advocate their own viewpoint, and it is usually only by the sequential appearance of inconsistent views in the press that one can detect a "debate." The ostensible issue that Ogarkov and Ustinov "debated" in this manner was the winnability of nuclear war, but this issue by its very nature affects the broader concerns of defense planning and expenditure. Ogarkov argued that nuclear weapons, with their immense destructive power, would inflict huge losses and that nuclear warfare therefore requires redundancies or reserves in materiel sufficient to guarantee the ability to exploit one's own nuclear strikes. Because such a war-fighting doctrine can justify limitless military procurement, the level of defense expenditure was probably one of the underlying issues in the Ustinov-Ogarkov "debate."

To appreciate Ustinov's role in the development of Soviet strategic doctrine, one must view him in the context of his two immediate predecessors at the Ministry of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy (from 1957 to 1967) and Marshal Andrey Grechko (from 1967 to 1976). Malinovskiy disavowed any Soviet intent to start a nuclear war, but called for preparations to fight such a war, because the imperialists might launch a surprise nuclear attack. He predicted that the Soviet Union would emerge victorious in a nuclear war.[4] Grechko, while also prophesying victory, conceded that no defense against strategic missiles existed. At the same time, he called for the attainment of strategic superiority and advocated counterforce targeting and probably also a policy of "launch on warning" for Soviet missiles.[5] Grechko, moreover, presided over the development and initial deployment of the Soviet Union's first counterforce missiles. It was also during the Malinovskiy-Grechko period that Marshal Sokolovskiy wrote his definitive work on military strategy, which intimated that the USSR should launch a preemptive attack once war became inevitable.

While both Malinovskiy and Grechko were professional soldiers, Ustinov is a civilian, who, prior to his appointment as minister of defense, had spent virtually his entire career in the defense industry. While many Soviet military figures remained silent on SALT I (which Payne interprets as an expression of opposition), Ustinov endorsed both SALT I and arms control in 1973.[6] He became defense minister shortly before Brezhnev gave a speech in January 1977 at Tula in which the Soviet leader avowed for the first time that the USSR did not seek strategic superiority, only parity.[7] In choosing Ustinov as minister of defense, the Politburo passed over such obvious senior military candidates as Marshal Viktor Kulikov, then chief of the General Staff, whom Payne identifies as a militarist (p. 52). Ustinov's early speeches and writings as minister of defense, collected in the 1979 volume under review, mirror Brezhnev's Tula speech: no pursuit of military superiority, no first strike, and no prediction of Soviet victory.[8] As already noted, Soviet practice and tradition would have permitted Ustinov to remain silent on these issues if he really did disagree with Brezhnev. As minister of defense, Ustinov thus represented a true departure from the war-fighting rhetoric employed by his predecessors.

[3] *The New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1984, p. 1.

[4] "Address to the XXII Congress of the CPSU," in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Soviet Art of War*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 167–70.

[5] Payne, pp. 50–51; and A. A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, tr. by US Air Force, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 148–51.

[6] *Izbrannyye rechi*, pp. 18–19.

[7] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 19, 1977, pp. 1–2.

[8] *Izbrannyye rechi*, pp. 319–20, 329, 353, 390–91, 423–25, 444, 493, 495, 500.

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When Ogarkov was appointed chief of the General Staff in 1977, his public reputation was, if anything, moderate. He had been the senior Soviet military delegate to the SALT I talks, and his writings, which focused on offensive operations in depth and on modern military technology,[9] contained no warfighting talk. In 1979 he was also to give a strong endorsement to SALT II[10] However, shortly after his appointment he published a cryptic statement that the introduction of nuclear-tipped rockets would, in accord with Marxist dialectics, be followed by the appearance of the means of countering (*protivodeystviye*) them.[11]

This statement took on greater meaning in 1979, when Volume 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* appeared containing an entry by Ogarkov entitled "Military Strategy," which was very much in the mold and tradition of Sokolovskiy's formulation of Soviet strategy.[12] Although Ogarkov rejected a first strike or first use of nuclear weapons and refrained from saying that the Soviet Union could count on victory in nuclear war, he still maintained that Soviet victory was an "objective possibility" if the proper measures were taken. In a 1981 article in *Kommunist*, the party's main theoretical journal, Ogarkov continued along the same lines.[13] Although he conceded that the fate of all mankind would be at stake in nuclear war, he nonetheless argued that such a war would require decisive combined-arms offensives on a theater-wide level. The materiel requirements for such operations, he said, would be immense because of the scale of losses to be expected in modern (presumably nuclear) war.

As if to correct Ogarkov and clarify Soviet doctrine, Ustinov shortly thereafter published an article in *Pravda* that emphatically denied that Soviet doctrine contemplated a "possibility of surviving or even winning a nuclear war."[14] On the issue of whether a new Soviet military buildup was needed, the Defense Minister had said several months earlier that there was approximate parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that Soviet forces "have everything they need to administer a timely and appropriate rebuff to any aggressor."[15] In these statements Ustinov was again following the line of Brezhnev who, by 1981, had announced that there could be no victor in nuclear war.[16]

THE CONTRAST between the positions of Ustinov and Ogarkov sharpened even further in 1982 when each published a pamphlet on Soviet military doctrine. Ogarkov's *Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland* appeared in January, and Ustinov's *Serving the Country*, in May. Ogarkov again emphasized that the USSR must plan for the possibility that the imperialists might unleash a nuclear war. In such an event, he said, nuclear weapons would give Soviet theater commanders "the increased ability to achieve war aims," and he argued that the Soviet Union should pursue "decisive political and strategic aims."

In the context of the discussion of nuclear war, Ogarkov reiterated several times that the aim of military operations was victory, although he never explicitly stated that the USSR would or could achieve victory. His discussion of nuclear weapons was in the context of their use within a Soviet "theater of military operations"—e.g., Western Europe or the Far East—rather than in the context of massive intercontinental attacks on cities. Perhaps Ogarkov was arguing that nuclear weapons could be feasibly employed in a limited war. But even this viewpoint would have been heretical, because official Soviet doctrine has long stated that a limited nuclear war (Moscow presumably envisages one initiated by NATO in response to a Soviet conventional offensive in Western Europe) would quickly escalate into an intercontinental exchange of strategic missiles. This point is discussed in the fine essays by Desmond Ball and Christian Hacke in *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War*. The Ogarkov pamphlet also stressed the importance of surprise in military operations and tended to glorify the cult of the offensive, suggesting that Ogarkov believes that a preemptive strike may be appropriate.

By contrast, Ustinov's pamphlet emphasized that "to count on victory in the arms race and in the nuclear war is madness." In probable reference to Ogarkov's discussion of the use of nuclear weapons in theater operations, Ustinov stated emphatically: "There can simply be no limited nuclear war." A limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to "irreplaceable losses" and the destruction of "entire peoples and their civilizations," and would inevitably assume a worldwide character.

On the issue of surprise and preemption, Ustinov pontificated

[9] "We Stand on Guard," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 20, 1967; "The Theoretical Arsenal of the Military Leader," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Sept. 3, 1971, p. 2; "Operations in Depth," *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp. 574–78; "Guarding the Motherland," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 23, 1977, p. 2.

[10] *Pravda*, Aug. 2, 1979.

[11] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 7, May 1978, p. 117.

[12] *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. 7, 1979, pp. 555–65.

[13] *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80–91.

[14] *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1981, pp. 1–3.

[15] Ibid., June 22, 1981, pp. 2–3.

[16] Ibid., Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 1–2.

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that it would be impossible for either side to disarm the other with a first strike, and that the outcome of modern warfare is "in the final count, determined by objective laws"—a formula used since the time of Stalin to minimize the importance of the surprise factor in warfare. On the issue of the level of military expenditures, Ustinov employed another Soviet debater's tactic that is discussed by Payne. Customarily, Soviet opponents of increased military spending do not attack it directly; they simply advocate spending in other areas. In Soviet debates about economic priorities, one can also usually deduce the debater's priorities from the order in which he discusses allocations to one or another sector of the economy. Ustinov first spoke of investment in heavy industry, then in consumer goods, and finally in agriculture, without saying a word about increased military budgets or using alarmist language to justify higher military expenditures.

In a July 12, 1982, article in *Pravda,* Ustinov again attacked "those who invent a 'sure method' of fighting a victorious nuclear war," and quoted from Brezhnev that "only someone who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of winning it." While this attack was ostensibly directed at war-fighting theorists in the United States, the real target may have been Ogarkov. As Payne points out, the opponent's position in Soviet debates is often ascribed to foreigners, who can more safely be attacked.

SOON AFTER the November 1982 accession of Yuriy Andropov, with whom Ustinov had been closely aligned, Ogarkov began to moderate his line. In March 1983 he publicly rejected the concept of limited nuclear war, disavowed Soviet adherence to a launch-on-warning doctrine, and endorsed Andropov's arms control initiatives.[17] Two months later he backpedaled a bit, at least in his rhetoric, arguing that the Soviet Union was well prepared for the initial hours of total war, which would be unprecedentedly intense and destructive.[18]

By September 1983, with Andropov seriously ill, Ustinov had become, as much as any other Politburo member, the regime's caretaker. In that month, Ogarkov fully recanted: in an *Izvestiya* article he acknowledged that starting a nuclear war would be suicide and that, even after sustaining a first strike, each side would still be able to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the other side. On the issue of "unacceptable damage," he even referred approvingly to Robert McNamara, the progenitor of the concept.[19]

Ogarkov's recantation came only a few weeks after the September 1983 incident in which Soviet fighters shot down an unarmed Korean Air Lines passenger plane. The leadership had assigned him the difficult job of explaining (and perhaps taking responsibility for) this incident in an unusual televised news conference. We might speculate that this embarrassing crisis weakened support for Ogarkov within the Politburo and made it easier for Ustinov and his allies to clamp down on Ogarkov's insubordinate views on strategic doctrine.

A month after his dismissal as chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov was reportedly appointed commander of the Soviet western theater of military operations, one of five such theater commands.[20] While it is not clear whether Ogarkov is subordinate to the commander of Warsaw Pact Forces, the new post will probably involve command authority only in time of war; thus at present, he probably has a title without a command. Although Ogarkov is not in total disgrace, it is clear that he has been significantly demoted. His new "command" is definitely subordinate to his own former position as chief of staff, and he has been moved out of Moscow (probably to Minsk), where his influence will be drastically reduced.

Numerous rumors and theories concerning the reason for Ogarkov's demotion have circulated in the Western press: a heart attack, Chernenko's displeasure with him for having supported Andropov's successful bid to succeed Brezhnev, the stalemate in Afghanistan, Ogarkov's overselling of the SS-20 missile.[21] However, there is nothing in the public record to support any of these speculative theories. The most plausible explanation for Ogarkov's demotion is that Ustinov and the party had to show the outspoken Ogarkov who is the boss on the key issues of strategic doctrine. The Soviet system cannot tolerate for long an official who defies his superiors on such an important question as the winnability of nuclear war. Ogarkov's successor, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, was already on record as following the Ustinov line on this issue. In May 1983, Akhromeyev stated that Soviet military chiefs "do not see the possibility of winning a nuclear war," that

[17] *The New York Times,* Mar. 17, 1983, p. 1.
[18] *Izvestiya,* May 9, 1983, pp. 1–2.
[19] Ibid., Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 4–5.

[20] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 16, 1984, p. 2; also UPI Wire, Oct. 15, 1984, PM Cycle, International Section.
[21] See, e.g., *The Economist* (London), Sept. 15, 1984, pp. 46–47; *The New York Times,* Sept. 17, 1984, p. 2; and Associated Press Wire, Sept. 11, 1984.

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the Soviet Union does not seek strategic superiority, and that it rejects the concept of limited nuclear war.[22]

Some Western accounts erroneously attributed Ogarkov's demotion to an article he had published in May 1984 in which he advocated increased Soviet investment in "smart" conventional weapons rather than in greater numbers of nuclear weapons.[23] But, although Ogarkov may have been breaking new ground, his advocacy was not obviously out of line with any statement by a top party leader, as was the case with his pronouncements on winning a nuclear war. Indeed, Soviet military leaders have traditionally been free to voice their expertise on priorities for weapons procurement.

What is more interesting about the May article is that it reconfirmed and extended Ogarkov's previous recantation of his war-fighting theories. In it, he not only explained further the concept of "unacceptable damage," but also explicitly renounced the concept of a limited, "decapitating" first strike. If there was anything objectionable in the article, it was that Ogarkov singled out for praise Marshal Georgiy Zhukov (the last important Soviet military figure to have been sacked).

There is, moreover, no reason to assume that Ogarkov's dismissal could be attributed to his last public statement. In other cases where top Soviet leaders have been removed for publicly defying the consensus of the Politburo, the ax did not fall immediately. For example, Gennadiy I. Voronov publicly differed with Brezhnev on agricultural policy as early as 1969, but it was not until 1971 that he was dismissed as premier of the Russian republic and until 1973 that he was removed from the Politburo.[24] The removal of the chief of the General Staff would require a strong consensus in the Politburo, which was probably difficult to reach in the years 1982–84, when two successions and other dramatic changes took place in the composition of the top party body. It is also not atypical for the Soviet system to exact repeated recantations from a discredited figure prior to his dismissal.

Although the Soviet press has traditionally allowed the military some freedom of expression on military matters, Ogarkov clearly exceeded this brief. Despite his marshal's uniform, Ustinov is a civilian with a perspective on strategic doctrine that differs from the military's. As Ustinov reemphasized in *Serving the Country,* Soviet military doctrine is formulated by the party (read: *not by the military!*). True, the question of whether a nuclear war could be won was the subject of a debate in the Soviet press in the 1970's, but this issue is so fundamental to Soviet security policy and so important to the Soviet Union's image in the world that it was natural for the party ultimately to impose uniformity on this subject. One can anticipate that no further open nuclear-war–fighting talk will appear in the Soviet military press.

RESOLUTION of this issue on a theoretical level will, however, have only limited impact on Soviet foreign and security policy. As Lambeth argues, the massive Soviet buildup over the last 15 years has been designed not so much to assure victory in war as to create a fear of Soviet power that will allow the USSR to achieve its aims without war. The fact that Ustinov and the Politburo consensus he represents have rejected the notion that nuclear war is winnable does not mean that they also reject an expansionist foreign policy. During Ustinov's term as minister of defense, the "war of liberation" by proxy became a fine art in Soviet policy. (As Roman Kolkowicz notes in the lead chapter in *Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War,* the doctrine of mutual assured destruction is totally irrelevant to this aspect of Soviet policy in the first place.) One also cannot expect to see an abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine or of its extension to countries like Afghanistan.

Moreover, Ustinov's acceptance of the theory of mutual deterrence does not mean that he is flexible on arms control, as Payne's model of the "arms controller" might suggest. Ustinov was probably one of the principal architects of the tough Soviet position on intermediate-range forces, and was certainly the principal spokesman for the Soviet line that led up to the walkout from the Geneva strategic arms negotiations in November 1983. Nor is there any evidence that Ustinov's concept of nuclear parity is anything other than the Soviet doctrine of equal security, which, among other things, means that the Soviet Union should have an arsenal equal to the combined arsenal of all its potential adversaries. Last, Ustinov's version of the doctrine of mutual deterrence does not necessarily mean that he or the Politburo is likely to accept what the Americans regard as the corollary of that doctrine, i.e., that weapons capable of destroying the other side's strategic weapons should be severely lim-

[22] *The Washington Post,* May 18, 1983, p. A-12; British Broadcasting Corp. Wire, May 19, 1983.

[23] For the article, see *Krasnaya Zvezda,* May 9, 1984.

[24] Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente,* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 53–54.

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ited. Ustinov, as defense minister,* has presided over the deployment of the Soviet Union's family of counterforce missiles, the SS-18, SS-19, and SS-20. In the START negotiations, the USSR showed no inclination to accept substantial limits on these destabilizing weapons. The true test of the Soviet Union's adoption of the US concept of mutual deterrence will be its willingness to make concessions in this area.

Nonetheless, Ustinov's version of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction will, it can be hoped, set some limits on Soviet strategic forces. As indicated at the outset, under a war-fighting doctrine, there is no limit to how many weapons are needed. Ustinov has already used the doctrine of mutual deterrence to argue against Ogarkov's strident call for redundancy in force structure, and, in fact, the US Central Intelligence Agency currently estimates that the Soviet military budget has grown only at a moderate 2 percent per year during Ustinov's term.[25]

*This essay was completed and in type before the death of Marshal Ustinov on December 20, 1984, and the announcement of the appointment of First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal Sergey L. Sokolov to replace him as the Soviet defense minister.—**Eds.**

[25]Office of Soviet Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, "USSR: Economic Trends and Policy Developments," a Joint Economic Committee Briefing Paper prepared for Hearings on the Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1983, before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics, Sept. 20, 1983, p. 8.

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Policy Succession in China

Jill A. Friedman

JOHN GARDNER. *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao.* New York, Holmes & Meier, 1982.

IMMANUEL C. Y. HSÜ. *China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1982.

RONALD A. MORSE, Ed. *The Limits of Reform in China.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, ED. *China from Mao to Deng: The Politics and Economics of Socialist Development.* Introduction by Bruce Cumings. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983.

THE DEATH of Mao Zedong in 1976 marked the end of an era, not only for the Chinese people, but for China watchers in the West as well. However unpredictable he might have been at times, Mao was a known quantity whose personality and writings had been intensely studied for more than a quarter century. His death, and the deaths of Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and other elder statesmen at approximately the same time, meant that China watchers in the West had to study a new array of personalities and policies within the uncertain context of political transition. The issues raised by the passing of the baton of leadership are the subject of several new books that attempt to shed light on China without Mao.

John Gardner in *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao* and Immanuel Hsü in *China Without Mao* focus attention on the people who have followed Mao to power. In works primarily intended for nonspecialists, both authors present chronological accounts of the complicated events following Mao's death. Recognizing the fact that Mao's passing raises issues of power, leadership, political structures, and other questions of interest to political scientists, Gardner has attempted to set his work within a theoretical framework of leadership transitions within socialist states. However, although generally useful as a summary of the events surrounding the rise and fall of the Gang of Four, the fall of Lin Biao, the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping, the eclipse of Hua Guofeng, etc., Gardner's work remains seriously flawed on several levels.

Most basically, Gardner's chronological presentation is so seriously oversimplified that it helps to perpetuate the myths about China's ruling elite that have elsewhere been gradually eroded—even by Gardner himself. Thus, the complex machinations of the various factions struggling for power during the Cultural Revolution have here been reduced to a struggle between rightists and leftists, capitalist roaders and Maoists.

Choosing to concentrate on detailing the daily developments of Lin Biao's alleged coup attempt, Gardner ignores more interesting questions raised by the events of the Cultural Revolution. For example, why and how did political organizations disintegrate so completely and so rapidly? What role, if any, did the history and development of factional politics in pre-Communist China play in the emergence of factional politics during the Cultural Revolution? What happened to the various factions, and what are the prospects for their reemergence in the aftermath of the arrest or promotion of their top leaders? Other interesting questions arising from the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent struggle for power in the wake of Mao's death—including the comparative ones raised but then ignored by Gardner—go similarly unexplored. Addressing such issues would have made for more useful and compelling reading than the presentation of a chronology whose significant points could have been summed up in one chart.

Another fundamental problem arises from Gardner's uncritical ac-

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ceptance of PRC sources in his treatment of the Lin Biao affair, the rise and fall of the Gang of Four, and other post–Cultural Revolution events. Despite brief cautionary words in his introduction on the reliability of his source material, Gardner's extensive and uncritical use of quotations from the Chinese media has the effect of lending credibility to the official PRC account of the events under study and tends to lull the general reader not only into believing he is reading "truth," but also into accepting the PRC's own weighting of the relative importance of the events in the Cultural Revolution and post-Mao periods. For example, one can only wonder whether the major significance of the Lin Biao affair lies in Lin's alleged treachery, or in some basic but here unexplored tension between the goals of the military and of the political organizations in the PRC.

A parallel distortion occurs through Gardner's uncritical acceptance of the weighting of events deemed important by the Western media, but which seem, in perspective, to have had a less significant impact on the current development of Chinese politics. Thus, his treatment of the Wei Jingsheng affair and "democracy wall" are accorded an entire 30-page chapter in which China is taken to task for not allowing the development of "Western democracy," while potentially more interesting issues, such as the tradition of this type of dissent in China after the 1911 revolution, are ignored.

Had Gardner tied himself more closely to the theoretical framework he lays out for the reader in the introductory chapter but then abandons, *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao* would probably have been a more interesting and useful work. Gardner, whose other work on China reveals a thorough understanding of both contemporary events and political theory, here again raises issues significant to the literature on political leadership, e.g., the problems with identifying the real leaders whether or not they occupy formal positions of power, and the problems inherent in leadership transition. However, in this volume, the context in which Gardner sees these problems is that of comparison between "democratic" and "socialist" states, i.e., between the good and the bad guys.

Whether the problems of political succession encountered by China might not be more usefully viewed through the theoretical prism of questions of routinization of charismatic leadership, or perhaps through the exploration of questions of modernization in what Samuel Huntington refers to as the crisis of institutionalization, are issues Gardner ignores. As a result, his current work adds little to our knowledge of China or to the advancement of the study of Chinese politics as a part of the field of political science.

Many of the problems encountered in *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao* are also found in Immanuel Hsü's *China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order.* Like Gardner, Hsü has presented a simplified chronological account of the major political developments in China in the 1970–80 period, which does little to illuminate the more interesting questions raised by the changes in China during the last decade. Like Gardner, Hsü also relies on extensive quotations from Chinese media—both mainland and Taiwan—for accounts of the fall of the Gang of Four, the rise of Deng, etc.

However, while Gardner's work suffers from its uncritical use of these sources, Hsü's quotations seem to be specifically chosen to serve the function of denigrating the government of the People's Republic regardless of the factional leanings of the individuals in authority. Thus, we are told that the selection of Hua Guofeng as party chairman was of "dubious legality" (p. 18); and that "everyone in socialist China today is interested in profit and openly talks about making more money" (p. 110). Hsü seems to particularly enjoy repeating anecdotes about Jiang Qing: "Jiang Qing was in bed when her captors arrived. She shouted: 'How dare you to rebel when the Chairman's body is not yet cold!'" (p. 18). Hsü is careful to point out the PRC government's efforts to eliminate political dissent: "The trend toward eliminating dissension was not limited to Democracy Wall" (p. 38). However, his concern for democratic rights seems suspended in his treatment of Taiwan. In his final chapter, entitled "Taiwan's Economic Miracle," Hsü praises the economic achievements of the Taiwanese government. He describes Taiwan as a "Treasure Island" (p. 177) of motor cycles and cars, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and "farmers neatly clothed and fed, with modest but comfortable homes" (pp. 172–73). In his exaltation of the material prosperity Hsü overlooks the very real issue of suppression of political dissent and the efforts to eliminate the native Taiwanese independence movement, not to mention growing urban and industrial pollution.

China Without Mao seems to have been written in the course of Hsü's preparation of the third edition of his well-known textbook, *The Rise of Modern China,* in which *China Without Mao* can be found, reproduced almost verbatim. One can only speculate at the reasons for its separate publication, but in its paperbook format,

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China Without Mao does serve as an inexpensive way of updating the hardcover second edition of the textbook.

THE AUTHORS of *The Limits of Reform in China* and *China from Mao to Deng*, while also interested in the shape of Chinese politics in the post-Mao era, have chosen to concentrate their attention on substantive policy changes rather than on personalities. Thus, the essays in these two volumes are generally more successful in shedding light on the consequences of the change of power following the transition from Mao. As with any edited volume, the individual essays are not of equal strength; some present original and stimulating research; others cover more familiar ground.

The Limits of Reform in China, edited by Ronald A. Morse, is the more interesting of the two books. The offspring of a conference held in May 1982, *The Limits of Reform* attempts to review and assess post-Mao changes in the intellectual, social, political, and industrial spheres of society. The published papers, here adapted and updated, are divided into two sections: "Management and Reform" and "Intellectual and Cultural Reform," with the first section being the more interesting.

In "Deng Xiaoping's Reform of the Chinese Bureaucracy," Hong Yung Lee argues that despite Deng's remarkable political skill—as demonstrated in the rehabilitation of victims of all political purges since 1957; his success, with support from the newly rehabilitated cadres, in shifting the regime's goal from revolution to economic development; and the placement of his protégés Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in commanding positions in the party and government—Deng remains faced with serious problems that inhibit his attempts to reform the bureaucracy in order to make it more effective in carrying out his economic development policies (p. 20). Hong sees an overstaffed Chinese bureaucracy—on the whole elderly and undereducated, beset with problems of low morale, factionalism, abuses of power, and corruption—as presenting a major obstacle to Deng's reform program. Overstaffing, a longstanding problem in the PRC, has in fact been exacerbated by Deng's reinstatement of all dismissed cadres. Hong is pessimistic about the possibilities for further streamlining of the cadre corps, particularly in the lower level government and party organizations, and believes that:

It will be comparatively easy to promote younger generations of cadres with formal education and technical competency to the leadership positions, but it will be extremely difficult to make them at the same time politically loyal to the top leadership group.... Since the corruption of the cadre is not simply due to the "bad Party style," but is a reflection of the moods and basic structure of the entire system, the ongoing effort will not be able to resolve thoroughly the problems of official corruption. (p. 34)

Andrew Walder is scarcely more optimistic about the possibilities for industrial reform in China. Walder believes that the creation of a more efficient industrial administration hinges not only upon the undertaking of a thorough-going reassessment of the industrial economy and its goals and the creation of new economic mechanisms to allocate capital and distribute industrial goods more effectively. More important, it hinges upon the creation of three fundamental conditions for rationally efficient economic administration: (1) the creation of clear-cut, unambiguous incentives for efficient management; (2) the development through training, experience, and personal orientation of a capacity to respond to management incentives; and (3) the implementation in the factory of conditions conducive to rational administrative behavior. These conditions will be difficult to create because of what Walder refers to as the "human dimension" of industrial reforms. Walder argues that long-standing past policies that placed a premium on output have led to the hoarding of stockpiles of raw materials, as well as to the growth of an elaborate informal network of personal relationships for material transactions beyond the reach of formal economic controls. Moreover, Walder believes that the long history of discrimination against educated personnel has left a dual legacy. On the one hand, it has led to the emergence of a significant group of political careerists in industry. On the other hand, it has left the bulk of the managerial corps ill-prepared by previous experience to operate profitably under conditions of enterprise autonomy. These factors, Walder suggests, will hamper progress and make industrial reform in China at best "a protracted and fragile affair" (p. 59).

Walder in fact has anticipated the economic reforms announced by the PRC itself in its "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) on Reform of the Economic Structure" (October 1984). The sweeping reforms of the economy called for by the CCP will seek to introduce competition among state-owned enterprises, separate government from purely economic functions, limit central planning, phase out consumer subsidies on many prod-

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ucts (the prices of which will now be determined by supply and demand), and create a new economic leadership corps through the promotion of young cadres and the reshifting of existing enterprise leadership.[1] While these steps should go far toward meeting Walder's above mentioned conditions for efficient economic administration, it remains to be seen whether the factors Walder describes as obstacles to industrial reform will have as negative an effect as he predicts.

Reform in the countryside also faces serious impediments, according to David Zweig. In "National Elites, Rural Bureaucrats and Peasants: Limits on Commune Reform in China," Zweig argues that reform of the commune system will be limited by resistance from those middle-echelon bureaucrats who would lose political power and prestige, and those peasants in rich rural areas who fear both economic polarization and loss of financial security. Current poor-peasant exuberance for private enrichment, which exhibited itself in the excessive zeal with which the collective was dismantled and state goals ignored in favor of local interests, undercuts the reformist program and weakens the position of the advocates of change at the elite level, while at the same time strengthening the position of those middle-level bureaucrats and peasants from the richer areas who fear that any change in the rural structure will undermine their preferred economic or political position. Zweig points out that as the opportunities for individual enrichment built into the reform program increase polarization between rich and poor, social and political tensions will be created that could derail efforts at commune reform. However, Zweig concludes that regardless of the limitations on reform in agriculture, China's countryside has already developed into a more complex political, economic, and social system whose final configuration it is impossible to predict.

The problems in reforming PRC economic and managerial systems elaborated by Zweig, Walder, and Hong Yung Lee are specific to the Chinese model of development, but are also, in their more general aspect, inherent in socialist models of development. The authors have attempted to identify real areas of difficulty with which the PRC leaders are already grappling.

By contrast, the problems identified by John Israel, Vera Schwarcz, and James Seymour in the "Intellectual and Cultural Reform" section of *The Limits of Reform* seem to derive from a more abstract model of what a modern "liberal democracy" should look like. Israel, for example, sets forth four characteristics of "liberal education": (1) a liberation and awakening of the mind; (2) an open-ended, skeptical search and humane attitude; (3) a pluralistic ideology; and (4) a diverse curriculum. He then takes the PRC to task for not living up to these standards. In similar fashion, Seymour decries China's politics for being "illiberal, undemocratic and ... feudal" (p. 153). To condemn the PRC for its failure to meet the standards of the West (a standard not always reached even there) does little to illuminate what are real problems in the areas of intellectual and cultural reform in China in particular or in socialist systems in general. Thus, rather than lamenting the fact that liberal education in the PRC has not blossomed as it did during the historically unique situation of the Southwest Associated University (*Lianda*) from 1938 to 1946, Israel might more usefully have examined other educational reform problems.

Some of the more important issues ignored by all the authors include the sociological consequences of the widening gap between the city and the countryside created by the disparity between the educational resources of urban centers and those of rural areas; the increasing employment problems created by an ever growing population of technically trained young people whose heightened expectations and demands come up against an economy where industrial growth must be balanced with agricultural needs and economic limitations; the problems created by the return of ever larger numbers of students trained in Japan and the West; and the ongoing political, economic, and social problems of what to do with the generation of young people from the Cultural Revolution period who are ill-prepared to occupy the positions of technical expertise that they believe are rightfully theirs. These are the problems of immediate concern in terms of the limits of reform in Chinese culture and education. Sadly, they are not addressed in this volume.

THE SENSE of disappointment and disillusionment with China found in some of the essays in *The Limits of Reform* rings even more strongly in the many articles in *China From Mao to Deng*. Edited by the Bulletin for Concerned Asian Scholars (BCAS), this loosely structured volume covers such diverse topics as political cartoons in Chinese media (Ralph Croizier), new development strategy in the people's communes (Victor Lippit), the future of the Chinese revolution

[1] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), Oct 22, 1984, pp. k/1–17. Also *The New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1984.

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(Edward Friedman), rural development and agrarian structure in China (Mitch Meisner and Marc Blecher), and post-Mao changes in a south China production brigade (Victor Nee), among others. Beginning, as BCAS did in the 1960's, with a strong belief in and commitment to the development and goals of the Chinese revolution, it is perhaps natural that this BCAS volume now expresses some of the strongest dissatisfaction with the current developments in Chinese politics, the greatest disillusionment over the revealed excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and often, the most need to interpret current events in terms of a continued belief in egalitarian development in China. Thus, in his introduction, Bruce Cumings laments the fact that we live in a "sadder time because the results of this century's greatest revolution now sit tarnished" (p. 3), as if somehow China itself rather than the Western idealized perception of its accomplishments had changed.

This loss of illusion is perhaps nowhere more strongly expressed than in the article "The Original Chinese Revolution Remains in Power" by Edward Friedman. Once one of the greatest admirers of the development of the Chinese revolution, Friedman here acknowledges that "the facts were often close to the opposite of the claims" made by foreign "progressives" in reporting on Maoist China (p. 24). Detailing some of the many abuses of the Cultural Revolution, Friedman sounds a pessimistic note on the possibilities for democratization and deregimentation of society in China. Yet his pessimism and disillusion are far from total. Friedman clings to his belief in the original goals of the Chinese revolution and seeks here to balance his criticism by recognizing and applauding some of the very real successes made in changing state and society. He cautions the reader to avoid the pitfall of extremes. Thus, if China was not as "red" as some in the West wanted to believe, neither is it as "capitalist" as many observers today would make it out to be. For Friedman, the hope for China lies in the values of the original pre-1949 revolution, and in the masses who, he believes, continue their commitment to these values.

Victor Lippit also recognizes the failure of past policies to live up to their Western reputation. In his review of Chinese agricultural policy and performance from 1957 to 1977, Lippit finds that rural income and living standards stagnated during the entire two decade period. The cause of this failure to improve conditions in the rural areas was, according to Lippit, not the egalitarian goals of China's past rural development strategy, but rather the prematurity and inefficient implementation of the strategy. Like Friedman, Lippit sees China's new leaders as pursuing not a "capitalist road," but a new path to socialism which points toward "a balanced growth of industry in a 'civilized' countryside with the commune as its institutional core" (p. 62).

Some degree of disillusionment with the Chinese revolution as well as hope in a return to its "original" path are found in articles by Peter Van Ness and Satish Raichur, Victor Nee, James Nickum, and Peer Mollen Christensen and Jorgen Delman. With the exception of Victor Nee's "Post-Mao Changes in a South China Production Brigade," however, which attempts to avoid sweeping generalizations about the future of China and concentrates instead on drawing, based on field work and extensive refugee interviews, an interesting and detailed picture of recent changes in China's countryside, very little new light is shed on either past policies or likely future developments in China. The disagreements among the authors over the degree to which "capitalism" has taken hold seems to be a discussion that does little to illuminate the ongoing debate within the Chinese leadership on how to balance the conflicting demands of developing both industry and agriculture, or improving living standards, while maintaining a strong defense against actual and potential enemies.

This problem is one that China has faced since the 19th century. While different solutions have been attempted both before and after Mao's revolution, neither the application of the dichotomous categories of capitalism and communism, nor an emotional handwringing over the fate of China, has ever proven a useful tool of analysis.

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NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

SOVIET MIGHT

TO THE EDITORS: *Problems of Communism* is my favorite political journal, one that I highly respect and read regularly. The review of my book *Inside the Soviet Army* ("Underrating Soviet Might," *POC*, November–December 1983) has praised my efforts, and I was very pleased that it was written by Mr. James T. Reitz, whom I consider to be one of the leading experts on the Soviet Army. The review was written with a high degree of professionalism and contains both praise and criticism of my work.

Unfortunately, I cannot accept all of his praise. For example, it is an exaggeration to suggest that I am the first to write knowledgeably on such topics as the "Strategic Directions (*Napravleniya*); and the role of the Airborne Assault, Diversionary (*SPETSNAZ*), and Fortified Area troops. Everyone interested in the Soviet Army knows that the *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, on p. 327 gave a very good description of "Fortified Area Troops" before I did. When Mr. Reitz wrote his review he must surely also have had in possession *Krasnaya Zvezda* for July 9, 1983, which refers to the commander-in-chief of the North-West Strategic Direction, in discussing events 42 years earlier, i.e., in 1941. Moreover, powerful members of the CPSU Politburo—Nikita Khrushchev, Andrey Zhdanov, Nikolay Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, as well as Marshals Georgiy Zhukov, Semën Timoshenko, Matvey Zakharov, Boris Shaposhnikov, Vasiliy Sokolovskiy, and Ivan Bagramyan all have carried official titles including the words "strategic direction." In the Soviet Union there are thousands of books published about warfare, and none of them can avoid mention of these people and their titles. So why does Mr. Reitz sing my praises?

I am also puzzled by many of his critical observations, because they simply do not apply to me. On p. 83 Mr. Reitz states: "According to Suvorov, Khrushchev threw 1,200,000 officers and NCOs out of the Army" in the early 1960's. This figure may be outrageous, but it was cited by Khrushchev at a Supreme Soviet session. The Supreme Soviet did not find the statement outrageous, but instead in January 1960 passed a law reducing the Armed Forces by 1,200,000 men (*Pravda* [Moscow], Jan. 15, 1960). If Mr. Reitz considers this a bad law, then he should take to task Khrushchev and the Supreme Soviet, not me.

Mr. Reitz also takes exception (on p. 83) to the observation in my book that "The rocket brigades lay down a nuclear carpet ahead of the Tank Army" and to the implication that the tank army then proceeds to cross this territory. Yet, almost simultaneously with the publication of my book, the Soviet Ministry of Defense published a book entitled *Voyennotekhnicheskiy progress v vooruzhënnykh silakh SSSR* (Military Technical Progress in the Armed Forces of the USSR), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982, which carries the following passages in Chapter 7:

"The opponent is defeated first of all by a massive carpet of nuclear strikes followed up by rapid troop movements.... The use of nuclear weapons creates favorable conditions for the advance.... Armored troops can quickly cross contaminated areas and inflict in-depth strikes.... Motor-rifle troops move forward in their fighting vehicles following the nuclear strikes.... Airborne troops are capable of reaching more quickly than others those areas subjected to nuclear strikes and can consolidate success."

Nothing in these passages mentions the possibility of the troops' dying from radiation. Soviet regulations make no mention of this; therefore it should not be a matter of concern. However, Soviet regulations do state: "Neither blood nor even life itself can be spared in achieving total victory over the enemy" (*Ustav vnutrenney sluzhby* [Regulations of the Internal Service], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975, p. 4.) These regulations were stated to have been accepted by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 30, 1975, and thus have the force of law. Anyone who breaks the regulations out of concern for the lives of soldiers rather than for victory is a criminal and liable to severe punishment under Soviet law. Mr. Reitz knows all this and also knows that the Soviet Union became a superpower only because it was prepared to sacrifice people in numbers quite unacceptable to its adversaries. So, why does he criticize me instead of Soviet law?

Mr. Reitz also describes as "outrageous" statements in my book to the effect that Soviet soldiers are not issued sleeping bags and at times must go for days without food. But, in fact, neither ordinary soldiers nor officers are issued sleeping bags. Perhaps, Mr. Reitz could produce a photo of such a sleeping bag? As for soldiers operating without food, we have an item in *Krasnaya Zvezda* of December 31, 1983, describing activities of a Soviet company in Afghanistan. The company received provisions for three days, but operated in snow and ice for ten days. Even *Krasnaya Zvezda* was forced to use the term "hunger." Moreover, this is not an isolated case. The eminent Soviet poet Aleksandr Tvardovskiy in his poem "Vasiliy Terkin" spoke of the hungry soldier on the offensive as being "a law of war (*zakon voyny*)." Did Stalin have Tvardovskiy shot for making this statement? No. He endorsed Tvardovskiy's nomination for the Stalin Prize. I describe what I myself saw in the Soviet Army. If Mr. Reitz dislikes the picture, let him criticize Stalin, Tvardovskiy, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* and the Soviet system of supplying rations, not me.

The criticism leveled by Mr. Reitz at my description of the large-scale Soviet preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 is also

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puzzling. He seems to question whether and where such preparations occurred. How then did it come about that 600,000 soldiers, thousands of tanks, and tens of thousands of military vehicles entered a small country? In 1968 I was located in the Carpathian Military District, and I describe that which I saw in person. In addition, the Baltic and Northern Fleets were placed on a war footing and carried out large-scale exercises. There then followed exercises for all Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces as well as for Rear Services and communications troops, civil defense units, and all Strategic Rocket Troops. In June and July 1968, large-scale maneuvers were carried out in Eastern Europe on the territories of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. These came to an end on July 11, and Mr. Reitz should remember perfectly well that tensions rose in Europe owing to the slowness of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. On July 23, the USSR spoke of more high powered exercises and began mobilizing reservists and civilian transport. All this was given wide and detailed coverage in the Soviet press. British and French newspapers at my disposal (and I would assume American newspapers as well) carried reports of troop, ammunition, and fuel deployment; of the concentration of forces on the borders; and of the expansion of the network of command points, communications centers, and hospitals. How could Mr. Reitz have overlooked or forgotten all of this?

Mr. Reitz professes difficulty in reconciling the statements "Russians must not be stationed in the RSFSR, Ukrainians in Ukraine, etc." and "It is also essential to mix all the nationalities together in divisions, regiments, and battalions." Simply put, the Soviet Armed Forces attempts to pluck each leaf from its tree and then mix the leaves of different trees together in a non-native setting. Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars, etc., serve in Latvia; Latvians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars serve in Georgia; etc. I devoted three pages to explaining and diagramming how this complex personnel policy operates.

Mr. Reitz mentions the "close similarity" between my map of Soviet military districts and their headquarters and the map on p. 95 of *The Military Balance 1980–81*, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London. Yet, if he compares the latter with my book he will discover an important difference. *The Military Balance 1980–81* indicates for the Soviet Union 16 military districts (map, p. 95) and 10 air defense districts (page 10). It is my opinion that there are only *two* air defense districts, and I so indicated on a map at the very beginning (p. 4) of my book. (The map of military districts on p. 46 of my book, not surprisingly, does look like that in *The Military Balance*, because I agree with that publication's number and location of Soviet military districts.) At the time, my indication of only two air defense districts was a rather daring departure from conventional wisdom. Interestingly, the most recent edition of *The Military Balance* (for 1983–84) has reduced the number of air defense districts to five (p. 11). I was shocked that Mr. Reitz failed to notice the enormous risk I took in raising this issue. It is also a pity that he did not offer his own reasoned opinion on such a basic question of the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces.

VIKTOR SUVOROV
London

MR. REITZ RESPONDS: In reading Mr. Suvorov's correspondence regarding my review of his book *Inside the Soviet Army*, I must confess that I underestimated his mettle. In the finest tradition of his illustrious namesake, the legendary tsarist field marshal Aleksandr Suvorov, author Suvorov launches boldly into the attack, attempting to elevate my molehills to mountains while ignoring the towering range of his own often largely unsubstantiated statements treated in my review.

Rather than enter into a lengthy and continuing trans-Atlantic fire fight by answering Suvorov's countercharges point by point, I would like to comment on three or four of his observations and leave it up to the readers to draw their own conclusions.

First, on the subject of "strategic directions." I wrote that "Suvorov writes about a number of topics either never before or only murkily reported in open Western and Soviet literature. These include...the role of the 'Strategic Direction.'" Mr. Suvorov terms it "an exaggeration" to suggest that he was the first to "write knowledgeably on such topics." If the 14-line, unattributed entry on "strategic direction" (*Strategicheskoye napravleniye*) printed on page 555 of Vol. 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (*Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*) to which Mr. Suvorov refers is not murky (like hundreds, if not thousands of other entries in that 8-volume set), I do not know what is. The concept is not even identified as a Soviet concept, nor is it fixed in time. The item only indicates that a "strategic direction" is an unspecified expanse of terrain, including any contiguous water areas and the aerospace above. Several of these "directions" can be located within a "theater of military activities" (*teatr voyennykh deystviy*). A "strategic direction" will contain strategic "installations" (*ob"yekty*) and may hold or be capable of holding "strategic groupings" of armed forces (also further unidentified).

Suvorov, on the other hand, discusses strategic directions prior to and during World War II, as well as at the present time, and even in the future, for a total of more than 10 pages throughout his book. For example, we learn of the Western, Southwestern, and Far Eastern Strategic Directions as though they exist today and will in the future. (We cannot be sure that such "Directions" *do not* exist; I am just concerned that Suvorov is the *only* person writing about them in the open press as if they existed today.) We learn from Mr. Suvorov (and no one else) that each direction does or will consist of four Fronts and a Fleet, and, in two of three cases, has a "Group of Tank Armies" as well. On p. 41, he assures us that "intermediate controls between the Stavka and Fronts do exist, *but they are given no publicity*. They (sic) are designated as high commands in the strategic directions" (emphasis added). We learn on p. 42 that the high commands of strategic directions functioned during the first half of World War II, were later abolished, and then were resurrected in the case of Vasil'yevskiy's Far Eastern Strategic Direction in 1945, which was kept secret. (This is more or less confirmed in World War II memoir literature.) But "from 1953 onwards all official mention of it [the Strategic Direction] ceased."

Do "directions" exist today? Says Mr. Suvorov, "*They exist and are in operation.* They are not mentioned officially, but no particular efforts are made to conceal their existence" (emphasis added). On p. 44 we learn that the Headquarters of the Western Strategic Direction (Hq GSFG) is "hardly concealed at all," and that the others are only "lightly camouflaged."

If they are not given publicity, and are not mentioned "officially" as existing in the present or future, we in the West,

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without Mr. Suvorov's unreferenced sources, are hard put to accept the existence of such links above Front level with the same conviction as he. I also have further difficulty, given the very extreme compartmentalization of information within the USSR, in understanding how a GRU (military intelligence) officer, whose very orientation and experience would be thought to have been directed against foreign military and other establishments abroad, became so privy to such a wide range of information on the Soviet Armed Forces and other vital internal Soviet matters as Mr. Suvorov discloses.

Mr. Suvorov also took me to task for commenting that he had written possibly more knowledgeably and in greater detail about fortified area troops than anyone heretofore; and he cites a very good description of such forces in Vol. 2 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*. My concern is not with the concept of Soviet fortified areas and the troops who manned them in the period before and during World War II. These have been discussed extensively in various open Soviet Russian-language military-oriented books and journals. The rather extensive article on p. 185, Vol. 2 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* about the "Fortified Region" (*Ukreplënniy rayon*—UR) describes the increasing use of UR's in a "series of countries," including the USSR, France, Germany, and Finland, as well as by the Japanese in Manchuria. Frontages, depths, and types of fortifications, are discussed in fair detail, but they are not ascribed to the Soviets or any other country specifically. Near the end of the entry is a 10-line passage concerning the use "in the years of the Great Fatherland War" (i.e., World War II) of a number of major units, specifically for the purpose of manning "fortified regions," but there is not one—I repeat, not one—word in the entire 90-line item to indicate the existence today of either "fortified regions" or fortified area troops in the USSR, although they may very well exist (I do not have in mind here troops of coastal defense). What the encyclopedia article does say near the end is only that "previously constructed UR's are retained even now in a series of states (Greece, Turkey, and [sic] others). Their construction and use in the system of the defense cannot be ruled out in the future."

Mr. Suvorov himself says on p. 68 of his book that the current existence of Fortified Area Troops, as well as of Airborne Assault Troops, and Spetsnaz, as (sic) "Land Force" arms of service are all, in his own words, "kept secret." He then goes on to tell us that today's UR's are either "completely new" or are refurbished types from before World War II, which "withstood Japanese attacks." (The attack would have had to happen in the pre-World War II period since the Japanese were strictly on the defensive in Manchuria in August 1945.)

The article on "Fortified Region Troops" (*Voyska ukreplënnykh rayonov*) that Mr. Suvorov lists as a "very good description of such troops," all of 12 lines in length, refers to no specific time and to no country. Also, the article refers to at least four or more kinds of troops making up these forces, seemingly generically.

My problem with Suvorov insofar as UR's are concerned involves accepting his numbers of "tens of thousands" of buried tanks (i.e., at least 20,000) and "thousands of [naval] gun turrets" (i.e., at least 2,000) employed just along the Chinese border. I have trouble not with his reporting of these installations per se (although again we have no source), it is just that his gun-tube quantities boggle—and are rejected by—this old artilleryman's mind.

On a third point, about reductions in Soviet Armed Forces personnel: on p. 270 of his book, Suvorov claims that Khrushchev "threw 1,200,000 officers and NCO's" out of the army. In his subsequent letter, Suvorov states that if I think the 1960 law that ostensibly reduced the Soviet Armed Forces by 1,200,000 million *men* was a bad law, I should take it up with Khrushchev. If Khrushchev had actually thrown out "1,200,000 *officers and NCO's*" instead of merely reducing the Armed Forces by 1,200,000 *men*," I would have considered it a very good law, because it would have gone a long way toward ruining a large part of a monstrous military machine that has threatened world peace for the last four decades.

This is not the place to repeat or extend my enumeration of the countless incredible statements encountered throughout Suvorov's book. I only offer a thought for Mr. Suvorov and for his advisors, who I believe have done him a disservice. Together, they face a hard decision—whether or not he will continue to opt for sensation, at the cost of declining acceptance among serious scholars of the Soviet military scene. Personally, I consider him both knowledgeable enough in substance and quite capable enough as a writer to succeed on his own without the hyperbole and exaggeration that has tainted his otherwise interesting work to date.

JAMES T. REITZ
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THE KGB AND THE POPE

TO THE EDITORS: William Hood's review of the books by Claire Sterling and Paul Henze on the plot to kill Pope John Paul II ("Unlikely Conspiracy," March–April 1984) is disturbing for several reasons. While offering what amounts in retrospect to gratuitous praise to both authors for their diligence and competence, Hood attempts to impress his own logic on Sterling's and Henze's truly impressive research. His main argument against the thesis of both of these books is that the plot was too amateurishly conceived and executed to be a credible KGB undertaking. Hence, it really wasn't a plot at all. This surely is a peculiar approach for an old intelligence professional to take, in that it supports the popular but ridiculous image of the KGB as the domain of 20-foot-tall, super-efficient, perfectly indoctrinated spooks who always follow the rule book. Beyond its implicit acceptance of this imagery, Hood's position is disturbing for a more fundamental reason, which he seems unable to grasp: the possibility that part of the cover scheme for the plot may have been to make it seem exactly as amateurish as Hood paints it. Indeed, if so, it has had the intended effect of enticing Hood and some of his colleagues still in the intelligence business into dismissing as improbable the involvement by the KGB in the assassination attempt.

Does Hood think there was *no* conspiracy? His title implies that. His analysis is equivocal, demonstrating an astonishing naïveté. Only *bien pensants* in the West who shrink from contemplating the actual nature of the Soviet system have ever tried to pretend there was no conspiracy. As Henze shows in his final chapter, even the Kremlin declared the shooting of the Pope to be the result of a conspiracy, blaming it first on some vague combination of Turkish fascists and Islamic fundamentalists but then quickly pulling all of the strands together to claim that the United States, and specifically the CIA, had done it.

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For their part, Sterling and Henze show in great detail how Italian investigators developed good evidence of a Bulgarian-Soviet conspiracy almost from the moment they began to investigate the shooting. Judge Ilario Martella declared at the end of Mehmet Ali Agça's trial in the summer of 1981 that there was clear evidence of a conspiracy, and he recommended that the investigation be continued. Everything that has appeared publicly since then has been the result of that decision. We have only seen some of Judge Martella's findings, but it certainly would appear at this stage that Sterling and Henze drew correct conclusions from their separate investigations.

The KGB and its Bulgarian sub-contractors have never advanced their own defense beyond the lines they developed in the first few weeks after the Rome shooting. They keep up the same silly disinformation campaign, arguing that the CIA, with the White House behind it, mounted the plot. They embellish only by trying to demonstrate that Sterling organized the Red Brigades in Italy and Henze the Gray Wolves in Turkey. Presto! The accusers become the criminals! This is really back to Lenin: when you lie, tell the biggest whopper imaginable. Then someone might believe you. But who does?

Hood certainly does not believe that the CIA or the White House is behind the attempt on the Pope's life, but he serves Soviet purposes by absolving the KGB and the Bulgarians, and then vaguely throwing the blame on the Gray Wolves and the Turkish mafia. The only way to make this weak case seem tenable—which is the way Hood chooses—is to ignore one of the most important aspects of the Sterling-Henze analysis, namely the manner in which the Soviets exploited the political Right in Turkey for their own purposes of subversion and encouragement of terrorism.

Henze demonstrates beyond doubt that Agça was not a Gray Wolf, and neither Henze nor Sterling could find any organizational tie between the National Action Party (of which the Gray Wolves were the youth arm) and any of Agça's activities. Their speculation that this party was merely used as cover for Agça has been confirmed by revelations in Turkey during the past year; the circumstantial evidence they present of Bulgarian links to the Turkish mafia has been confirmed several times over, with further investigations and trials in Turkey and Italy showing the manner in which this entire coterie of Middle Eastern drug and arms smugglers was sponsored by Bulgaria for operations aimed at destabilizing the West. With all this going on—ignored for years by the press and apparently undiscovered by Western security authorities—is it any wonder that the Soviets thought they could get away with a jerry-built plot to get rid of the bothersome Polish Pope?

It is surprising that Hood finds this such a difficult concept to grasp. Perhaps the additional information that has come out since he wrote his review will help him develop more insight into KGB operations. Hood's model of an utterly logical and efficient KGB has never been valid: not 20 years ago, and not today. It is a poor frame of reference for understanding the very real schemes of subversion, disinformation, and—yes—assassination promoted by the Soviets in today's world.

S. ENDERS WIMBUSH
Oxford, England

TO THE EDITORS: William Hood in an essay-review in *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1984, rejects the Soviet and Bulgarian involvement in the plot to kill Pope John Paul II on the grounds of the unprofessional nature of the attempt. Instead, he suspects Agça of being "merely a psychopathic free-lance terrorist who stumbled into relatively innocent contact with Bulgarian intelligence, and who... decided *independently* to fulfill his earlier threat to kill the Pope" (emphasis added, p. 70).

In his review of Paul Henze's *The Plot to Kill the Pope* and Claire Sterling's *The Time of the Assassins*, Mr. Hood ignores the wealth of documentary evidence presented. A more careful reader would have known that Agça acted as part of a conspiracy. This was established beyond any reasonable doubt by Judge Severino Santiapichi in his verdict issued on September 25, 1981 (see Henze, p. 20; Sterling, p. 23).

Was the plot really below the high professional standard of the Soviet and Bulgarian intelligence services? The reviewer wonders how any intelligence could have chosen a man whose "fingerprints, a physical description, and even a psychological assessment were on file with the Turkish police and with Interpol," (p. 68) his photographs splashed across the Turkish press, his confession to having murdered a Turkish journalist televised? It does not occur to Mr. Hood that all this publicity had one purpose: to establish in advance as forcefully as possible the murderer's image as a rightwing Turkish fascist in order to divert any suspicion from the actual conspirators. As Henze points out, after the attempt, Agça's record of his rightwing affiliations was accepted without question by the entire world press. In the aftermath of the drama in St. Peter's Square, *The New York Times* headlined its story "Trail of Mehmet Ali Agça; Six Years of Neo-Fascist Ties" (May 25, 1981).

No wonder that the three Bulgarian intelligence agents were in no hurry to leave Rome and return to Sofia; they fell victim to their own success. Another suspect, Bekir Celenk, left London at the very last moment before Judge Ilario Martella issued a warrant for his arrest. A Turkish citizen, he sought and was granted refuge and protection in Bulgaria. Why should the Bulgarians have refused to extradite Agça's suspected accomplice if they had nothing to do with the plot as Mr. Hood believes?

Was the attempt so amateurish? Suppose that the two bombs held by Oral Celik, identified as the second gunman in St. Peter's Square, did explode and cause panic as planned, and that Agça escaped. Or that he did not confess and incriminate the Bulgarians. In all probability, the Bulgarian connection would have remained unknown forever. All the details meticulously gathered by both authors indicate a carefully planned and highly professional operation that miscarried only because of some unforeseen developments.

Mr. Hood's contention that the Soviets have never engaged in the murder of prominent foreign leaders (p. 69) also remains open to question. Polish Prime Minister and Commander-In-Chief, General Władysław Sikorski, was killed in a mysterious airplane crash in Gibraltar in 1943 at the time when Kim Philby was in charge of the airport's security. Henze writes about this extensively (pp. 111 and 112), but the reviewer chose to ignore the entire in-depth analysis of the vast background which includes the Turkish, Polish, Bulgarian, as well as Soviet aspects of the plot to kill the Pope.

JAN NOWAK
Annandale, VA

MR. HOOD RESPONDS: It has been my observation, and pos-

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sibly that of Mr. Nowak, that even intelligence men with the same experience and professional background occasionally differ in their analysis of a secret operation even though they have access to the identical files and data. It is therefore not surprising to find persons with rather different experience disagreeing on the basis of press reports.

Mr. Nowak asks if it is not possible that the Bulgarians selected Agça as an assassin because his open association with rightwing Turkish groups would deflect suspicion from the true authors of the murder. This is a valid point. But it remains difficult to square this attempted camouflage with the open manner in which Agça alleges the Bulgarians dealt with him in Rome.

If Agça had not confessed, Mr. Nowak states, "in all probability, the Bulgarian connection would have remained unknown forever." This would be true only as long as all of the *many* participants cited by Agça also remained silent and as long as there were no leaks or defections from within the Bulgarian or Soviet camps. Aside from these not entirely negligible possibilities, I find it difficult to believe that any competent intelligence service would assume that any young man would contemplate a lifetime in prison without, sooner or later, striking back at those he might come to hold responsible for his plight.

Mr. Nowak's experience in the Polish resistance may well confirm the axiom that secret operations cannot safely be run on the assumption that a captured operative will remain forever mute. It is to guard against the possibility of a captured agent telling what he knows—because of torture, a change of heart, or simple self-interest—that security practices common to all intelligence services have come into existence. *On form,* high-risk agents do not sport about in hotels run by their sponsors; they are not invited to tea in their case officer's apartment; they are not driven to the scene of an assassination by two case officers whom they know and in an automobile that could easily be traced. Such agents are handled at arm's length, rigidly compartmented from other activists, and their knowledge of their sponsor's facilities and personnel is held to the essential minimum.

Mr. Nowak suggests that if "the two bombs held by Oral Celik, identified as the second gunman in St. Peter's Square, did explode and cause panic as planned ... ," Agça might have escaped. This is of course a reasonable possibility. But what evidence is there that there were two bombs, and that Oral Celik was to detonate them? Do we have independent proof of this, or is it another of Agça's stories, and like so many of the others, subject to future editing by the author? Why is it that Celik was allegedly issued a pistol and two bombs, while Agça had to make do with only a pistol? If Agça had been issued the same equipment allegedly given to his brother in arms, Agça might have been able to make his own way out of St. Peter's Square.

The mysterious death of General Sikorski is indeed pertinent to any discussion of KGB activity. Moreover, it brings Jan Masaryk's "suicide" (in Prague, March 1948) to mind. As far as I know, nothing has been proved in either case, but if murder was involved, the tactics in the Sikorski affair—like those used by the "umbrella man" in the assassination of Bulgarian émigré Georgi Markov—was surely a measure better than those involved in the events in Rome.

I do not know who was behind Agça in his attempt to kill the Pope. But, as stated in my review of the books by Claire Sterling and Paul Henze, the events disclosed by the authors' research into the crime did not convince me that it was an operation conducted from start to finish by a secret intelligence service. Until more evidence comes forth, and independent confirmation of Agça's allegations is published, I see no need for a rush to judgment.

Mr. Wimbush's notion of a double bluff—wherein an intelligence service deliberately commits a series of blunders so obvious that the dimwitted opposition will ignore the trail leading straight back to the perpetrators—is such a recondite contribution to counterintelligence that it is best evaluated by those with a better grasp of the subject than Mr. Wimbush attributes to me.

WILLIAM HOOD
New York, NY

MORE ID IDENTS

TO THE EDITORS: Since publication of my supplement "Leaders of Sectors and Desks" to Robert Kitrinos's article "International Department of the CPSU" in the September-October 1984 issue, I have come across several significant new identifications and/or additional information.

1. Yevgeniy Korendyasov was noted in *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1984, as dealing with Senegal—in addition to Mali and the Congo. He may therefore be responsible for all of Francophone Africa.

2. Vladimir Travkin appears to have supplanted Konstantin Kurin as the ID's Mexican Desk man. See *Asi Es* (Mexico City), June 1, 1984.

3. Vladimir Ulasevich appears to be the ID's Canadian Desk man. See *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), Aug. 10, 1983.

4. Viktor Krasnykh appears to by the ID's Portuguese Desk man. See ibid., Oct. 10, 1980. Actually Vladimir Pertsov had never been specifically noted in that capacity, and his connection with Portugal had only been inferred from his known connection with Spain.

5. Sergey Semivolos has been identified as responsible for Grenada and presumably the whole English-speaking Caribbean region within the USA/Canada sector. See an undated document of the Moscow Embassy in Grenada, "Year of Political and Academic Education," from the US Archives collection of Grenada documents.

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